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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The dissertation investigates whether liberal conceptions of autonomy are 
relevant to higher education in African. And if they are relevant, the dissertation 
further examines the extent to which liberal conceptions of autonomy can 
enhance governance arrangements of the higher education system. The focus of 
the research is on governance arrangements. It proceeds by exploring selected 
cases of African universities in order to show that these universities function 
autonomously along a continuum of less autonomous to more autonomous (or 
substantively autonomous) systems, and argues that universities with the least 
autonomy can be said to function as less liberal institutions and those with more 
autonomy function as liberal universities.  
Different philosophical conceptions of autonomy are examined (in Chapter 4) to 
foreground what may be considered as constitutive meanings or marks of liberal 
autonomy. The constituent elements include freedom, rationality and objectivity, 
authenticity and identity, responsibility, critical thinking, and the enhancement of 
a vibrant critical community. This discussion has considered autonomy from a 
specific historical context of conceptual theorisation. In view of this, autonomy 
can be considered as more liberal and / or less liberal depending on the 
characteristics of the constituent elements. A continuum exists in conceptions of 
autonomy. This dissertation argues for a liberal communitarian position of 
autonomy where the “encumbered self” is acknowledged together with its life 
circumstances (Callan, 1997; Sandel, 1984). The recognition of the situatedness 
of being further sustains the concept of a deliberative process of engagement and 
promotes the public good.  
The dissertation has also examined the development of higher education in 
Germany, England and the United States in order to understand how conceptions 
of autonomy in each of these systems have developed against the background of 
the particular societies at the different historical moments. For instance, 
Wittrock‟s (1993) account of the universities in Western Europe, England and 
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America acknowledges that as much as universities are situational; that 
universities are neither disembodied nor mindless in terms of how they frame 
their missions, yet again the same universities represent a particular function and 
identity as reflective spaces in different societies across generations. This 
discussion has further looked at university autonomy through the symbolisms of 
the University of Reason, the University of Culture, and the University of 
Excellence (Readings, 1996).  
Chapter Five has argued that neoliberalism and globalisation can make university 
governance less autonomous. Despite that neoliberalism and globalisation have 
been ushered in to make the university space the most dynamic in research and 
technology, such an approach has ushered in a competition-concentrated model 
of higher education in Europe and America (Scott, 2006: 129-130). While 
acknowledging that “ economic and technological forces have impacted on the 
university, undermining some of its modernist assumptions based on the idea of 
autonomy and underpinned by academic self-governance”, Delanty (2004: 248-
249) considers these shifts and forces as multidirectional and not uni-linear in the 
sense of one replacing another. The dissertation argues that the African higher 
education system has similarly been affected by globalisation and neo-liberalism. 
Despite their being founded on notions of freedom, globalisation and 
neoliberalism undermine the practice and governance of higher education on the 
African continent. This dissertation argues that the function of universities is not 
just to focus on its economic extension but also and more importantly its civic 
role, and proposes that higher education in Africa can fulfil its civic role by the 
creation of a cosmopolitan citizen. In this way, the African university has a real 
chance to widen its autonomy. In conclusion, the implications of this envisaged 
civic role of the university on academic freedom and institutional autonomy are 
also examined.  
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OPSOMMING 
 
 
Diè tesis ondersoek of liberale kosepsies van outonomie relevant is vir hoër 
onderwys in Afrika en in gevalle waar dit wel die geval is die mate waartoe 
diesulke konsepsies beheermaatreëls van die hoër onderwyssisteem bevorder. 
Die fokus van die ondersoek is gerig op beheermaatreëls. Die ondersoek gaan 
voort en ondersoek „n geselekteerde aantal gevalle van Afrika universiteite om 
aan te toon dat diè universiteite outonoom funksioneer op „n kontinuum van 
minder outonome tot meer outonome stelsels en argumenteer dat universiteite 
met die minste outonomie as minder liberale instellings en die met meer 
outonomie as liberale instellings beskou kan word. 
Verskillende filosofiese konsepsies van outonomie word verken (in hoofstuk 4) 
om die wesenlike betekenis of kenmerke van liberale outonomie te belig. Die 
wesenselemente van outonomie wat so aan die lig gekom het sluit in die van 
vryheid, rasionaliteit en objektiwiteit, outentiekheid en identiteit, 
verantwoordelikheid, kritiese denke en die bevordering van „n dinamiese en 
kritiese gemeenskap terwyl begrip van outonomie voortspruit uit „n spesifieke 
historiese konteks van teoretisering van die konsepsies. Outonomie kan in die lig 
hiervan beskou word as meer liberaal en/of minder liberaal na gelang van die 
aard van die wesenskenmerke aanwesig; en die wyse waarop die kenmerke 
gemanifesteer word – „n kontinuum bestaan dus in die konsepsie van outonomie. 
In die tesis word geargumenteer vir „n liberale gemeenskapsposisie van 
outonomie waar die belemmerde self tesame met sy/haar lewensomstandighede 
erken word (Callan, 1997; Sandel, 1984). Die erkenning van die gesitueerdheid 
van bestaan handhaaf verder die konsep van „n raadplegende proses van 
interaksie en bevorder openbare welstand. 
Die tesis ondersoek verder die ontwikkeling van hoër onderwys in Duitsland, 
Engeland en die VSA om te verstaan hoe konsepsies van outonomie in elke 
sisteem ontwikkel het teen die agtergrond van die spesifieke gemeenskap op 
verskillende historiese momente. Wittrock (1993) se weergawe van die 
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universiteite in Wes Europa, Engeland en Amerika erken byvoorbeeld dat 
hoewel universiteite gesitueerd is universiteite nie disembodied of mindless is in 
terme van hoe hulle hul missies vorm hulle tog spesifieke funksie en identiteit as 
reflektiewe ruimtes in verskillende gemeenskappe oor generasies heen 
vreteenwoordig. Die ondersoek het verder na universiteteit outonomie ondersoek 
aan die hand van die simbolisme van die Universsiteit van die Rede, die 
Universiteit van Kultuur en die Universiteit van Uitnemendheid (Readings, 1996)   
In Hoofstuk 5 word geargumenteer dat neoliberalisme en globalisasie 
universiteitsbeheer minder outonoom kan maak. Afgesien daarvan dat 
neoliberalisme en globalisasie infaseer is om die universiteitsruimte die mees 
dinamiese in navorsing en tegnologie het sodanige benadering „n kompetisie-
gesentreerde model van hoëronderwys in Europa en Amerika ingelei (Scott, 
2006: 129-130). Delanty voer in die verband aan dat alhoewel ekonomiese en 
tegnologiese magte op universiteite geimpakteer en sekere van sy modernistiese 
aannames gebaseer op die idée van outonomie en onderle deur akademiese 
selfbeheer beskou hy hierdie verskuiwings en kragte as multirigting en nie 
uniliniêr in die sin dat een die ander vervang. Daar word voorts geargument dat 
ook die hoëronderwyssisteem in Afrika op dieselfde wyse geaffekteer is deur 
globalisasie en neo-liberalisme. Ten spyte daarvan dat dit gevestig is op idees 
van vryheid ondermyn globalisasie en neo-liberalisme die beoefening en beheer 
van hoer onderwys op die Afrikaanse vasteland. Daar word voorts 
geargumenteer dat die funksie van universiteite nie net is om te fokus op 
ekonomiese uitbreiding nie maar ook, en belangriker, op haar burgerlike rol. Ten 
slotte word geargumenteer dat hoër onderwys haar burgerlike rol kan vervul deur 
die skepping van „n kosmopolitiese burger. Op die wyse het die Afrika 
universiteit „n ware geleentheid om haar outonomie te verbreed. Ook die 
implikasies van die gevisialuseerdere burgerlike rol van die universiteit op 
akademiese vryheid en institusionele outonomie word onder die soeklig geplaas .                       
 
 
 
 
 
 vii 
DEDICATION 
To my family, for enduring my continuous pursuit of knowledge.  
 
 viii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
For the finality of this work, I pay tribute to all great philosophers, some of 
whom will soon become my contemporaries, who have contributed to the 
shaping of my philosophical ideas. This list is too long to find space on this page. 
However, there are special minds to whom particular thanks are due: 
To Professor Yusef Waghid, Dean of Education and Professor in Philosophy of 
Education at Stellenbosch University, for his unconditional financial support 
towards my studies. Even in those moments of my despair, he did not lose faith 
that I could make it.  May this dissertation be a special honour to him for his 
innovative philosophical guidance throughout the production of this dissertation. 
He has continued to be a great source of inspiration and support; and he has 
availed to me all the chances of study, research and professional publication one 
can possibly dream of in higher education at this stage. 
To Chancellor College, University of Malawi, for allowing and supporting me to 
delve into this area of study against all odds. 
To Priscilla, Shalom and Chikondi for accepting to live with a part-time husband 
and father respectively, during my long pursuit for knowledge. 
To my mum, sisters, brothers and my extended families for living with my long 
spells of absence, physical and otherwise. 
For my life, health and prosperity, May my God be praised. 
 ix 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
DECLARATION ...................................................................................................... ii 
ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................. iii 
OPSOMMING .......................................................................................................... v 
DEDICATION ........................................................................................................ vii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................. viii 
 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION: ORIENTATION OF RESEARCH ................ 1 
1.1 Governance and power in higher education .................................................... 3 
1.2 Possible avenues for understanding university autonomy in governance 
structures .......................................................................................................... 9 
1.2.1 The state control model of university governance ..............................................10 
1.2.2  The supervision model of university governance ...............................................11 
1.2.3 The state intervention model of university governance ......................................12 
1.3 Institutional autonomy and academic freedom .............................................. 14 
1.4 The quest for a liberal conception of autonomy: a snapshot ......................... 18 
1.5 Methodological considerations – Philosophical analysis .............................. 24 
1.5.1  Some methodological conclusions ............................................................... 31 
1.6 The structure of the dissertation .................................................................... 32 
 
CHAPTER 2  GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS IN AFRICA’S 
HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEMS ..................................................................... 35 
2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 35 
2.2 The story of higher education in Africa: the pre-colonial beginnings ........... 36 
2.2.1 The pre-colonial formal higher education systems in Africa .............................37 
2.3 The connection between higher education and national development in the 
first African independent states ..................................................................... 40 
 x 
2.4 The African university in the post-independence period............................... 41 
2.5 Higher education governance systems in nine African countries: a 
contemporary picture ..................................................................................... 42 
2.5.1 Higher education governance in Egypt...............................................................43 
2.5.2 Higher education in Nigeria ...............................................................................46 
2.5.3 Higher education in Ghana .................................................................................50 
2.5.4 A comparison between the Kenyan higher education system and higher 
education in Zimbabwe ......................................................................................54 
2.5.5 Higher education in Uganda ...............................................................................56 
2.5.6 The university system in Malawi ........................................................................59 
2.5.7 Higher education in Namibia ..............................................................................61 
2.5.8 Major trends in higher education governance arrangements in South Africa ....63 
2.6 General characteristics of higher education governance patterns on the 
African continent ........................................................................................... 71 
2.6.1 The legacy of colonialism ...................................................................................72 
2.6.2 The influence of a globalised market economy ..................................................73 
2.6.3 Governance of higher education systems and the state ......................................77 
2.7 Predominant patterns in African higher education governance systems: 
concluding reflections.................................................................................... 80 
 
CHAPTER 3 THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF UNIVERSITY 
AUTONOMY .......................................................................................................... 85 
3.1 Introductory remarks ..................................................................................... 85 
3.2 The philosophical-historical development of the concepts of academic 
freedom and institutional autonomy in universities ...................................... 85 
3.3 Transformations of the modern university and its influence on conceptions of 
autonomy: a focus on German, British and American higher education 
systems .......................................................................................................... 89 
3.3.1 Understanding the changing nature of the identity of the (Western) university 
through Bill Readings‟ symbolism. ..................................................................104 
3.4 Reconsidering university autonomy through traditions of reason ............... 112 
3.4.1 Can higher education exist without being autonomous? ..................................113 
 xi 
3.4.2 A postmodernist perspective on the relationship between autonomy and 
education and its influence on academic freedom in Africa .............................115 
3.5  Concluding remarks .................................................................................... 118 
 
CHAPTER 4 CONCEPTIONS OF AUTONOMY ............................................ 122 
4.1 Introductory remarks ................................................................................... 122 
4.2 The liberty of the ancients ........................................................................... 123 
4.3 The idea of liberty in the modern period ..................................................... 128 
4.4 Liberalism and the competing conceptions of liberty ................................. 133 
4.4.1 Positive and negative concepts of liberty .........................................................134 
4.4.2 Varieties of liberalism and their implications for educational autonomy .........137 
4.4.3 Political and comprehensive liberalism ............................................................144 
4.5 Constitutive features of liberal autonomy ................................................... 148 
4.5.1 Rationality and objectivity ................................................................................148 
4.5.2 Freedom and/or free will ..................................................................................149 
4.5.3 Critical thinking ................................................................................................150 
4.5.4 Authenticity/identity .........................................................................................151 
4.5.5 Responsibility ...................................................................................................152 
4.5.6 Community:  unencumbered freedom versus situated autonomy – in defence of 
comprehensive liberal autonomy and/or liberal communitarian autonomy .....153 
4.5.7 Liberal autonomy and the good ........................................................................157 
4.5.8 Reframing higher education autonomy within a democratic deliberative 
discourse ...........................................................................................................160 
4.6 Concluding remarks ..................................................................................... 169 
 
CHAPTER 5 GLOBALISATION, NEO-LIBERALISM AND HIGHER 
EDUCATION ........................................................................................................ 172 
5.1   Introduction ............................................................................................... 172 
5.2  Conceptualising globalisation and neo-liberalism and how they may affect 
higher education operations ......................................................................... 175 
5.3  The relationship between information systems and globalisation .............. 189 
5.4  Africa‟s trajectory in the new global economy .......................................... 191 
 xii 
5.5  The impact of neo-liberalism and globalisation on higher education in Africa
193 
5.6  Concluding reflections ................................................................................ 199 
 
CHAPTER 6 COSMOPOLITAN CITIZENSHIP AND THE ROLE OF 
HIGHER EDUCATION IN AFRICA ................................................................. 203 
6.1  Introductory remarks: understanding cosmopolitan norms ........................ 203 
6.2  How do cosmopolitan norms arise?............................................................ 206 
6.3  The role of cosmopolitan norms in enhancing higher education systems to 
promote social justice .................................................................................. 211 
6.3.1 The feasibility and role of cosmopolitan norms in enhancing higher education 
systems on the African continent ......................................................................223 
6.3.2 The centrality of hospitality and respect and an exclusion of love and care as 
cosmopolitan values .........................................................................................230 
6.4   Concluding remarks ................................................................................... 233 
 
CHAPTER 7 THE CIVIC ROLE OF UNIVERSITIES: SOME 
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS ....................................................................... 237 
7.1   The civic role of African universities ......................................................... 237 
7.2  A synopsis of the project, its foundations and the researcher‟s position .... 239 
7.3  Some limitations of this study .................................................................... 248 
 
LIST OF SOURCES ............................................................................................. 250 
 1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: ORIENTATION OF RESEARCH 
This research investigates whether a liberal conception of autonomy is relevant 
to governance arrangements in the higher education systems on the African 
continent and the extent to which liberal conceptions of autonomy can enhance 
governance arrangements of the higher education system. In response to these 
questions I argue that liberal conceptions of autonomy are relevant because the 
constituent elements of liberal autonomy can assist in the smooth operations of 
the university in Africa. In particular, I argue for a liberal communitarian 
position of autonomy. Liberalism is a philosophy that is founded on the 
importance of individual rights and freedoms in governance as the best way of 
promoting the individual person as well as managing public policy. A fuller 
discussion of liberalism is given later in Section 1.4 and Chapter 4. The position 
that I argue for in this dissertation is rooted in a liberal acceptance of the 
principles of liberal equality and pluralism as well as an acceptance of the social 
imbeddedness of human beings. The debate further locates the broadening of 
liberal conceptions as the major source for notions of globalisation and neo-
liberalism. Despite the fact that these notions are founded on liberal notions of 
autonomy, I further argue that the influence of globalisations and neo-liberalism 
on African higher education systems has made these systems less autonomous. In 
order to make higher education governance more autonomous, I propose the 
adoption and enhancement of cosmopolitan norms and values within African 
higher education systems for making universities more autonomous and letting 
them contribute towards a democratic civic role in societies. In this thesis, 
“cosmopolitanism” will be used to mean a philosophical position that prioritises 
the belief that people are essentially connected to each other because they share 
the same “nature” – humanness. This form of cosmopolitanism also believes that 
our belonging is secondary to our common nature as people. The cosmopolitan 
perspective further advocates that as moral agents, people ought to be aware of 
the consequences of their actions towards each other, and that this requires our 
conversations to take account of the importance of forgiveness and friendship 
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(Benhabib, 2006: 19; Waghid, 2005: 331). I will elaborate on these views later in 
Chapter 6.    
This dissertation sets out to answer its main questions by first deconstructing the 
meanings and relationships between the concepts of governance, power and 
autonomy in the higher education sector in general. This is done in order to 
locate the place and function of autonomy in the higher education system. In this 
dissertation, “governance” will be used to designate decisions that define 
expectations, grant power or even verify performance. The traditional meaning of 
steering will be employed to check how the exercise of political power and the 
use of institutional resources are made use to the general benefit of the public. In 
other words, the conceptual framework of governance in this dissertation will 
lean on processes more than statutes or institutional structures. Within the 
matrices of “governance”, questions of autonomy will arise. While noting the 
variations that exist in defining “autonomy” within philosophy, this dissertation 
will argue for a conceptual reposition of autonomy to mean the capacity of 
rational individuals to make informed, uncoerced decisions without, at the same 
time and in the same regard, abrogating their obligations and responsibility to 
other people (including future generations) as well as the particular conditions of 
society at a given time. I argue that only when the particular conditions of life are 
taken into systematic controversy within the processes of making informed 
choices, will such “autonomous” living refer to true self-governance.  
A purposive sample of higher education governance systems on the African 
continent will be looked at in order to uncover underlying conceptions of 
academic freedom and university autonomy as manifested within the governance 
systems. The purposive sample on higher education systems in Africa is provided 
as way of gauging whether liberal autonomy is relevant or not. The notion of 
“relevance” will be employed in this dissertation to test how pertinent or 
applicable are the governing structures given the historical, political, economic 
and socio-cultural position of higher education systems on the African continent. 
The location of the research question along the lines of relevance assumes that 
higher education has a particular end towards which it should be striving. Later 
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in the dissertation I argue for a vision of higher education practice that prepares 
students to meet the global challenges. Among the global challenges I further 
argue that the cultivation of cosmopolitan values and norms is best suited for 
advancing this cause while at the same time mitigating the negative impact of 
globalisation and neo-liberalism on higher education systems in Africa. Given 
this orientation, the size of the sample will not be considered as a major issue of 
focus in this dissertation. What will be of value in the sample are the general 
characteristics of governance that reveal the forms of autonomy prevailing in 
these systems or not.  
I now put forward an argument as to why forms of governance systems are viable 
avenues for assessing forms of autonomy in higher education institutions. This 
discussion will enable me to introduce debates around issues of autonomy and 
the context of higher education in Africa.  
1.1 Governance and power in higher education 
My understanding of governance and power in higher education systems will be 
linked to governance of public institutions since public higher education 
institutions on the African continent are the primary focus of this study. 
Governance of higher education systems will be taken to mean the way higher 
education systems and institutions are managed and organised (Neave, 2006: 4). 
In many cases, the management and organisation of higher education refers to a 
multitude of things, including the way the power and/or authority structures are 
organised. Such arrangements may have to deal with questions about who reports 
to whom, who does what, and many other things. To many people, this kind of 
arrangement is usually understood to be constituted within the acts of an 
institution promulgated by their respective parliaments and constitutions.  
As opposed to constitutional meanings of management and organisational 
arrangements in higher education systems, I argue that „management‟ and 
„organisation‟ need to go beyond the frames of constituted acts to include life-
forms and the various ways in which people manage emerging problems in their 
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lives. In this regard, governance arrangements also include how the different 
players live out and execute their duties, obligations and responsibilities as well 
as the perceived state of affairs in the higher education system itself. Hence 
Neave (2006: 4) also argues that governance in higher education systems refers 
to the dynamics in the balance of power and the mode of coordination between 
key players and local university authorities. 
The idea that the management and organisation of higher education systems is 
linked to „balance of power‟, „coordination‟ and „authority‟, as Neave has 
indicated above, is intriguing for the purposes of this work. In the first place, the 
idea of balance of power tells a story about the nature of higher education 
systems and their environments. Since this discourse is mainly concentrated on 
public higher education, the idea of balance of power will be understood in this 
context to refer to different levels of the structural organisation of higher 
education institutions and systems in relation to public interest. For instance, it 
may refer to the level and extent to which councils exert their influence on other 
bodies in the institutional structures of the university such as the senate, deans 
and faculty committees and other college committees and how such influence 
and acts relate to the interests of the other players and the system as a whole. 
Balance of power can also relate to how other players in the management of 
higher education systems perceive their roles in relation to the functions and 
authority of those in leadership positions in the university. As such, governance 
will naturally relate to a myriad of issues in higher education systems.  
Naturally, the organisational structure of higher education systems worldwide is 
understood to be a vertical ladder of increasing authority and command as one 
moves up. A properly managed system of higher education is one in which the 
relations between the different stages of authority are smooth and converse with 
each other. In other words, a properly managed system is one in which there is 
coordination between the various authority structures and their subordinates.  
Ajayi, Goma and Johnson (1996: 176), quoting Saint, state that university 
governance refers to the “mechanisms whereby an institution incorporates the 
participation of relevant interest groups in defining the scope and content of its 
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work – including the capacity to mediate among these interests when they enter 
into conflict – and the means whereby it demonstrates accountability to those 
who support it through its mission, mandate and application of its resources in 
the pursuit of these goals”. In other words, governance in the higher education 
system refers to the way role players execute their functions. In many cases the 
governance of universities is legally provided for in their acts and statutes, as 
Ajayi et al. (1996) also agree.   
While noting other considerations, like the one above, on what university 
governance implies, I further argue that the governance of higher education 
systems means far more than constitutional arrangements in university Acts, 
funding modalities and other structural arrangements. Although the way in which 
structures are laid out is foundationally important, university governance 
includes how such university structures play themselves out in real-time cases, 
the various roles and the different understandings that people playing the roles 
have and the nature of the relationship between the higher education system and 
other systems in the nation. This understanding of higher education governance 
assumes a people-driven understanding of higher education systems in which the 
relationships between key players and other agents in the system directly reflect 
how people acting or involved in the university system want to be understood by 
others. It is at these moments and many others that I will later make the case for 
the infusion of cosmopolitan values and norms into the governing systems of 
higher education on the Africa continent.  
For example, higher education systems have historically promoted different 
social, economic and even political thought patterns that eventually became 
dominant in societies. In this regard, higher education systems can be equated to 
opinion setters and leaders. But such a role of higher education also reveals that 
the promotion of a particular way of approaching social and political issues by its 
very nature indirectly reveals how the higher education system would want the 
outside world to understand it. Nevertheless, this particular way of looking at 
things, or perspective, is done corporately by the individual persons, 
organisations or centres within the system. In other words, the corporate identity 
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and nature of any university is found in the actions and decisions of its different 
operating subjects or agents. 
Furthermore, I take note that funding modalities in higher education systems say 
more than the availability of funds to higher education. Funding modalities in 
many African states are indicators of the social and political dimensions higher 
education systems operate in. A majority of higher education systems on the 
African continent happen to be state sponsored. This point is discussed later in 
this work. Hence, it suffices to mention that the different mechanisms put in 
place by governments as a condition of their sponsorship and monthly financial 
monitoring of expenditure before any new funds can be released to the university 
tend to be perceived as examples of state control in the governance arrangements 
of the higher education systems. Nevertheless, I acknowledge that in the 
financial world, such mechanisms are in place for the sake of financial 
accountability rather than control. 
Whether one opts to look at funding, management or selection of students and 
appointment of lecturers, it is a common phenomenon to conclude that the 
governance arrangements and management systems of higher education are a 
source of protracted debates. One may wonder what really is at stake in higher 
education systems so as to attract such concern about how its systems are 
arranged. I think that it is clear from this that higher education has traditionally 
been considered a „powerhouse‟. Various characteristics of the notion of „power‟ 
are manifested within the operations of the higher education system itself. But 
such power can also be played out in the relationship between the higher 
education system and the larger society.  
I now move on to argue that the concept of power in relation to higher education 
governance can be understood from two perspectives. On the one hand, the idea 
that higher education is involved in the production and dissemination of new 
knowledge creates a sense of power within the institutions because “knowledge 
is power”. The concept of knowledge as power can be understood in relation to 
the empowerment of individuals who have gone through higher education in any 
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society. In other words, a person who undergoes higher education and training 
fundamentally becomes a transformed person in the sense that one‟s capabilities 
become enhanced. Secondly and linked to the first idea is the idea that higher 
education systems in their processes and outcomes have the potential to shift 
power relations in society. The potential to shift power relations is higher on 
many students coming from underprivileged families in Africa, once they have 
managed to go through the higher education system. In other words, through the 
activities of teaching and research, higher education systems have enabled 
individuals, qualified through their systems, to assume higher social and 
economic positions in their societies than they otherwise would have occupied 
without such an education. In this regard, I argue that there are insignificant 
cases of individuals who are worse off after finishing their university education, 
compared to their original status at entering the university, than those individuals 
who finally emerge in improved or better-off positions. In other words, more 
people are better off after attaining higher education. In this regard, I further 
postulate that the worsening of one‟s position after successfully finishing higher 
education may be a factor not directly arising from one‟s higher educational 
status. These points of strength in individuals that come as a result of higher 
education consolidate the idea that knowledge is power, hence universities and 
their management systems become contested power domains. I also acknowledge 
that the power that one gets after going through higher education may in many 
ways also be seen as entrenching the existing power relations in many societies.  
This explains why there is a general understanding that higher education has 
within itself the power to deliver certain desirable goods either to the persons 
who are engaged with it or to society in general. In other words, higher education 
systems are considered to have an inherent capacity to affect the social, 
economic and political landscape of a nation. As such, questions regarding how 
such higher education systems are governed do not only remain knowledge 
issues but they also acquire a vital economic and political force within and 
between different societies.  
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In consideration of all that is at stake in higher education systems, the 
management and organisation of the system has become a heavily contested 
terrain. The contestation in the governance of higher education systems can be 
considered from a multitude of angles or sides. It can be considered from the 
point of where the higher education system obtains its power, who exercises 
control in the system, for what purpose and to whose benefit. This kind of 
questioning and the answers it delivers may escape the ordinary terrain of 
answers. Fundamentally, such questioning goes to the heart of what a higher 
education system is or is not. The questioning touches upon such things as what 
the higher education system is free to do or not do, what its players within the 
system can/should do or not do and the kind of leverage the higher education 
system has in playing itself out in relation to the other systems and/or goals in the 
larger society. In view of the nature of these questions, I argue that debates about 
the governance of higher education systems on the African continent 
fundamentally reveal the conception people have or want to have of the 
university in relation to society in general. Such conceptions can touch on the 
identity of the university, its autonomy and other things.  
Ajayi et al. (1996: 176–177) continue to argue that what distinguishes the 
university institution from other institutions is “its relatively fragmented 
organisational structure, the diffusion of decision-making power among its many 
semi-autonomous units, and the substantial authority and initiative vested in 
individual academics, especially the professoriate (and deans)”. If organisational 
structures, decision-making powers and the agency of individuals are some of the 
marks of such contestation, one can fairly conclude that the contestation about 
the management and organisation of higher education systems is in fact a 
contestation over the autonomy of higher education systems themselves. 
 If the above concluding statement is valid and true, glimpses into university 
autonomy reveal that issues of autonomy, although they become elements of 
constituted acts, cannot be observed outside the governing structures in place and 
forms of institutional culture. In this regard, I proceed to claim that it is through 
an analysis of governance structures and power systems that one comes to know 
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the nature of the autonomy a particular higher education system exercises. In 
other words, autonomy per se is an element that one cannot set out to observe in 
the operations of a higher education system. What is at stake are concrete 
arrangements of operations. It is through these governing arrangements and their 
objectives that one can only derive a sense of the autonomy enshrined or not in 
the whole system.  
1.2 Possible avenues for understanding university autonomy in governance 
structures 
In this subsection I draw on works that have discussed the relationship between 
government and higher education in order to understand possible positions of 
autonomy in higher education systems. One caution I need to consider is that 
such a usage only matters from the point of view of taking considerable interest 
in public higher education systems. I also note that although governments on the 
African continent continually want to know the nature of their private higher 
education systems, such interests are considered only from the point of knowing 
how such systems assist in developing the citizens, ordinarily vested in the 
government. In this regard, governments have not shown interest in the intricate 
operations of private higher education systems except for their contribution to the 
desired national good. On the other hand, public higher education systems are 
considered differently because in many ways governments want to see these 
systems stand as direct agents for serving government interest in meeting its 
public interest. Similarly, the government, which is the legal custodian of public 
interest, is inevitably considered as a key partner in the running of the public 
higher education systems. 
The governance of public higher education systems makes certain assumptions 
about the desirable place of the state in relation to the public higher institution 
(Neave, 2006; Omar & Figaji, 2000). In general, the position of the state in the 
governance of the higher education system tends to vary between three 
ideological positions. These ideological positions can also be considered as 
models of governance (Omar & Figaji, 2000: 80). According to Omar and Figaji 
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(2000: 81) the three models are state control, state interference and state 
supervision. Nevertheless I am not going to provide a detailed analysis of the 
motives behind each state inclination in relation to higher education except for 
what each means in terms of higher education governance. In the following 
paragraphs I explore what each model means. 
1.2.1 The state control model of university governance 
The state control model concentrates on the control of the higher education 
system by the state and as a consequence considers the efficient management of 
the same of less importance. In this model, the state determines the activities of 
the academy with regard to allocation of funds, appointment of professors, 
student selection models and many more. Such an approach to higher education 
systems is based on an understanding that the higher education system is created 
and completely funded by the state and should be controlled/determined by the 
state. According to this view, the state may achieve this control through either 
political or bureaucratic means. State control can be manifested through various 
university processes such as determining the conditions and modes for selection 
into the university and controlling the actual process of selection, controlling 
who may hold high posts in the university system and demoting personnel who 
are perceived to be anti-government and controlling funding mechanisms such as 
determining the limit of tuition fees universities can charge students, as indicated 
above.  
One can also add that in some instances state control has manifested itself in the 
university system through monitoring mechanisms to the extent of instilling in 
individuals the perception that even internal activities are monitored by state 
agents. In this case the state and its agents assume the role of „Big Brother‟. State 
control as a model would include all monitoring activities that the state institutes 
over the university and its personnel going beyond the frames of co-operative 
action. Such cases of state monitoring of the higher education system can include 
the monitoring of staff and student political behaviour for the state‟s own 
political advantage. In other words, the rationale that states may have for the 
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control of higher education systems in this model are far from advancing the 
ends of knowledge in the concerned communities, but more for its own political 
survival.  
1.2.2  The supervision model of university governance 
In the state supervision model, the state provides a framework within which 
higher education is expected to perform. The key players within the higher 
education system are considered to do their jobs with some degrees of autonomy. 
Even if one case can have state supervision as a general characterisation of the 
state-university relationship, it is impossible to rule out moments of government 
intervention. But according to this model, government intervention is considered 
desirable only when the agreed desired ends and goals are not produced or 
reached. In other words, government maintains the role of retroactive 
intervention.  
The state supervision model assumes that government and the university system 
are equal partners that need to agree on what is best for a future citizen. In this 
case, universities understand themselves as agents of implementation in the best 
way they see fit and in relation to how universities themselves understand their 
function in society. Even though government has the right to intervene when the 
desired goals are not attained, such an intervention is worked out in coordination 
with the university structures. This conception means that there is a shared 
understanding between the state and the university on the future of a country and 
its citizens. In many instances, this desirable working relationship between the 
university and the state can only be achieved within conditions attuned to 
deliberative democracy because among other things, “deliberation not only lends 
legitimacy to decisions about matters of public interest, but also brings epistemic 
advantages to democratic processes” (Coughlan, Divala, Enslin, Kissack and 
Mathebula, 2007: 84). In this regard, the supervision model of higher education 
governance also works to the advantage of promoting a deliberative culture in a 
nation. I will come to this point later in this work. 
 12 
1.2.3 The state intervention model of university governance 
The last form of relationship between universities and government is state 
intervention (Omar & Figaji, 2000: 80–81). State interference appears in 
institutions that claim to be autonomous, legislatively or not, but nevertheless 
also see government intervening in the activities of the universities when 
government sees that such activities are opposed to its own political agenda. In 
the state interference model, the most crucial functions of the university become 
sanctioned by the state, although there may never be any legislation stipulating 
this. State mechanisms and political agendas become operative in the academy.  
Because of the instability of the nature of governing systems and other political 
systems, especially on the African continent, the state intervention model usually 
results in unstable governing systems in the higher education sector on the 
continent. In a few cases, interference takes place at the change of government 
when this change simultaneously changes the face of high-ranking personnel in 
the university. Interference can also be seen when government publicly claims to 
have a democratically arranged relationship with the university but forces the 
university to toe the line behind the scenes. In Chapter 2 I will show instances of 
state interference in higher education on the African continent. These cases 
include the university system in Zimbabwe and the dictation over the quota 
selection system in Malawi.  
The notion of interference ostensibly has the implication of dislocating or 
disturbing the normal order of operation. In a number of cases, such interference 
is seen as antithetical to autonomy, whether considered from the point of view of 
negative freedom (Berlin, 1984) or the point of view of situated autonomy or 
positive liberty (Berlin, 1984; Callan, 1997). (These conceptions of autonomy are 
explored in Chapter 4.) But the understanding of interference as antithetical to 
autonomy is one complication in the idea of interference as a model of 
governance. There can be a second line of thought in interference as a model of 
governance. I particularly refer to persistent interference to the extent that such 
interference acquires a distinctive pattern of governance. This understanding of 
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interference does not contain in itself a view of interruption of the arrangement 
of things because in one way or another people expect that state operations are 
likely to interfere with what they may consider as a normal way of running things 
while at the same time also holding such state interference as normal and 
expected.  
It is more in the second line of thought that the idea of interference per se does 
not denote lack of autonomy and that imagining interference in this way does not 
say much about whether a particular situation is free or not free. Hence I propose 
that much of what can validly be regarded as interference are instances of 
infringement on the agreed course of running affairs or standard protocol. In 
other words, the presence of the state in itself is not indicative of less autonomy.  
In conclusion to these smaller subsections on the different forms of state-
university relationship, it is clear that the models and their characteristics are not 
water-tight formulas. In other words, I understand the models to exist alongside 
each other although at times there has been the impression that each of the 
models exists in isolation. It is theoretically possible for an institution of higher 
learning (a university) to exhibit different forms of the nature of its relationship 
with the state, whether at the same time and in different occasions or simply at 
different periods of its university life. This is largely dependent on particular 
issues that are under consideration at the different occasions. I acknowledge that 
this thinking begs the question of whether the models are definite models in the 
final analysis. 
What I have tried to do in this subsection is to highlight that it is in the 
governance structures where forms of autonomy manifest themselves. If it is the 
case that there are variations in terms of where power tilts in the higher education 
systems, it is also the case that the tilting of power in the whole governance 
arrangement will tend to define the higher education system‟s understanding and 
application of academic freedom and institutional autonomy. It can also be 
indicated that the different forms of state-university relationships such as state 
control, supervision and interference manifest themselves in forms that issues of 
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academic freedom and institutional autonomy take within individual universities. 
The terms academic freedom and institutional autonomy have often been 
misunderstood to mean one and the same thing. These two similar terms are 
different, though, and in the subsequent section, I follow up on this distinction.  
1.3 Institutional autonomy and academic freedom 
In my introductory remarks, I have introduced the concept of autonomy and I 
note here that there different conceptions of autonomy both in theory and 
practice. The orientation of this dissertation understands autonomy from the 
point self-governance, that is, being a law unto oneself. Nevertheless, rational 
autonomy requires that one be aware of the conditions within which such 
autonomy arises or is shaped and that autonomy necessarily entail forms of 
responsibility. Similarly, several different and contested meanings have been 
offered for institutional autonomy and academic freedom.
1
 Terminologically, 
institutional autonomy is the same thing as university autonomy. A number of 
scholars treat academic freedom and institutional autonomy synonymously. For 
instance, Du Toit (2007: 15), quoting the work of Moodie, states that academic 
freedom involves three distinct elements. These elements are individual 
academic freedom, academic rule (or self-regulation) within the university and 
the autonomy of the institution of the university in relation to state and society. 
This position brings academic freedom and institutional autonomy to an 
inseparable relationship whereby one cannot be fully understood without the 
other. Hence, in most discourses, institutional autonomy and academic freedom 
have been indelibly linked together. In this exposition I will endeavour to look at 
these two elements as different, although they are closely related to each other. 
 The idea of institutional autonomy centres on the right of the institution to carry 
out its affairs with as little interference as possible from external influences 
(Saunders, 2005: 1). Others consider this right as the right of the university to 
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, 
how it will be taught and who may be admitted to study (Berkhout Waghid, 
                                                 
1
 A full discussion of the evolution of the concept of university autonomy, which is the seedbed for any 
discussion of academic freedom and institutional autonomy, will be given later in Chapter 4. 
 15 
Taylor, van Wyk & de Klerk, 2005: 1). The determination over what may be 
taught and how that is taught relates closely to what individual academics may 
autonomously decide to do central to their work. I therefore concede that such 
consideration brings a constitutive dependency between academic freedom and 
institutional autonomy in the sense that the practice of academic freedom gets 
vested in an autonomous community of lecturers and students dedicated to the 
service of truth (see also Hall, 2006).  
Saunders‟ (2005) re-conceptualisation of institutional autonomy will be shown to 
be problematic as I embark on an evaluation of expositions of autonomy later in 
Chapter 3. The problems inherent in Saunders‟ (2005) conception involve 
signalling the idea that being autonomous means not being influenced by any 
other factors or sources apart from oneself. As will be shown, such a view 
presupposes an unencumbered self. It presupposes the existence of a self in 
isolation or in wonderland. I think this conception is problematic because it does 
not represent the full reality of human existence and how teaching and learning 
actually occur in and between human beings. Education by its very nature 
presupposes interaction with the „other‟. This interaction automatically diffuses 
the sense of an educational institution that would operate without being 
influenced directly or indirectly by the external other/reality.  
On the other hand, I need to note that I understand the conception of institutional 
autonomy of Berkhout et al. (2005) and that of Hall (2006) as implying that an 
institution determines its course of life in liaison with other factors or agents that 
the institution may come in contact with. In other words, autonomy is not lived in 
isolation but in co-ordination. Hence other factors are bound to shape the course 
of an autonomous life. 
Wolpe, Singh and Reddy‟s (1995: 119) conceptualisation is understood as 
indicating that institutional autonomy refers to the parameters within which a 
university as an institution may do or not do certain things or offer certain 
programmes. According to this conception, university autonomy may be 
considered to deal with the relationship between the university and other 
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stakeholders such as the state or the corporate world. Hence, university 
autonomy refers to the broader framework of operation. Similarly, Ajayi et al. 
(1996: 176) argue that university autonomy protects the corporate rights of self-
regulation that the state confers upon the university as an institution in 
legislation.  
The analysis of university governance in Africa, which will be presented in 
Chapter 2, among other things, indicates that university autonomy is deemed to 
have been achieved by simply legislating that the university and its operations 
are independent. This particular conception evokes a specific understanding of 
the nature of autonomy, which I delve into in Chapter 4. But in a nutshell, it 
evokes a sense of freedom as merely „freedom from‟, which Isaiah Berlin (1969) 
calls a negative conception. It is also very clear that this legislation as a condition 
of autonomy is compromised internally by conflating state functions in the life of 
the university, by making a sitting president a chancellor of every university and 
by giving the chancellor the prerogative to choose the majority of university 
council members, as will be shown is the case in a number of countries on the 
African continent. Hence, circumstances within which universities find 
themselves have led people to think that the extent and definition of university 
autonomy depends on the nature of the state and how the state relates to the 
university (Ajayi et al., 1996: 176).  
On a different reading, one can postulate that such a working relationship 
represents a conception of autonomy that is not lived in isolation but one that is 
negotiated through and by the different key players of society. But then, if 
autonomy is a matter of social negotiation, such negotiation may work better 
with a deconstructive approach than other approaches because of the inherent 
renewal that proponents of deconstruction bring to social practice if applied 
correctly. In this regard, people‟s conceptions of university autonomy need to be 
negotiated from time to time between the state and the university and it should be 
realised that no single conception of university autonomy is applicable 
universally. But also underlying this conception is the belief that any such 
negotiation crucially or primarily depends on what one understands the person to 
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be and what may be considered as desirable and worth of achieving by the person 
given the different patterns of thought that one adopts (see also Biesta, 2006: 
119). On a peripheral deterministic note, one can respond by querying how much 
is actually in control of the person and how much is accountable to other forces 
such as globalisation and cosmopolitanism. In Chapters 5 and 6, I return to these 
issues as I examine particular conceptions of autonomy and conceptions of a 
desirable contemporary university with a view to developing a cosmopolitan 
person.  
Berkhout et al. (2005) argue that academic freedom refers to the immunities that 
the university teacher, as a professional, needs to enjoy in order to function 
effectively and the right of the academic to study and publish without any 
hindrance, except where such acts infringe on the rights of others. Hence 
Berkhout et al. (2005: 1) characterise academic freedom as “an unbiased and 
objective search for truth(s) or an endeavour in which boundaries of 
knowledge(s) and understandings are continuously and critically tested and 
expanded”. In this regard academic freedom gets justified because of its 
functional significance with regard to the advancement of knowledge, which 
demands that the processes of seeking objective truth should not be corrupted by 
parochial ideologies and interests (Ajayi et al., 1996: 177). This thinking 
assumes that advancement of knowledge within the university and society cannot 
be achieved if university professors and lecturers are hindered from doing their 
job in the way they know best.  
The above idea is similar to that of Wolpe et al. (1995: 119) who stress that 
academic freedom relates to the internal organisation of teaching and learning 
within an institution. In this regard, academic freedom may refer to how a subject 
already approved may be taught, from what orientation and with what content, as 
the individual academic may determine. It is important to note in this case that 
academic freedom is pursued in a manner that does not violate the constituents of 
institutional autonomy. But Wolpe et al. (1995) are also quick to caution that 
such freedom is not unlimited in the sense of the academic having a free hand in 
terms of choice of subjects and research tools. These authors also argue that 
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infringement on others‟ rights needs to be avoided in the exercise of such 
freedom. 
In general this exposition proposes that autonomy is never absolute, that its 
exercise must be accountable to the terms and conditions of the governance 
structures in practice. As such, this assumption affects the way autonomy is 
understood. Crucial to this is also the fact that such assumptions will tend to shift 
the meaning(s) of autonomy in relation to the defining circumstances 
characterising higher education‟s relationships with its stakeholders. This will be 
shown by the different conceptions or understandings of autonomy held by 
different universities on the African continent.  
1.4 The quest for a liberal conception of autonomy: a snapshot  
This dissertation investigates whether a liberal conception of autonomy is 
relevant to higher education governance on the African continent. The 
dissertation centres itself on questions of relevance and the extent to which such 
forms of autonomy can be considered as relevant to higher education systems on 
the African continent. Such an interrogation invariably asks whether Africa, in 
particular, requires its own particular conceptions of autonomy in the governance 
of higher education systems given the environment of governance that is 
predominantly prevailing on the continent, as will be shown in Chapter 2. The 
evaluation of governance systems on the African continent will further probe 
whether there can be any conditions that militate against an exclusively liberal 
conception of autonomy in higher education. Through this process, I want to 
argue for situated forms of autonomy as relevant to the African higher education 
systems. But this kind of argumentation assumes a background regarding what 
liberal autonomy is and/or is not. Therefore, in the third chapter, I will dwell on 
various positions/aspects of liberal autonomy. In this chapter my main aim is to 
find and discuss constitutive meanings of liberal autonomy.  
Liberal or not liberal, does it really matter in the way African universities are 
governed or managed? Does it matter how they go about doing what they 
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perceive as their mission? I suggest that this complexity be approached by first 
analysing the common and generative assumptions on freedom or autonomy in 
order to locate where the whole debate on academic freedom and institutional 
autonomy lies. This chapter will provide a provisional understanding of the 
concepts of liberty, liberalism, academic freedom and institutional autonomy as 
my preamble to what follows in Chapter 4, which goes into detail about what I 
perceive as competing conceptions of autonomy.  
The prominence of philosophical debates over conceptions of freedom/liberty 
and autonomy came with the Enlightenment period, especially in the works of 
thinkers such as Kant. The Enlightenment period marks the beginning of a whole 
movement known as liberalism. What is central in liberalism is its strong belief 
in liberties, especially those of the individual person. 
General discussions on freedom or liberty today tend to be marked by Berlin‟s 
(1969) initial characterisations of liberty as positive liberty and negative liberty. 
In general, the idea of negative liberty involves the absence of external constraint 
or control on the individual person, whereas positive liberty involves the 
individual person‟s capacity for self-determination. This is the capacity to map 
the course of life and events for one‟s life. As will be explained in Chapter 4, it is 
the concept of positive liberty that is the backbone of the ideal of autonomy.  
A clarification of the idea of autonomy is crucial for this project because 
autonomy, understood from this positive sense, implies practical or material 
independence. In other words, the principle of autonomy in human life aims at 
the actual realisation of the desired human condition, whether individually or 
collectively. The structures that one finds in the governance systems of higher 
education on the African continent are partly a symbol and also a 
conceptualisation of how each national state or society would want to be or what 
it would want to become.  
The positive conception of liberty can be broadened to include ideas of inner 
peace, the presence of inner control, an inner experience of choice, spontaneity, 
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fulfilment and even spirituality, where the individual finds the inner space to 
express herself or himself. This understanding of freedom is in tune with the 
operations of the human faculties such as the ability to act according to the 
dictates of reason and in accordance with one‟s own true self or values and the 
recognition of some universal values. In general this sense of freedom implies 
mastery over one's inner condition. In today‟s understanding the problem of 
autonomy has gone further to imply questions of how to organise human 
collectives with actual individual autonomy, especially if one considers the huge 
problem of free choice, free expression and free acting in the economy. But it is 
also possible to conceive autonomy as confined to areas of public dialogue or 
politics.
2
 As such, considerations over the meaning of autonomy have also 
involved discourses in democratic theory. 
The term liberalism, from which I coin whether liberal conceptions of autonomy 
are relevant for higher education in Africa, has been universally used to 
designate any ideology, philosophical view or political tradition that seeks to 
make liberty its primary political value and virtue. As such, liberalism can be 
seen as a social ethic that advocates liberty and equality in general. Because of 
the complexity of debates surrounding concepts of liberty, as will be shown in 
Chapter 4, debates on freedom and autonomy have tended to range from formal 
and limited formulations to substantive considerations. In some general 
characterisation people tend to associate autonomy or freedom with individual 
rights, freedom of thought for individuals, limitations on governance powers, 
especially by governments and religious institutions, the rule of law, the free 
exchange of ideas, a market economy that supports relatively free private 
enterprise, a transparent system of government in which the rights of all citizens 
are protected, and many more.  
It is also important to note here that liberalism and democracy are essentially 
connected because of the importance both place on the liberty of individuals. 
Nevertheless, liberalism and democracy are not equivalent terms. Both would 
emphasise equal citizen rights by law and an equal opportunity to pursue one‟s 
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 Similar conceptions can also be accessed from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom.  
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chosen goals and to succeed in life. Liberalism thus makes a preferential option 
for forms of governance where the governed freely and willingly give their 
consent to be governed and recent democratic theory adds the conditions on 
which such a government should operate. Liberalism in this sense essentially 
opts for democratic processes. Although the preference for democratic processes 
has been misunderstood to mean representative democracy where a few chosen 
representatives actually rule, it is still believed to provide the checks and 
balances needed to protect the rights of citizens in contemporary societies. 
However, I think that for liberals, democracy is not an end in itself but an 
essential means to secure the liberty, individuality and diversity of individuals. 
Despite the common grounds on which liberalism stands, it is not one 
homogeneous trend of thought. Just as notions of liberty have received diverse 
interpretation, liberalism also exists in various strands due to the complexity of 
the ideals it stands for. For instance, McLaughlin (1992) conceptualises 
liberalism through citizenship ideals. These ideals stretch liberal citizenship on a 
continuum between maximal and minimal characterisations. While 
McLaughlin‟s (1992: 236) characterisations of liberal and democratic 
citizenship, that is, identity, virtues, political involvement and social 
prerequisites, do not intend to address conceptions of liberty, it is the case that 
they are rooted in liberty itself. Similarly, liberalism can be conceived as a brand 
of thought that navigates between minimal or formal forms/characterisations and 
substantive or maximal conceptions.  
In order to characterise the minimal and maximal conceptions within liberalism, I 
introduce some of the debates that Callan (1997) introduces in response to a form 
of liberalism believed to have been proposed and promoted by Rawls (1971). 
The formal or minimal conceptions within liberalism designate a concentration 
on formal, legal or judicial ascriptions (McLaughlin, 1992: 236). From an 
educational point of view, Callan (1997: 170) considers this form of liberalism as 
including “no more than the lowest common denominator in a society‟s 
understanding of what children need to learn”. Callan‟s discussion assumes the 
predominance of the very liberal ideals.  
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Callan‟s (1997: 5) rejection of the communitarian assumption that virtue and 
liberalism simply do not mix and the untiring effort to stretch the liberal theory to 
include unconditional moral commitment, care and moral distress confirm the 
existence of substantive forms of liberalism. From McLaughlin‟s (1992) point of 
view, maximal perspectives of liberalism emphasise a clearer understanding of 
democratic principles, values and dispositions within the liberal system of 
thought. As such specific demands are placed upon the subscribers of this liberal 
thought to create specific dispositions and capacities required for the sustenance 
of the system. I think that this conception of liberalism yearns for something 
beyond the basics of a just society in Rawlsian terms. 
Callan‟s (1997) commentary on Rawls‟ (1971) conception of liberalism 
acknowledges liberalism as both comprehensive and political. The recognition of 
comprehensive doctrines within democratic processes and the securing of a 
workable overlapping consensus can also be read in relation to McLaughlin‟s 
(1992) two ends of the continuum. On the one hand, there are variations of 
political liberalism, depending on how lax or stringent the criteria placed on the 
demands for reasonableness is (Callan, 1997: 19). On the other hand, variations 
of comprehensive liberalism are more determined by the level of tolerance and 
responsiveness to issues of plurality. Of crucial importance in the different 
characterisations of liberalism in relation to this thesis is the outcome on 
conceptions of autonomy that are viable for any liberal society or just any society 
wishing to become liberal.   
Callan‟s (1997) Creating Citizens categorically distinguishes the two brands of 
thought within liberalism but particularly defends the broader version of 
liberalism. He highlights the fact that the liberal debate on autonomy centres on 
the different conceptions of an autonomous self. Callan considers that this 
autonomous self is “an unencumbered self”. He argues against a conception, 
largely promoted by Sandel (1984) and others, that assumes that the self is 
unencumbered by any ends prior to choice. This view means that people are not 
obliged to fulfil any ends they have not chosen. As individuals people choose 
what they want to do and what they want to be and in such an exercise of 
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choosing they are not influenced by their circumstances except their desire to 
choose freely. Choice in its simplest forms becomes their sense of autonomy. 
This conception is close to the thinking that the essence of academic freedom 
resides in the freedom of the academic from external interference regarding “who 
shall teach, what they shall teach, how they teach and whom they teach” (Hall, 
2006: 371, citing Higgins). 
In a sense, the conception of an unencumbered self as quoted by Callan (1997) is 
parallel to Rawls‟s conception of the autonomy needed for the formation of a 
basic society. In this regard, people agree to operate on the basis of the common 
elements they agree on and leave out of the agreement for social cooperation all 
things on which they fundamentally differ (Rawls, 1996: 194). Callan (1997) 
disputes such a reading of a liberal conception. He argues that such a thesis of 
liberal autonomy hinges on the bizarre metaphysics of the unencumbered self.  
The truth is surely that whatever reflection autonomy requires does not 
demand that we can detach ourselves from all our ends. The requirement is 
only that we be capable of asking about the value of any particular end with 
which we currently identify and able to give a thoughtful answer to what we 
ask (Callan, 1997: 54). 
I labour to give a clear conception of this position of autonomy because, among 
other things, it recognises the social and political situatedness of persons. In other 
words, I defend an understanding of autonomy that is lived deep within one‟s 
comprehensive doctrines. This sense of autonomy is lived within the framework 
of people‟s ends and not detached from them. This understanding falls within 
Callan‟s notion of “choice as willing” and not “choice as choosing” (1997: 57). 
In “choice as choosing” the agent only faces a choice-set or possible alternatives 
from which to choose from, whereas in “choice as willing”, choice represents a 
categorical valuation and a decision is made on the basis of its suitability, not 
merely in consideration of comparison with other alternatives.  
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“Choice as willing” gives rise to valuation and commitment to choice, and such 
implications are not available in a process of simply choosing from alternatives 
on the simple basis of what is preferable at the time, “choice as choosing”. 
Similarly, the idea of the unencumbered self, an emblem of “choice as 
choosing”, can have “debilitating effects on legal and political thought” (Callan, 
1997: 54). Callan‟s conception of an autonomous self as living autonomously 
through “willing choice” will exert a great deal of influence on what the 
discourse on autonomy in African higher education should look like. Among 
other things, the conception choice as willing engages conscience and gives one 
the idea that  “the process of forming one‟s own judgement about how to live 
depends on careful assessment of the reasons available in a given social setting 
for living one way rather than the other” (Callan, 1997: 66). In other words, 
living autonomously means making choices willingly within and in full 
consideration of one‟s given circumstances or environment for the good of the 
self and other. Recognition of this situatedness or imbeddedness brings meaning 
and life to autonomous living. Hence a good life can hardly be lived in utter 
disregard of the conditions of responsible choice and action in relation to 
responsibilities to the rights of others (Callan, 1997: 10–11, 68). 
For me, the idea of republican freedom is seriously compromised if a 
lecturer continues to express him/herself with unhindered freedom, making 
unsubstantiated claims about some students with the aim of excluding them 
from class – all in the name of academic freedom (Waghid, 2006: 381). 
1.5 Methodological considerations – Philosophical analysis 
This dissertation uses philosophical methodologies and philosophical analysis to 
resolve its questions. The idea of philosophical method can be traced right back 
from the pre-Socratic period to Socrates, Aristotle, to Descartes, Kant, 
Wittgenstein and many more. I characterise a philosophical method as that 
method whereby a person begins to wonder and doubt about accepted beliefs and 
their meanings. This is done in order to gain more clarity on issues and problems. 
Hence arguments and justifications become an integral part of the philosophical 
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methods. I think that my philosophical method will become incomplete without 
the use of philosophical analysis. I employ “philosophical analysis” to the 
“breaking down” or “analyzing” of key concepts central to the argument of 
autonomy I am making in this dissertation. Among some of the central issues are 
questions regarding what constitutes particularity in the various forms of 
governance? What would be their resultant effects on how a university lives itself 
out or makes claims of autonomous governance? What conceptions of autonomy 
are relevant to higher education on the African continent? What threats or forces 
further impact on the possibility of autonomous higher education systems? What 
responsibilities are facing higher education and how does higher education 
contribute to cultivating capable citizens of managing society? What is 
globalisation and neo-liberalism and how do they affect the conception of an 
autonomous university? How can a cosmopolitan perspective understanding help 
Africa in battling against the negative effects of neo-liberalism and globalisation 
while at the same time help in recreating the future citizen? The philosophical 
method that will be employed to resolve these questions is one that finds a 
common ground between the interpretive framework, as well as a critical 
perspective with a touch of post-structuralist analysis. I now explain some of the 
connecting ideas to this framework.  
While philosophical analysis is a general term applied to the philosophical 
methodologies, analytical inquiry is a methodology associated with analytical 
philosophers such as Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgestein, W.V.O. Quine and 
many others. Within this tradition analytical philosophy became famous for 
clarifying the meanings of language. There are two distinctive issues that one is 
bound to consider when beginning to bring the analytical framework into focus 
in a work like this dissertation. The first is the understanding that analytical 
philosophy largely seeks to clarify meaning, whether taken conceptually or 
linguistically (Curren, Hager & Robertson, 2003). It is notable that the early 
periods of analytical philosophy were heavily associated with mathematical 
logic, among other things.  
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One can also bring to the fore Kant‟s (1961) distinction between synthetic 
judgements and analytical judgements. Simply put, Kant‟s synthetic judgements 
come about because of people‟s assessment of experience whereas analytical 
judgements are those they make based on their understanding of concepts. Such 
an orientation of analytical judgements would assume analytical philosophy to 
use universalistic conceptions of meanings. Similarly, one can also argue that 
forms of universalism would make certain results easily predetermined and stated 
as a matter of fact.  
Given the discourse on higher education autonomy that is the centre of this work, 
such analytical inclinations are likely to imply that discourse on higher education 
should create a universal conception of what academic freedom and institutional 
autonomy are according to the nature and functions of the higher education 
sector in general. In other words, according to this pattern of thought valid 
assessments of institutions and the nature of their governance system would be 
based on their resemblance to universalistic conceptions of university 
governance or what universities are supposed to represent. By implication, such 
universalistic conceptions also mean that universities, irrespective of their 
circumstances or conditions, need to subscribe to the same conceptions of 
autonomy. 
While I adopt usage of the analytical methodology in this dissertation, there is 
something different in this usage that needs to be pointed out immediately. I use 
the analytical method in the sense of “elucidation of concepts, articulation of 
theories and their reconstruction” (Heslep, 1997: 21). This position takes me to 
methodological analysis and does not necessarily posit the universalism of the 
concepts under scrutiny or their universal application. Although the philosophical 
analysis can evoke sentiments of it promoting the grand narratives, the particular 
usage employed in this dissertation is one that makes the debate responsive to 
Africa‟s problems in managing higher education. At the same time, the discourse 
aims to reformulate avenues through which African universities can create a 
cosmopolitan citizen who is at home locally and internationally. In other words, a 
conceptual work on university autonomy and institutional autonomy requires a 
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sense of particularity that is essential to conceptions of autonomy within the 
African experience, while at the same time respecting the norms of reason 
regarding the general theoretical positions on autonomy. The discourse reflects 
on the African experience of higher education governance and management as an 
example of how different forms of governance can influence forms of autonomy.  
This attachment to the African experience also dictates the end results of my 
choice of methodology. As Chapter 2 indicates, higher education in Africa 
should be considered within the terrain of its circumstances or conditions. This 
being the case, it is also true that conceptions of autonomy that people running 
the systems on the continent have will not necessarily fit into the universal mode 
of autonomy because of the special demands facing the development of the 
higher education sector on the continent. As a result, my purposive sample of 
nine systems of higher education systems on the continent gives a glimpse of 
governance structures across the African continent. These are Egypt, Nigeria, 
Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. In all 
these cases, the state/government is involved in the governance of higher 
education systems. Nevertheless, there are some variations with regard to the 
extent to which government is considered to fundamentally affect the running of 
these systems. This point is further elaborated in section 2.6.3. 
What I have tried to establish above is a conception of critical analysis that 
borrows from the universalistic stances but does not itself remain universalistic 
because of demands of particularity. In other words, any discourse on higher 
education governance on the African continent would need to consider the 
special conditions in which higher education finds itself in on the African 
continent. Such a special consideration implies a coordination of the interpretive 
framework and the critical framework. Wittgenstein (1958) proposes that people 
draw new meanings implicit in the forms of life and that in this sense 
“philosophy” can be conceived as “what is possible before (emphasis original) 
all new discoveries and intentions” (1958: 50e).  
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Similarly, Habermas (1978) proposes that considerations on education should 
prioritise “human interests”. In other words, no meaningful discourse on 
education can take place if one does not gain understanding or knowledge of 
one‟s place and interest in the process of improving or empowering human lives. 
In addition, Horkheimer (1982: 244) argues as follows: “Theory is said to be 
critical to the extent that it seeks human emancipation to liberate human beings 
from circumstances that enslave them. Its guiding ideal is the emancipation of 
human beings and it is known as a form of education”. In other words, critical 
educational theory on conceptions of autonomy in African higher education is a 
critique of how domination of a pure liberal or pure communitarian position may 
not emancipate people‟s interests given the fusion of social, cultural and political 
milieu higher education operates in on the African continent.  
The particular demands of mixing these theoretical frameworks enable me to 
propose a conception of autonomy for African universities that has elements of 
liberalism but is not completely liberal yet at the same time has elements of 
communitarianism. Using Kymlicka (2002: 337), the methodological position of 
this dissertation argues for an adoption of autonomy that maintains a healthy 
balance between individual choice and a communal perspective to the extent that 
none erodes the other. Callan (1997: 67) makes this connection by asking the 
following: “If forming my own best judgement about how to live requires me to 
reflect autonomously on the judgements that others make and on the criticisms 
they might level against mine, then how can a good life be possible at all if I 
shirk the requirement?” Inevitably, Callan (1997: 68) further concludes the 
discussion by pointing out that “a good life could hardly be lived in utter 
disregard of conditions of responsible action”.  
But as much as one can claim specificity in a methodological framework for a 
work of this nature, one also needs to bear in mind that in educational study no 
one method works in isolation. The interpretive-critical framework may be 
considered as inevitable on the understanding that critical theory grows out of 
interpretive theory. However, critical theory accepts the self-understanding of 
agents as both the starting point and culmination, but it insists that self-
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understanding itself needs to be explained (Fay, 1975: 92). In this regard, I also 
consider the critical and self-reflective capacity of analytical inquiry in 
understanding the dynamics of whether a liberal conception of autonomy is 
relevant to higher education on the African continent through an examination of 
the governance patterns.  
My story and place in using analytical inquiry will not be complete if I do not 
explain the three dimensions of analytical inquiry, which are personal, public and 
professional. Waghid (2002a: 2–4, quoting Soltis) explains that a personal 
dimension comes into play as one invokes “a set of personal beliefs about what 
can be considered as good, right and worthwhile” in one‟s understanding of what 
university governance and autonomy mean. In this regard, the position of 
situated autonomy that I defend in this dissertation using some of Callan‟s ideas 
can be considered as my preferential understanding of how academic freedom 
and institutional autonomy need to be explained given the circumstances of 
higher education governance on the African continent. Nevertheless, my 
reflections on higher education on the African continent are not intended to 
benefit the self but to provide a side of the public discourse on autonomy given 
African realities and how such discourse may eventually guide educational 
policy and provide space for debates and critiques (Waghid, 2002a: 3). By 
adopting this analytical inquiry I also wish to offer a different perspective on 
understanding autonomy in higher education governance on the continent to 
academics and other key players in higher education governance. My last stance 
fulfils the professional dimension of analytical inquiry (see Waghid, 2002a 
quoting Soltis).  
The merits of critical theory will also come to bear as I examine cosmopolitan 
citizenship later in the dissertation. I should emphasise in this regard that critical 
theory, which fundamentally rests on the merits and necessity of interpretive 
categories, will provide space for the creation of a cosmopolitan perspective and 
a cosmopolitan citizen in higher education endeavours on the continent. Critical 
educational theory tries to expose the roots and consequences of the agents‟ self-
understanding of their autonomy, thereby informing social practice.  
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 Given the nature of this study, one cannot rule out a deconstructive touch. Hence 
I will relate to deconstruction because of its critical potential to present what is 
other or different (Biesta, 1998: 5). But this position is later clarified by Biesta 
(2006: 66-69) who argues that rational communities become constituted by 
themselves and “other” community forms that come in the “interruption of the 
work and the enterprise of the rational community”. In a way the other exists, 
recurs and troubles the rational community. He also argues as follows: “The 
other lives inside the rational community as a constant possibility and comes into 
presence as soon as one responds to the other, to the otherness of the other, to 
what is strange in relation to the discourse and logic of the rational community” 
(Biesta, 2006: 66). In this dissertation, it is evident that the questioning over 
whether liberal conceptions of autonomy are relevant to higher education 
governance on the African continent is firmly infused with an awareness of the 
other. In a specific way in this study, one will have to reckon with the distinctive 
features of higher education autonomy, what it means to have un-autonomous 
institutions and governance systems. But again, one‟s consideration of higher 
education governance and its characteristics, however global and cosmopolitan 
this perspective can become, has to consider that the demands and circumstances 
for operating higher education on the African continent are different. I consider a 
post-structuralism methodology as crucial because of the otherness and 
interruptions of the other that the African scenario is bound to present. The 
approach will assist in revealing “what we have not thought to think, about what 
is densely invested in our discourses or practices, about what has been muted, 
repressed and unheard of in our liberatory efforts”, thereby creating my space or 
personal dimension  for critical analysis from the inside (Waghid, 2002a: 2, 55–
56). In this way, one can also manage to explore why certain conceptions seem to 
be more favoured and favourable for particular circumstances. But the 
predominance of an analytical frame of mind in the whole process is to be used 
to provide illumination, understanding and different perspectives of issues 
involved in this debate (Waghid, 2002b: 4).  
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1.5.1 Some methodological conclusions  
This dissertation falls within the category of philosophical analysis and is centre 
on providing a critique of major philosophical issues emanating from educational 
discourse and practice. This methodology will be applied on issues surrounding 
higher education governance and autonomy in Africa. Through this work, three 
dominant philosophical frameworks will constantly be used. These are the 
interpretive theory, critical theory and elements of deconstruction.  This choice 
of method has been influenced by the set of questions that this dissertation 
sought to investigate. Among the issues are question around governance and 
autonomy in Africa. 
While most analytical forms of inquiry have tended to universalise bodies of 
knowledge, I do not think one can do the same with education and (African) 
higher education in particular. One way to understand this is to look at Kant‟s 
(1961) distinction between synthetic judgements and analytical judgements. 
Simply put, Kant‟s synthetic judgements come about because of people‟s 
assessment of experience whereas analytical judgements are those they make 
based on their understanding of concepts. Such an orientation of analytical 
judgements would assume analytical philosophy to use universalistic conceptions 
of meanings. Universalistic conceptions would, by implication, mean that 
universities, irrespective of their circumstances or conditions need to subscribe to 
the same conceptions of autonomy. In any case, I have used analytical inquiry 
differently, in the sense of “elucidation of concepts, articulation of theories and 
their reconstruction” (Heslep, 1996: 21). This position takes me to 
methodological analysis and does not necessarily posit the universalism of the 
concepts under scrutiny or their universal application. In other words, a 
conceptual work on university autonomy and institutional autonomy requires a 
sense of particularity that is essential to conceptions of autonomy. The particular 
attachment to the African experience has also influenced my choice of 
methodology. As Chapter 2 has indicated, higher education in Africa should be 
considered within the terrain of its circumstances or conditions. Such a special 
consideration implies a coordination of the interpretive framework and the 
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critical framework. Wittgenstein (1958) proposes that people draw new meanings 
implicit in the forms of life and that in this sense „philosophy‟ can be conceived 
as “what is possible before (emphasis original) all new discoveries and 
intentions” (Wittgenstein, 1958: 50e). This is also in line with Habermas (1978) 
who argues that people‟s considerations on education should prioritise “human 
interests”. My story and place in using analytical inquiry involves three 
dimensions of analytical inquiry, which are personal, public and professional 
Waghid (2002a: 2-4, quoting Soltis). By adopting this analytical inquiry I aimed 
at offering a different perspective on understanding autonomy in higher 
education governance on the African continent. My last stance fulfils the 
professional dimension of analytical inquiry (see Waghid, 2002a quoting Soltis).  
1.6 The structure of the dissertation 
In this chapter I have tried to locate the problem of tracking down and analysing 
the issues of higher education autonomy within higher education governance 
structures. Among other things, I have discussed how issues of governance and 
power emerge in higher education discourse and their importance in 
understanding autonomy. I have also considered the initial relationship between 
institutional autonomy and academic freedom by considering different 
perspectives from a number of scholars in the area. Further on in this chapter, I 
have provided a quick analysis of what is basically considered as central in the 
liberal conception of autonomy and tried to make a preferential option for a form 
of autonomy that is essentially situated before clarifying on my methodological 
framework.  
This background work is meant to lay the foundations for the scheme of my 
argument. In this argument, I consider autonomy to be central to any liberal 
tradition. As my argument develops I will recognise different positions in 
understanding autonomy. I will then argue that understanding such difference in 
relation to the discourse of higher education governance on the African continent 
causes a fundamental shift in the way people ordinarily conceive autonomy in 
higher education. 
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My analysis of governance forms in the running of higher education on the 
African continent, which follows in Chapter 2, is aimed at revealing two things. 
First, this analysis is meant to provide an understanding of how key players and 
analysts dealing with higher education governance understand this system on the 
continent. Hopefully this will bring out the professional dimension of this 
analytical inquiry. This understanding will particularly focus on the management 
and structural arrangements of public universities in the randomly selected 
countries on the continent. Second, I wish to understand what forms of autonomy 
may be relevant to higher education governance on the African continent in 
relation to the university‟s mandate of producing citizens. Chapter 3 examines at 
least three different higher education systems with the purpose of understanding 
first how conceptions of academic freedom and institutional autonomy developed 
in these systems. I go further in this analysis to discuss current positions of 
autonomy that may characterise the systems in question. In Chapter 4, I examine 
different philosophical conceptions of autonomy. In this chapter I also attempt to 
outline and discuss constitutive meanings or marks of liberal autonomy. This 
discussion will later act as a foundation on which my further analysis will be 
based. As a matter of clarification on the constitutive meanings and marks of 
liberal autonomy,  
The challenges facing higher education on the African continent cannot be 
considered as complete if one does not at the same time consider how the 
mandate of the public university to create future citizens can be carried out 
efficiently given that the contemporary world no more operates in segmented 
units in so far as the knowledge economy is concerned. Chapter 5 will therefore 
consider the impact of globalisation and neo-liberalism on higher education 
discourse, particularly in Africa. In this regard and among other things I will 
discuss Africa‟s trajectory in a globalised economy and the challenges that 
globalisation and neo-liberalism present to the governance of higher education 
systems. In this regard, I will also highlight how educational marketisation and 
localisation play themselves out in shaping and reshaping the characteristics of 
university autonomy through the governance systems on the continent. In this 
chapter I will argue that globalisation and neo-liberalism make higher education 
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systems on the African continent less autonomous. My conclusions therefore are 
in sharp contrast to the main assumptions about globalisation and neo-liberalism 
that they usher into peoples‟ spheres of freedom.  
Given my conclusions in the preceding chapters, Chapter 6 seeks to understand 
the extent to which cosmopolitan norms can at least address concerns over 
autonomy in African higher education systems. In this chapter, I argue that 
cosmopolitan norms can assist in reshaping higher education autonomy discourse 
on the continent. In view of this, I also examine Nussbaum‟s (1997, 2002) 
conception of a world citizen where, among other things, she suggests that “our 
task as citizens of the world, and as educators who prepare people to be citizens 
of the world, will be to draw the circles somehow toward the centre (emphasis 
original), making all human beings like our fellow city-dwellers” (Nussbaum, 
1997: 60). Nussbaum (1997: 61) further explains that the implications of this 
conception are such that people give up their special affections and 
identifications in an effort to make all human beings part of their community of 
dialogue, respect and concern. Using such a cosmopolitan mindset, I will proceed 
to examine the extent to which such an emancipatory project can be realised 
given the conditions of African higher education. Some of these conditions, as 
will be explained in the chapter 2, include the state‟s assumed prerogative to 
regulate the higher education system as national asset over and above 
essentialized notions of the nature and function of the university. 
Through answering most of the issues I have raised in this structural view, I hope 
to definitively come to understand whether liberal conceptions of autonomy are 
relevant to higher education governance on the African continent and the extent 
to which one holds this view. In the following chapter (two) I evaluate 
governance arrangements in some African universities. As already mentioned, 
this snap evaluation is intended to create a background on whether a liberal 
conception of autonomy is viable for African universities, but more so to check 
the prevalent forms or conceptions of university autonomy and academic 
freedom in place.  
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CHAPTER 2  
GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS IN AFRICA’S HIGHER EDUCATION 
SYSTEMS 
2.1 Introduction 
In this sub-section I examine a number of higher education governance structures 
on the African continent in an attempt to reveal the possible forms of autonomy 
that higher education systems in Africa have. The selection of the cases has been 
done through purposive sampling in order to give a picture of what the situation 
is in different parts of the African continent, where that information has become 
available. The countries under focus include Egypt, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, 
Uganda, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. South Africa is treated 
separately in this work because of its unique features. Among other things, the 
raging debates on how higher education governance needs to be managed have 
become so complex that treating South Africa as just another African case runs 
the risk of not paying attention to how debates on South African higher education 
system indirectly shape how other African countries try to manage their own 
systems. My approach recognises the important ramifications that the debates on 
South African higher education have for the continent despite South Africa‟s 
being historically, socially and politically different.  
The focus of the selection can rightfully be regarded as an analysis of higher 
education in Africa in the post-colonial period. This analysis, despite its focus, 
recognises that higher education on the African continent was introduced long 
before the colonisation of Africa by different European states. In the following 
subsection, I discuss this historical picture of higher education in Africa, paying 
much attention to the nature or character of higher education, as a prelude to any 
discussion of note one can have of higher education on the continent. 
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2.2 The story of higher education in Africa: the pre-colonial 
beginnings 
Several scholars have documented the beginnings of higher education on the 
African continent. In most cases, there has been a tendency to think that it is 
colonisation that brought higher education onto the continent. Nevertheless, the 
works of Ajayi et al. (1996) and Assie-Lumumba (2006) trace the origins of 
university life on the continent back to the ancient centres of civilisation on the 
African continent, such as Egypt and the African traditional societies in general. 
This subsection revisits these origins in an argument to show that some of the 
directions and redirections of higher education on the continent today are directly 
related to the ancient forms of higher education on the continent. Assie-
Lumumba (2006: 25), quoting Ajayi et al. (1996: 5), states that “indigenous 
higher education produced and transmitted new knowledge necessary for 
understanding the world, the nature of man (sic), society, God and various 
divinities, the promotion of Agriculture and health, literature and philosophy”. 
The descriptions of higher education from Ajayi et al. (1996) that Assie-
Lumumba draws on were initially drawn from elements of African sagacity. 
Despite the lack of technological advancement, African societies developed 
forms of knowledge that superseded what an ordinary person needed to know in 
order to be and survive as a member of a particular society. Such knowledge did 
not only rely on repetition of traditional norms but went further to give rational 
explications of such bodies of knowledge and their justifications and refutations 
(Odera Oruka, 1990).
3
  
Ajayi et al. (1996: 3–5) use some of Odera Oruka‟s (1990) findings on African 
sagacity to argue for the existence of philosophers or original thinkers in African 
indigenous cultures who created and nurtured forms of informal higher 
education. The system of higher education remained “predominantly oral, 
eclectic and even esoteric” (Ajayi et al., 1996: 4), while the forms of knowledge 
could range from metaphysical to epistemological to social. Ajayi et al. (1996: 5) 
                                                 
3
  This subsection will not provide details of this debate because it is not its focus, but an elaborate 
discussion of African philosophic sagacity can be accessed from Odera Oruka‟s (1990) book.  
 37 
also argue that such higher forms of knowledge by specific individuals were 
recognised and promoted by the society by rewarding such individuals with 
different gifts and even pieces of land. Today, acquisition of higher education is 
rewarded with degrees and certificates, which are further used by individuals to 
acquire lucrative jobs. 
What is really distinctive in African sagacity or forms of higher education, as 
explained by Odera Oruka (1990) and used by Ajayi et al. (1996) and Assie-
Lumumba (2006), is that philosophic sagacity, although it naturally operated 
outside the confines of the communal pool of knowledge, was highly treasured 
by the community and considered as part of the community. In other words, 
Odera Oruka‟s (1990) descriptions of philosophic sages give the idea that such 
individuals managed to give explanations of things or events beyond the ordinary 
pool of explanation available in the community. But due to the nature of African 
traditional societies, that is their communal nature, such explanations were not 
considered as totally oppositional to the framework of the community although 
in most cases they would be critical of community traditions. 
The other element that is unique in traditional forms of higher knowledge is that 
these forms were valued in the community for what they offered. Higher forms 
of knowledge provided an exceptional source of solutions for problems facing 
societies and for the advancement of these societies. Despite the fact that at times 
philosophic sagacity is considered as esoteric, these forms of knowledge are 
valued not just for their own sake but for the development of the community as a 
whole. The developmental character that was attached to sophisticated traditional 
forms of knowledge resonates with ideals of a „developmental university‟ in 
today‟s formal higher education and training. 
2.2.1 The pre-colonial formal higher education systems in Africa  
A number of universities were established on the African continent before Africa 
became colonised by western countries. These centres of higher education were 
mostly influenced by religious structures, such as Islam, Christianity and African 
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traditions. The Egyptian civilisation stands out as the root of the idea of a 
university “as a community of scholars with an international outlook but also 
with responsibilities within particular cultures” (Ajayi et al., 1996: 5). 
Alexandria served as a connecting point between the Mediterranean Sea, the Red 
Sea and the Indian Ocean. The rulers of Alexandria established a museum that 
assembled different forms of knowledge from the transecting cultures through 
the copying of manuscripts, thereby attracting leading scholars. The people who 
were appointed to manage the collection were also given the responsibility of 
guiding young scholars in a collegiate system. Quoting Riad, Ajayi et al. (1996: 
6) state the following: 
Scientists and men of letters lived in the institution. They were housed and 
fed and were able to give themselves up entirely to their research and 
students, with no menial duties to perform. Its organisation was similar to 
that of modern universities, except that the resident scholars were not 
required to give lectures.  
The works collected in this library included those on cosmography, astronomy, 
literature, history and mathematics while others directly influenced the formation 
of modern scientific botany, human anatomy and physiology. The works 
collected in the Museum of Alexandria also contributed to the formation of the 
monastic system in which models of communal living were favoured and the 
search for knowledge became a joint enterprise (Ajayi et al., 1996: 7).  
Despite the fact that one finds mixes of Western influence in secular higher 
education, the origins of Ethiopian higher education have mixes of both Christian 
and Islamic influences, countries on the western coast such as Sierra Leone and 
Liberia were influenced by Islam, Christianity as well as the secular Western 
worldview because they started in the second half of the 19
th
 century. The 
Freetown Debate that Ajayi et al. (1996: 16–20) describe is characterised by 
indignation at the low level of education that Christian missionary initiatives 
implied on the one hand and an inspiration to create space for a “secular African-
controlled university” (Ajayi et al., 1996: 17) on the other hand. This indignation 
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is echoed despite the growing influence of Western education in Africa during 
this period.  
Ajayi et al. (1996: 8) also note that higher education within the Islamic tradition 
initially started with the need to teach children the “rudiments of Arabic and the 
Koran”, which was mainly done informally and in homes. As the children 
became more sophisticated in the knowledge of Arabic and the Koran, there was 
a need to move on to higher levels of knowledge with more advanced pupils. 
This impetus created madrasas (or colleges) and “some of the madrasas attracted 
enough reputable teachers and the courses of instruction were organised more 
formally like universities, … and curricula built around one or more of the 
schools of Islamic law, Advanced Philology, Hadith, History, and Geography” 
(Ajayi et al., 1996: 8). The growth of scholarship in the Muslim tradition rested 
on “the need of rulers to use scholars in their administration” and “the need of 
pious Muslims seeking contemplation” (Ajayi et al., 1996: 8–9). Some of the 
first and influential universities established in this line were the Karawiyyin 
University of Fez (also known as al-Karawiyyin of Fez) in Morocco, Al-Azhar of 
Cairo in Egypt and the University of Timbuktu. The last-mentioned became 
famous, though not with much posterity, because of its quest for autonomy, piety 
and learning (Ajayi et al., 1996: 10).  
What I recognise as notable characteristics of the life of the university in Africa 
during the pre-colonial period can be summarised as the quest for knowledge, 
autonomy and piety. These elements emerge from an analysis of higher 
education from Islamic and Christian influences. Such education also tended to 
develop from informal education to formalised ways of conducting the search for 
knowledge. African traditional systems also reveal the independence of thought 
of the philosophic sages and a deeper quest for knowledge and explanation of 
puzzles confronting the human race as at the centre of developing higher forms 
of knowledge in traditional societies. In my view, it is the traditional perspective 
of sagacity that provides leads to the role higher education was assumed to be 
introduced for. 
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2.3 The connection between higher education and national development in 
the first African independent states 
As the development of knowledge moved from lower forms to sophisticated 
forms in both traditional societies and religious communities, there was also the 
need for knowledge to change from informal transmission to formal 
transmission. At this stage higher education clearly became a symbiosis of two 
functions. On the one hand was the need to use higher education for national 
development and administration. On the other hand, the quest for contemplation 
also took root, though largely associated with monastic forms of life. The need 
for higher education to assist in national development is echoed in a number of 
sectors including a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO) conference on higher education in Africa that was held 
in Tananarive from 3 to 12 September 1962 (UNESCO, 1962: 17–19). In this 
space (that is, UNESCO 1962), the role of higher education in the post-
independence era is phrased as the need to forge unity by promoting the African 
character of the independent states, which is commensurate with world 
civilisation. Among other things the university was expected to “encourage and 
support elucidation of and appreciation of African culture and heritage, thereby 
liberating the African mind socially and culturally” with a holistic approach to 
the development of the human person (UNESCO, 1962: 18). 
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, the real need that gave rise to the origin of the 
African university was an indigenous aspiration towards independence. This was 
the need to establish institutions that would not just train African people to work 
as interpreters of the colonisers and evangelists of the different religious 
institutions that were being established but would also create “an African elite 
who could work side by side” with the Europeans (Ajayi et al., 1996: 30). Of‟ 
course such an initiative was started by those Africans who had already been 
trained to see the benefits of proceeding with Western education. The connection 
that was perceived to be there between university education and national 
development gained momentum alongside the growth of nationalist movements 
in different African states such as Ghana, Ethiopia, South Africa and many 
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others. In a way, access to higher education and the attainment of a higher 
educational qualification was seen as one of the ways of bringing the African 
person on a par with the Western person. This is why Ajayi et al. (1996: 49) note 
that “by the 1930s, perceptive observers began to see that future constitutional 
development in Africa depended more on the educated elite than on traditional 
leaders”. 
2.4 The African university in the post-independence period  
 In the above section, I have highlighted two central motifs for the development 
of the African university. These include the fact that the African university was 
seen as a means of steering national development through human personnel 
training. But it is also clear that the university was one way of creating an elite 
group in Africa that could stand up to the authority of the Western coloniser. It is 
also important to note here that although African ancient civilisation has been 
noted as the core of the university, many universities on the continent were only 
created after 1960. Since then, the “assumed role of the postcolonial university in 
Africa as an institution with a social mission in economic development and 
national building” has not been an easy road.  I argue that this has been the case 
because of the way higher education was popularised and patronised in the post-
independence period. 
The creation of higher education systems in the colonies was accompanied by a 
fear that educating the African would endanger the settler‟s privileged position 
(Assie-Lumumba, 2006: 32–33). Even if this was the case, African higher 
education in the post-independence period is a mirror of the partition of Africa, 
or a mirror of the countries that colonised Africa. For instance, the British 
believed in social Darwinism
4
 and were the first colonisers to authorise 
establishment of higher education institutions with affiliation to the British 
universities. On the other hand, French colonisers developed what Ajayi et al. 
(1996) refer to as a “hidden and open policy” of education. This system aimed to 
educate not the masses but only a few elites who would be loyal to the French 
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 Social Darwinism believes that culture is hereditary and even education by a particular system would 
not change one into a member of the educator‟s species or nature (see Assie-Lumumba, 2006: 33). 
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culture and promote it. In general, the French believed that such elites would 
require further training in France. But in other instances, such as Tunisia, the 
French developed open education systems (Assie-Lumumba, 2006: 35). The 
higher education system that was developed in Ethiopia was different from the 
patterns one can notice in the other colonies. Again, such a system is a reflection 
of Ethiopia‟s historical picture. Ethiopia became independent in 1804 by 
defeating Italy. As such Ethiopia has been regarded as a symbol of hope for 
many struggling African nations because Ethiopia symbolised self-determination 
in the early stages of African consciousness (Assie-Lumumba, 2006: 41) 
This section cannot exhaust all the cases that mark the beginnings of higher 
education in Africa in the aftermath of colonisation and independence. However, 
But it suffices to safe that my comments on the few cases I have picked manage 
to give some picture of the landscape of higher education and the different 
motives behind the establishment of higher education. In the next subsection I 
will endeavour to develop a contemporary picture of higher education in Africa 
in selected cases. The selection has been motivated basically by availability of 
research on higher education in the countries. In some cases, not much is written 
about higher education so that making these cases a sample in this work would 
prove problematic.  
2.5 Higher education governance systems in nine African countries: a 
contemporary picture 
In this subsection, I will consider governance arrangements in randomly selected 
countries. Much of what one reads on higher education in Africa tends to be 
descriptive and as such there is a great deal of quantitative information on higher 
education systems on the African continent compared to a few analytical works 
on the same. In my argument I will fall back on a work edited by Altbach and 
Teferra (2003). This work, though, is not the only conceptual analysis of the state 
of higher education on the African continent. For instance, Olukoshi and Zeleza 
(2004) have edited another work dealing with issues of liberalism and 
internationalisation in African universities. On the other hand, Altbach and 
 43 
Teferra‟s (2003) work is one of the latest publications on the state of higher 
education governance in Africa. Altbach and Teferra‟s collection is authoritative 
for this purpose because of its inclusiveness. This collection is comprised of 
chapters by authoritative educational researchers within each country in Africa.  
2.5.1 Higher education governance in Egypt 
My first purposive random choice of Egypt acknowledges the Egyptian higher 
education system as unique within the African context because the geographical 
location of the country offers it unique cultural mixes as the country can be 
considered as one of the meeting points of early civilisation. In Section 2.2.1 I 
have discussed the origins of higher education in Africa as dating back to the 
Egyptian civilisation. Egypt is home to one of the oldest universities in the 
world, the Al-Azhar University. This university was established much later, that 
is 970 A.D. (Assie-Lumumba, 2006: 36), than the Alexandria Museum and 
Library (Ajayi et al., 1996: 6), which laid the foundations for university life. The 
account of university beginnings in Egypt by Ajayi et al. (1996: 5) reflects the 
role and function of the university as a centre for free pursuit of knowledge 
combined with necessary responsibilities within particular cultures. It is recorded 
that “the spirit of resistance and local patriotism symbolised by Alexandria bred 
the monastic system” (Ajayi et al., 1996: 7). This can be seen as an exercise of 
autonomy in resistance to political authority. In addition, this period led to the 
favouring of monastic or communal life whereby the search for knowledge was 
held as a joint venture of the members of the community.  
Today, Egypt continues to act as a meeting point of African, Asian and European 
values and ways of life. According to Said (2003: 385–300), public higher 
education in Egypt today is considered to be free but mainly in relation to the 
Egyptian legislative framework. This view can evoke the nature of higher 
education in the early centuries as experienced by the people of Alexandria. 
Although such is the case, one also notes that in many cases today‟s university 
personnel and management conduct the business/affairs of the university system 
in much the same way that government business is done. In other words, Said 
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(2003) argues that there is little distinction between the civil service and the 
university system, in so far as the governing system and structure are concerned.  
The Egyptian higher education sector is by legislation divided into two 
categories similarly controlled by separate legislations. There is the university 
sector that, in principle, is headed by a Supreme Council of Universities. This 
council is chaired by the Minister of Higher Education. It is argued that it is only 
in theory that this council is independent of the ministry itself (Said, 2003: 292). 
Said‟s observation can be taken to mean that the Ministry of Higher Education, 
which is an arm of government – the political institution, practically controls the 
affairs of the higher education sector. 
 On the other hand, there is a non-university sector that incorporates higher 
technical institutions. This sector has the same structures as the one controlled by 
the Supreme Council of Universities, only “it is far less autonomous” (Said, 
2003: 292), even in terms of how its legislative framework works. This can be 
explained by the fact that the Ministry of Higher Education, through the Supreme 
Council of Universities, makes “all major decisions concerning admission levels 
and standards, definition of programmes and curricula, creation of new academic 
posts … establishment of academic standards and their assessment”, as Said 
(2003: 292) notes. This implies that by legislation, technical institutions in Egypt, 
by their nature, are supposed to be controlled by government although the 
technical institutions have structures similar to those in the universities. 
Given some of the elements the researcher has highlighted above, one can 
conclude that the Egyptian public higher education system is a good example of 
a higher education system that is created for government and run by government. 
For instance, Said (2003: 292) indicates that the Ministry of Planning and the 
Ministry of Finance discuss with individual universities their budget needs and 
allocations. In this process the Supreme Council of Universities and the Ministry 
of Higher Education are not involved. As a result, Said (2003: 292–293) also 
states, “institutions have very limited authority over internal reallocations of 
resources among budget categories”. So the lack of distinction between the state 
 45 
and the university systems, which I have pointed out above, is not only on 
account of their similarity but because the state controls the university. 
Based on the research that Said (2003) reports on, one can fairly conclude that 
the higher education governance system in Egypt today is in the hands of 
government and/or state bureaucracy. This means that the university system in 
Egypt does set the agenda for most of its activities. The government of Egypt is 
the main agent that sets the agenda of higher education and ensures that its 
projects are carried out. Such conditions in governance systems and structures 
are indicative of state control, as outlined above. But as much as one can argue 
that the state controls the higher education sector in Egypt in general, there is 
also some evidence indicating that the state at times interferes with the same 
mechanisms that it puts in place to regulate higher education. For example, the 
state and some of its agents, like the Minister of Finance, are at liberty to 
overlook the Supreme Council and the Ministry of Education in relation to 
funding needs and requirements. While the main condition of the relationship 
between the state and the university is that of state control, instances of state 
interference can also be observed where the state can be regarded as interfering 
with its own set protocols. It is in this regard that I think that the Egyptian higher 
education system in Egypt exhibits forms of less autonomy because of being 
state controlled.  
In conclusion, it is important to note that an examination of the higher education 
system reveals that Egypt was the first place to show traces of higher education 
dating back to a few centuries B.C. On top of this, Egypt has the oldest surviving 
university system, the Al-Azhar University, which was established in 970 A.D. 
(Assie-Lumumba, 2006: 36). Nevertheless, the origins of higher education in 
Egypt were the Alexandria Museum and Library (Ajayi et al., 1996: 6). I have 
pointed out above that the origin of higher education in Egypt reveals a picture of 
the university as a centre for the free pursuit of knowledge that is combined with 
the necessary responsibilities within particular cultures (Ajayi et al., 1996: 5). In 
my view the origin of higher education in Egypt shows that university life was 
endowed with greater autonomy than is the case currently. The “spirit of 
 46 
resistance and local patriotism that symbolised Alexandria” and gave birth to the 
monastic system “favouring the search for knowledge as a joint venture” (Ajayi 
et al., 1996: 7) exemplifies a state of human agency and autonomy where people 
could not compromise their autonomy in the face of any authoritarian system or 
intruding authority. In this period, though, the picture of political forces that 
could direct the search for knowledge to their advantage does not come up. 
Despite such a prestigious beginning for higher education, today‟s Egyptian 
higher education governance shows many signs of being under state control and 
being directed more by politics than by the mere search for knowledge as a joint 
venture whose terms could only be dictated by the co-operating members.  
2.5.2 Higher education in Nigeria 
The origins of higher education in Nigeria can be understood in the context of the 
broader West African region. Okafor (1971: 21–23) reports that although at the 
outset there was a need for the creation of a university that would cater for the 
African character, suggestions for the university favoured Sierra Leone‟s 
Freetown as the place where the university needed to be established. As such, 
Fourah Bay College was created in 1876 with affiliation to the University of 
Durham (Ajayi et al., 1996: 23). This university faintly represented the need for a 
university for West Africa that would take into account the need for an African 
environment of education where the character of the Africa person is nurtured.  
“Fourah Bay College remained the only university institution in West Africa 
until 1948” (Ajayi et al., 1996: 24). 
The need for the establishment of a university in Nigeria was commensurate with 
the need for a West African university, to some extent. Benjamin Nnamdi 
Azikiwe was the first Nigerian to call for the establishment of a university in 
Nigeria (Okafor, 1971: 41). This call was part of a broader call for „a new‟ or 
„renascent‟ Africa whose philosophy centred on five principles, namely spiritual 
balance, social regeneration, economic determination, mental emancipation and 
national resurgence (Okafor, 1971: 42). The establishment of an African 
university based on these values and principles was regarded as a vital tool for 
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emancipating the mind of the new African person while at the same time helping 
in the reconstruction of a New Africa. Ajayi et al. (1996: 27) conclude that the 
African university as envisaged by Azikiwe would be defined “not merely by its 
historical continuity with the African past, but even more by its commitment to 
the renaissance of Africa”. 
Although not very successful, Yaba Higher College, established in 1930 (Okafor, 
1971: 72), was the first establishment of higher education in Nigeria. Among 
other things, the college was criticised for duplicating the efforts of other 
institutions and for being just another institution meant to cater only for the 
supplying of government with young recruits who could work with it and not 
necessarily for empowering the citizenry because its standard was low. This 
college closed in 1947, giving way to the establishment of the University of 
Ibadan, which was affiliated to the University of London (Okafor, 1971: 80, 88, 
& 91). 
Yaba Higher College and the University College of Ibadan were not started as 
direct results of colonial imperatives. These institutions were started as a result of 
pro-nationalist thinking that considered the establishment of centres of higher 
education as critical to the independence of West African peoples. It is also clear 
that although the colonial governments ensured the origins of these institutions 
through the various commissioned reports, education was left in the hands of the 
missionaries. The creation of the University of Ibadan, with affiliation to the 
University of London, and its claims to university autonomy came under attack 
because of the thinking that a university within a state could not be absolutely 
autonomous and that such claims have to be in tandem with the social mission of 
the university – “to reflect national aspirations of the people” it was meant to 
serve (Okafor, 1971: 96). 
Today, the higher education system in Nigeria is marked by the type of its 
political system. Nigeria has a federal government in which several states 
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„claim‟5 to have semi-autonomous forms of governance. Consequently, there are 
'“federal universities” and “state universities” (Jibril, 2003: 493). Jibril further 
states that the higher education system was created by government as a way of 
producing midlevel workers to meet the needs of the colonial civil service. To an 
extent, the Nigerian system of higher education can be considered as part of the 
government system, in so far as its scope is framed and operates according to 
what government desires.  
Nonetheless, the above thinking assumes that government cannot put in place 
structures for the development of its people. The problem here lies in whether 
such structures are really put in place for the development of citizens or whether 
they only serve government‟s utilitarian purposes. Okafor (1971), Ajayi et al. 
(1996) and many others duly recognise that the genesis of higher education in 
Nigeria was linked with nationalist liberation motives as well as the need to 
make the university a centre for creating personnel for national development.  
Jibril (2003) also recognises that in Nigeria, all higher education institutions 
came to be considered as full, „autonomous‟ colleges and universities after 
independence in 1960. Despite this statement, Jibril (2003) does not shed enough 
light regarding the nature and parameters of this autonomy, if any. Such lack of 
clarity moves one to speculate that the autonomy of these institutions resides in 
their legislative framework. But whether this autonomy is in a lived form or 
exercised in the business of higher education is another matter. Nevertheless, 
what is clear is that the university system, which came into effect after the 
1960‟s, was part of the broader agenda for national development.   
To date, higher education institutions in Nigeria are still heavily subsidised by 
the state. The governance structures between the universities, polytechnics and 
colleges of education are the same irrespective of whether the institution is a 
state or a federal institution. Each institution is governed by a council, 
comprising both internal members and members external to the institution. These 
members are directly chosen by a respective government. While each institution 
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  My indication of the concept „claim‟ is not meant and used in a pejorative sense as it may appear in 
this case. 
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has its normal administrative ladder from principal down to clerks, it is senates 
(in the case of universities) and academic boards (in the case of the other higher 
education institutions that are not universities) that decide over academic issues 
such as curricula, admission requirements, examinations and accreditation. Jibril 
does not clearly separate the councils from the senates and academic boards. One 
can only assume that these are different bodies that enable the institutions to 
operate efficiently. 
Jibril (2003: 493) also notes that the federal government keeps an eye on each of 
the institutions through the appointment of a government agency for each type of 
institution. The agencies oversee quality assurance and control and funding in 
accordance with government directives. Not much light is shed on how these 
government agencies operate in relation to the functions of the councils, senates 
and academic boards. Trade unions such as the Academic Staff Union of 
Universities and other similar arrangements for students operate nationwide to 
bring to the attention of government the needs/grievances of their members. 
Again, not much elaboration is made on these processes. But one can equally 
intimate that this relationship reflects a „master-servant‟ relationship. 
The nature and functions of the relevant governing bodies for universities in 
Nigeria raise questions as to whether the Nigerian higher education system is 
really as autonomous as Jibril (2003: 493) claims it to be. This questioning is 
necessary because what one is provided with is a picture of a post-independence 
government that has overarching control and influence over the institutions of the 
university and its structures. In this relationship, the government is portrayed as 
the „master‟ or the „initiator‟ of most university activities, and there is no clear 
sign that such a role by the government could possibly be carried out in line with 
democratic values and principles. The assumption that this role of dominance is 
normal for a government in Africa is also problematic.  
To sum up, one can state that higher education life in Nigeria shows two 
dominant faces. On the one hand, the life of the university colleges before 
independence came along with the introduction of colonialism, although it is 
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stated that the governments did not actively involve themselves with the 
university. The setting up of the university was left in the hands of missionaries. 
Despite the missionary influence in establishing higher education in Nigeria, it is 
also evident that the system that was planted allowed more room for liberal 
values, hence the call to Africanise the nature and functions of the university by a 
number of people such as Azikiwe (Okafor, 1971: 41–44). In the post-
independence period, higher education adopted a nationalist agenda of providing 
a workforce for the development of the country. This period shows elements of a 
system that is less liberal because of the perception that the university was 
established to fulfil national goals of development. But what makes it less liberal 
is the control of government over the determination of how the university will 
function and who will control it. The predominance of a government agenda, the 
government control of budgets and other crucial positions in the governance of 
the university, although fulfilling to an extent the need for a place of learning 
attuned to African needs and the urge for West African nationalism, do not fare 
well on the map of liberalism.  
2.5.3 Higher education in Ghana 
The demand for higher education in Ghana can be considered as rooted in the 
traditions of the Ghanaian society. Budu, Gariba and Munah (2007: 31) argue 
that the pre-colonial Ghanaian societies valued knowledge and those who were 
well versed in the traditions of a community and who could apply this knowledge 
to solve local problems, irrespective of their status in society. In this case, it 
appears that the value of knowledge lay not in possessing knowledge for its own 
sake but in its high potential for resolving problems confronting humankind.  
Although Ghana became an independent republic in 1960, its university life 
stretches back to the colonial period with the University College of the Gold 
Coast being established in 1948 as an affiliate college of the University of 
London (Budu et al., 2007: 34). The university was created to offer programmes 
in the humanities, arts, sciences and agriculture. In the post-independence period, 
accelerated growth and social transformation prompted the need for varied and 
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specialised human resources and institutions, which shifted the focus of higher 
education to the development of science and technology (Budu et al., 2007: 1). 
This explains the reasons for the establishment of the University College of Gold 
Coast, whose core function was to provide specialised training for teachers of 
science and mathematics in secondary schools and technical schools (Budu et al., 
2007: 36).  
Quoting Sawyerr, Budu et al. (2007: 36) also argue that university development 
in Ghana was accompanied by a great deal of public interest that saw the 
development of higher education as a critical component for and of national 
development. In Ghana several universities have been established with campuses 
in all the regions of the country (Budu et al., 2007: 35).  
Sawyerr‟s (1994: 22–53) own analysis of the higher education system in Ghana 
identifies three development stages of the system. He argues that from 1957 to 
1966, the relationship between the university and the state could be described as 
that of state control. The government invested a great deal of resources in the 
sector with the hope of making the sector play a critical role in national self-
discovery, culture and sovereignty. The state of events that led to state control 
were university elitism, conservatism and bureaucracy on the one hand and the 
state‟s impatience with university conduct on the other hand, which further 
developed into the state claiming greater control of the university (Budu et al., 
2007: 39).   
Sawyerr (1994) and Budu et al. (2007) seem to agree that from 1966 to 1981 the 
university system in Ghana underwent a period of relative autonomy. While this 
period historically reflects mixes of military rule and civilian rule, there were no 
major attempts to control the universities (Budu et al., 2007: 40). The 
universities maintained their freedom to determine their modes of operation in 
terms of teaching, research, expansion of faculties and internal administration. 
This period also represents the economic downturn of the Ghanaian economy 
after independence, but although the government had reduced funding to 
universities, the universities retained their power to allocate funds to different 
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programmes. Budu et al. (2007: 41) point out that this state of relative autonomy 
may have been contributed to by a number of critical factors. First, the 
fragmented organisational structure of the university along with the traditions of 
academic freedom and the decentralised decision-making power among principal 
officers, the senior professoriate and the committee systems managed to shield 
the university from external pressure. A second factor was the strong leadership 
and diplomatic skills that the university had. The university also enjoyed a 
privileged status, which political authority understood well (Budu et al., 2007: 
41).  
The third stage of development is regarded as a stage of confrontation and 
directed change. This stage has mixes of supervision and control, which gives 
one the impression that this was a stage of state interference. This was a time 
when Ghana was ruled by the military regime of Jerry Rawlings (ibid).  
I would agree with Effah (2003: 345) that the general picture of higher education 
in Ghana today is that of “a two-tier, or bicameral system of governance”. This 
system of governance assumes that university councils would be independent and 
have sufficient “autonomy to determine the content of academic programmes, 
subject to appropriate oversight for the maintenance of standards” (Budu et al., 
2007: 36). Similar to Nigeria, the first university was modelled after the British 
system with the intention of training people to take over the roles in government 
from the British colonial bosses. Until today, the “public tertiary institutions are 
perceived as a vital part of the national project of self-development and self-
realization” (Sawyerr, in Neave & Van Vught, 1994: 25). 
In this bicameral system there are councils that take care of overall finance, 
development, appointments and discipline, as well as senates/academic boards 
that are responsible for all academic matters. The university council consists of 
members from government, the university, students‟ representative councils and 
workers‟ associations, as well as alumni (Effah, 2003: 345). Effah also notes that 
the “minister of education has ministerial oversight over all levels of education”. 
Government funds up to 40% of the higher education system‟s budget. The 
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White Paper on Education in Ghana introduced the idea of cost sharing between 
government, students and the private sector (Effah, 2003: 343–344). 
Although history shows government intrusions into the running of the 
universities, such as the appointment of „special professors‟ directly responsible 
to the president as well as the demands to conform to government regulation and 
rules, Effah (2003: 346) maintains that “the institutional structure, the legal 
framework provided for in the acts and statues, and the substantial amount of 
authority vested in the elaborate system of committees and boards insulate the 
academic community from outside forces and interference”.   
In other words, Effah‟s account amounts to an argument for formal institutional 
autonomy as structured in the statutes of the university. But that conception falls 
short of any indication for the substantive conditions of autonomy. Although 
substantive conditions of autonomy are not thoroughly examined in Effah‟s 
account, he nevertheless indicates that “absolute autonomy is not possible as long 
as the government continues to fund higher education” (Effah, 2003: 346). 
Sawyerr‟s views concur with this thinking in his observation that in post-colonial 
Ghana there has been a tendency to treat “universities as objects of policy and 
means for achieving given ends and not as subjects with a definite character and 
ethos …” (Sawyerr, in Neave & Van Vught, 1994: 24). In most cases the ends 
are defined by the government in power. Sawyerr‟s view consolidates the view 
that African governments treat higher education systems as a means to their ends. 
The university system in Ghana has also come under the influence of 
globalisation and neo-liberalism. This is evidenced by the drift towards a market-
oriented model of the university. Although the initial stages were introduced in 
Ghana through the private higher educator sector, the public higher education 
sector, through the University for Development Studies, has also adopted market 
models of higher education. Budu et al. (2007: 54) argue that this university was 
established with the purpose of adopting alternative perspectives for teaching, 
research and community outreach. This approach to the university combines the 
merits of technological approaches and community integration in the 
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development of curriculum. Hence, in the case of Ghana, one can talk of market-
oriented courses as well as people-centred courses where the development of the 
larger society is assigned a pivotal role in curriculum innovation (Budu et al., 
2007: 54–59).   
2.5.4 A comparison between the Kenyan higher education system and 
higher education in Zimbabwe 
Kenya‟s public higher education system, which is comprised of six universities, 
is headed by its state president, who serves as chancellor. This system is similar 
to Zimbabwe‟s system where the state president is the sole chancellor of all 
seven state-sponsored universities (Maunde, 2003: 644). In both cases, the 
president is also considered to wield enormous power and influence over the 
affairs of the university. 
Among other things, the president in Kenya appoints the vice-chancellors and 
principals of the universities‟ constituent colleges. These appointees owe their 
positions to their loyalty to the head of state. The president also nominates most 
members of the university council (Ngome, 2003: 362). “The various statutes 
that regulate public universities in Kenya allow government to have direct 
control over university institutions” (Ngome, 2003: 367). As a result, political 
patronage, rather than competence and merit, characterise most of the 
appointments and promotions and all decision-making processes.  
The concentration of power in one person‟s hands manifests itself in Kenya‟s 
higher education system at different levels of governance. Ngome (2003: 367) 
argues that the vice-chancellors and the principals exercise enormous power and 
authority to the extent of single-handedly controlling appointments and 
promotions. Formally, councils are mandated with such matters. In addition to 
these governance structures, management boards were also created to assist vice-
chancellors in the running of universities. The case presented by Ngome (2003:  
363, 367) indicates a system of higher education in which confusion and 
ambiguity surround the nature and functions of the appointed boards. This 
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conclusion is based on the observation that in some cases, the management 
boards are constitutionally sanctioned while in others, they are not. These boards 
are also heavily used to ratify the personal decisions of vice-chancellors, while in 
other cases the boards assume senate powers in university management (Ngome, 
2003: 362, 367). 
In the governance of public higher education in Kenya, the management of 
financial resources has moved from free universities to fee-paying universities 
subsidised by government. Also in place are student loan schemes and bursaries 
from government. Due to dwindling funding from government, parallel and 
external degree programmes were introduced to boost the revenues. 
Nevertheless, Ngome (2003: 363) worries that it is mostly students from affluent 
families who may benefit from these schemes because “all students were eligible 
for the loan regardless of their economic status”. From such intimations one can 
further conclude that equity principles are missing in terms of access to public 
higher education in Kenya. This is the case considering that the cost of higher 
education means much more than the basic tuition. The demand by university 
students that government financial schemes cover every individual student 
equally irrespective of need or distress, as it is recorded by Ngome (2003: 363), 
is a scenario that one can find in a number of African universities, including the 
University of Malawi and in universities in Zimbabwe, for example.  
Ironically, Ngome (2003: 362) wants to make one believe that it is the 
“management by committee system that tends to slow down decision-making 
processes” in the university governance system irrespective of the catalogued 
political and administrative interference that the university is made to live with. 
In itself, this thinking may imply that Ngome in his perspective does not endorse 
democratic representative systems of governance and the merits that accrue from 
such processes directly to the people participating in the processes. He would 
rather see an efficient governance system that operates by directives from a 
certain authoritative position than a deliberative democratic process that 
inevitably takes time to resolve issues. 
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While the president in Zimbabwe is the chancellor of all state-sponsored 
universities, he is also the head of the government agency funding universities 
(Maunde, 2003: 644). Maunde‟s analysis of higher education in Zimbabwe 
avoids tackling the governance of higher education. Instead, the author has opted 
to consider the historical and descriptive aspects of higher education in 
Zimbabwe. But towards the end of the chapter the author slightly hints that 
government has overarching control over higher education (Maunde, 2003: 647). 
The public higher education system in Zimbabwe can be considered one where 
there are no checks and balances in the way power is exercised. “The use of 
university budget allocations was left to the arbitrary whims of the Ministry of 
Higher Education and the university authorities” (Maunde, 2003: 647). I concede 
that my reading can be considered as “reading between the lines”, but the point I 
want to make is that it is quite evident at the end of this chapter that the 
government in Zimbabwe uses the university to resist change. Although not 
much information is given on how the system itself is governed, conclusions of 
state control of higher education are to a large extent justifiable.  
2.5.5 Higher education in Uganda 
 In Uganda, the higher education system was started, developed and managed in 
order to contribute to national and regional development. Although university 
life was established as far back as 1949 (Musisi & Muwanga, 2003: 7) the 
University Act was only created in 1970. Musisi and Muwanga (2003) locate the 
origins of the university in Uganda to the initiatives of the British colonial 
administration, which established Makerere Technical School in 1922, after the 
First World War “to assure the world that it was also concerned with the welfare 
of colonial peoples” (2003: 7). The school was created to develop a middle cadre 
of civil servants beyond clerks, messengers and interpreters, and to improve on 
the educational policies prevailing at the time. This technical school developed 
into Makerere Higher College for East Africa in 1937. In 1963, Makerere 
University amalgamated with universities in Kenya and Tanzania to form the 
University of East Africa (ibid). It is during this period that Makerere became 
renowned as a world-class university for the training of professionals. 
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Makerere University‟s strength lay in its reputation, its location in a vibrant 
and growing city, and its well-established infrastructure. The quality of its 
staff, the highly selective quality of its student body, sound and innovative 
management and external linkages and support were sources of great pride. 
(Musisi & Muwanga, 2003: 8) 
Makerere University can be considered as central to understanding the life of the 
university in Uganda. The flourishing beginnings of university life in Makerere 
took a dramatic turn at the beginning of the 1970s. Musisi and Muwanga (2003: 
9) argue that inflation and world economic monetary mechanisms remain at the 
root of this dramatic turn of events. On the one hand, high inflation in the 1970s 
ate into university budgets, particularly salaries and other services. On the other 
hand, the World Bank and other international monetary organisations encouraged 
the new African governments to cut down on public spending by, among other 
things, reducing funding of non-essential services. The university was also 
perceived as non-essential compared to the government mandate to provide 
education at primary and secondary levels. It is conceded that such forces and the 
policy shift came at a time when the population was growing and demand for 
higher education was increasing (Musisi & Muwanga, 2003: 10). The Ugandan 
higher education system was further disturbed by several years of civil unrest. 
The effects of these conditions were observed in lowering of the morale of 
university lecturers as they tried to make ends meet, the dwindling of teaching 
and learning resources and student unrest. In general, one can argue that what 
seemed to be a flourishing African university life suddenly came to an end. 
These conditions made the governance of the higher education system in Uganda 
problematic.  
The University Act, which was promulgated in 1970, gave government political 
power/control over university administration. Policies were generated and issues 
resolved according to government directives. One can easily conclude that such 
legislation, although meant for the higher education system, fundamentally tilted 
the balance of power in higher education towards government. 
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The public higher education system in Uganda has three evident key players. 
These are the National Resistance Movement, which controls government, the 
universities and the National Council for Higher Education (NCHE). The NCHE 
acts as “an intermediary body between higher education institutions and the 
government” (Musisi, 2003: 614). The NCHE is also mandated to promote the 
objectives of university education; address government‟s development, 
coordination, planning, administration and financial management of national 
universities; coordinate students‟ admission and accreditation of national 
universities; and serve as a data bank on higher education institutions for 
government and other key players (Musisi, 2003: 618). 
Musisi argues that Uganda allows candidates to apply for studies directly to any 
of the available tertiary education institutions. It appears as if before this was the 
case, students were applying and being allocated space in the university 
depending on the demand in the public service (2003: 618). This could mean that 
government directly allocated places for students and determined what they were 
to study in the university. The current access conditions also mean that the 
system has moved from a fully government-funded system to a cost-sharing 
system. But due to increases in enrolment in a bid to increase revenue, the quality 
of teaching and learning dropped. Musisi (2003: 619) argues that the drop in 
quality forced government to create a department of higher education. It is 
important to note in this regard that the University and Other Tertiary Institutions 
Act was only promulgated in 2001 to take care of the governance system and 
issues of student access (Musisi, 2003: 619).  
Musisi (2003: 619) argues that the new act contains two main objectives, which 
are to regulate and guide the establishment and management of higher education 
institutions and to act as a qualifications framework watchdog. The act also 
creates and puts into operation the NCHE. The act removes the president as 
chancellor and increases the powers of senate representatives and councils. 
According to this act, the NCHE is empowered to register, monitor, evaluate, 
coordinate and certify institutions and their activities (Musisi, 2003: 619). 
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2.5.6 The university system in Malawi 
Until recently Malawi had one national university, the University of Malawi, 
with five constituent colleges and one central administration centre named the 
University Office. It was only in 1997 that an act of Parliament established the 
second national and public university called Mzuzu University. Its first students 
were admitted in January 1999. Three private universities were opened after 
2000. 
Similar to other African countries, the public higher education system in Malawi 
was introduced to meet the economic and cultural demands of the country after 
independence in 1964 (Chimombo, 2003: 414). Chimombo (2003: 415) further 
indicates that at its establishment, the University of Malawi was intended to 
create local personnel that would assist government and the private sector; it 
would also initiate educational and industrial research that would benefit the 
whole education system and the wider public sector. Nevertheless, issues of 
access and financing have, over the years, been under the strict control of 
government.  
The system of higher education in Malawi has five constituent colleges under the 
University of Malawi. The five colleges are Chancellor College, the Malawi 
Polytechnic, Malawi College of Medicine, Bunda College of Agriculture and 
Malawi College of Nursing. These are run by the central offices of the University 
of Malawi. The University Office coordinates selection, funding and all other 
major activities for the constituent colleges. In other words, governance at the 
University of Malawi uses a federal system with parallel administrative 
structures in each of the five colleges, that is, from principals to librarians and 
support-staff structures. This means that the structures of governance that are 
manifested at the level of individual colleges are replicas of administrative 
structures at the University (Central) Office. In this case, each stage of the 
administrative structure, each assistant registrar of a college, owes allegiance to 
similar structures in the central offices by carrying out instructions from such 
offices as well as responding to local structures of authority in each individual 
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college. Chimombo (2003: 416) argues that this dual system of allegiance creates 
confusion and duplication in the governance system of higher education in 
Malawi.
6
 
The financing of higher education in Malawi has since its inception been 
dependent on government. Hence, there has been a heavy government 
involvement in the choice of what programmes are to be run and to what extent. 
For instance, in different political circumstances of the nation, access to the 
university has been shifting between access based on academic merit and access 
based on a district quota system. These shifts have largely been dictated by the 
government in power. In addition to this, entrance to the university, that is, to 
each college, still depends on the available bed-space in each college. Due to 
limited space, only a few candidates have traditionally been selected every year 
to start their first year. One can consider this limited provisioning of college bed-
spaces as an unintended consequence brought about by inadequate government 
infrastructure since all the colleges in this regard are owned by government.  
Furthermore, Chimombo (2003: 419–420), citing Dzimadzi, states that until 
1985, university education in terms of fees, board and lodging, and medical 
expenses was free. Students were also given an allowance for incidental 
expenses. Afterwards a co-sharing mechanism was hesitantly put in place at the 
instruction of the World Bank. The co-sharing positioning of higher education in 
Malawi has resulted in a deepening financial crisis in the sector. This crisis is 
easily noticed in the increasing dilapidation of university infrastructure and 
declining relevance and quality of education and research, which eventually led 
to the inability of the university to implement some of its programs, such as 
adequate training of lecturers, production of up-to-date research and provision of 
books. Chimombo (2003: 419) also notes that this situation has been seen as the 
foremost reason for a number of conflicts between staff, students, management 
and government, leading to numerous strikes in the sector. The frequent closures 
of the university due to political and economic unrest resulted in the university 
                                                 
6
 Similar observations are also contained in the Malawi Institute of Management Report (MIM) (1997) 
on the state of the University of Malawi, available at http://www.unima.mw/downloads/mimreport.pdf, 
p 43.  
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abandoning its term system to adopt a semester system because, among other 
things, the university curriculum could not cope with the routine term calendar 
for each year due to these constraints.    
The higher education system in Malawi shows signs of collapsing standards in 
output and lack of morale at all levels of the system because of unstable and 
dwindling government financial support. Chimombo (2003: 421) argues that the 
governance system in the University of Malawi is in a crisis. The crisis concerns 
issues of direction, internal organisation and relevance. The Malawi Institute of 
Management Report (MIM, 1997: 48) to the Malawi Government, in general, 
proposes a more market-orientated type of university offering in terms of 
stepping up university output in order to meet the increasing demands of the 
market economy. The market-oriented university is proposed as one way of 
effectively using the dwindling resources.  
Towards the end of the 1990s the University of Malawi introduced higher tuition 
fees, from 2 500 Malawian Kwacha to 25 000 for residential students. Ironically, 
almost all students, who are selected on a residential basis, are given loans by 
government, covering tuition, board, medical expenses and book allowances. In 
theory, the loans are repayable after graduation. It is not clear to the public how 
these loans are being recovered. Chimombo (2003: 420) argues that this policy 
tends to favour certain groups of people in society, especially those coming from 
wealthy families. Chimombo (2003: 420) also maintains that “the student loan 
scheme was undertaken without wider consultation and debate or consideration 
of more equitable ways” to fund public higher education in Malawi.  
2.5.7 Higher education in Namibia 
Otaala (2003: 478) claims that the university system in Namibia inherited the 
British idea of a university with its concepts of autonomy and academic freedom. 
Nevertheless, there is no elaboration as to what autonomy and academic freedom 
may mean in the Namibian case of higher education. But further on, Otaala 
(2003: 480) describes the University of Namibia as having taken its place in 
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assisting government to achieve its goals of national development. This 
promotion of national development is encapsulated in what is seemingly a 
managerialist and neo-liberal agenda. The governance philosophy at the 
University of Namibia is coined as the “promotion of management efficiency” 
(Otaala, 2003: 480).  
I argue that Otaala‟s (2003) views may cause ambivalence in one‟s 
understanding of higher education in Namibia. This is in relation to a reading of 
how governance of the university is handled as enacted in Section 6 of the 
University of Namibia Act, no. 18 of 1992 (Republic of Namibia, 1992). This 
section states that the chancellor, who is the titular head of the university, shall 
be elected and be in office for a period of six years, after which he/she may be re-
elected. This formulation initially opens up the chancellor‟s position to any other 
persons who may be capable of and interested in holding the position. This 
basically means the position is open to competition from any members of the 
public who feel that they qualify for the post.  
Later in the act things turn around as the act virtually makes the head of state 
chancellor of the higher education system. Section 26 (1) states, 
“Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 6, the first Chancellor of the 
University shall be the incumbent of the office of President of the Republic of 
Namibia on the date of commencement of this Act, who shall be deemed to have 
been elected as Chancellor of the University in terms of that section”. In other 
words, by virtue of making the state president the titular head of the higher 
education system, the chancellorship of the University of Namibia falls under 
state control just as in many other cases that I have evaluated above. The mixing 
of this idea with the concept of a free market of ideas and economic productivity 
only adds confusion to the understanding of governance in the university for 
governments are not the best proponents of a free market and economic 
competition on the African continent.  
In addition, the university is expected to submit a programme of activities for 
each preceding year to the Minister of Education, who in turn presents it to 
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Parliament. In this regard one needs to note that according to forms of public 
governance, parliament is one of the institutions of government. In addition to 
this, parliaments on the African continent are also reflective of ruling parties in 
the different countries, in many respects. This observation implies that the 
University of Namibia, given other African cases I have analysed above, may not 
be independent of government. Funding for the university comes from 
government upon consultation between the Minister of Education and the 
Minister of Finance. 
2.5.8 Major trends in higher education governance arrangements in 
South Africa 
My last country of analysis is South Africa and I outline a few major trends that 
characterise higher education governance in South Africa. My concentration goes 
on governance patterns after the abolition of the apartheid system. Nevertheless, 
such a focus cannot take place in exclusion of an understanding of the basic 
characteristics of life that necessitated educational change in South Africa. As 
such, the apartheid system of higher education governance will be mentioned in 
order to shed light on the motivations for some of the changes that have occurred 
in higher education governance in South Africa since then. In this regard, I want 
to acknowledge that the recently introduced transformation of the higher 
education sector in South Africa has gone through tremendous change and 
through different paradigms. Lange (2003: 2) asserts that “the transformation of 
governance of higher education institutions in South Africa took a historical form 
that responded to particular political and ideological circumstances”.  
The historical picture of higher education governance in South Africa can be 
considered by analysing the apartheid period as different from the post-apartheid 
period. My contention is that the options for higher education governance in 
South Africa since the end of apartheid have always reflected an option against 
its previous imbalances and segregatory educational policies. In other words, the 
apartheid system of education acts as a background for the creation of a new and 
antithetical higher education order.  
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Higher education governance in South Africa is affected by and reflects its 
history under apartheid. Nash (2006: 4) argues that the apartheid system created 
an “ongoing crisis of legitimacy for all South African universities” by reinforcing 
racial barriers, among other things. The apartheid system, instead of creating a 
unified higher education system, created three deformed systems. The Bantu 
Education Act, which was promulgated in 1953, motivated and determined most 
patterns of higher education governance in apartheid South Africa. Within this 
framework, tertiary institutions fell into three categories: the English-medium 
universities, the Afrikaans-medium universities and the homeland universities. 
The main thrust of building a system based on racial segregation rested partly on 
the assumption that each ethnic group needed to enjoy its own homeland 
education system, where the culture, language and heritage of each group would 
be preserved and promoted (Nash, 2006: 5).  
This categorisation and framing assumed that higher education institutions would 
have a great deal of leverage in so far as matters of self-governance were 
concerned within their locations of operation. But such a categorisation and its 
characteristic management of higher education systems also assumed ideals of 
segregation and separate development, thereby creating imbalances in forms of 
pedagogy and educational governance (with particular reference to separate 
schools, see Hartshorne, 1992: 36–37). For instance, the homeland universities 
were deprived of the state-of-the-art facilities for efficient higher education 
development whereas the white universities, in this case both the English-
medium and Afrikaans-medium universities, had many resources at their 
disposal. 
Hall and Symes (2003: 6) argue that the divisions in the apartheid higher 
education system were characterised by language, ethnicity, location and 
resources and that the governance of the institutions during this period did not 
reflect one model of state-university relationship. In other words, while the state 
exerted much influence on the governance of the homeland universities, such as 
the University of Venda, the University of the North and the University of 
Zululand, in order to protect its own political interests of seclusion, the so-called 
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liberal universities, such as the University of Natal (now called the University of 
Zululand), the University of Cape Town and the Witwatersrand University, were 
subjected to little state interference, given the nature of state repression at the 
time. The Afrikaner universities, such as the Rand Afrikaans University, the 
University of Pretoria, Stellenbosch University and the University of Port 
Elizabeth, were regarded as promoters of the seclusion ideology and hence also 
regarded as part of the state. 
The differential treatment of universities by the state created imbalances between 
the universities. In general, the governance of the higher education system during 
the apartheid system is characterised by lack of homogeneity and coordination. 
This background created a need for a single, co-ordinated system of higher 
education that would effectively remove the discrepancies, discrimination and 
injustices that resulted from the apartheid system (Department of Education, 
1997; Hall & Symes, 2003; Nash, 2006). 
The inception of a new system of higher education governance in South Africa is 
informed by a number of values. These values are meant to enable the nation to 
rid the system of the discrepancies and injustices while at the same time creating 
enabling conditions for a democratic South Africa. The Education White Paper 3 
(Department of Education, 1996: 7–8) outlines the pillars upon which higher 
education governance in South Africa is supposed to rest. Some of the major 
pillars for higher education governance include equity and redress, 
democratisation and development. Higher education was also expected to 
maintain values of quality assurance, effectiveness and efficiency, academic 
freedom, institutional autonomy and public accountability. 
In general, there is a strong intimation in White Paper 3 that higher education in 
South Africa should create conditions that would enable the education system to 
contribute to the common good of society. Equally high on the higher education 
governance agenda is that the system should be “assigned a greater role to 
national development through global competitiveness” (Waghid & Le Grange, 
2004: 34). The expectation that higher education should play a greater role 
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through global competitiveness demands that the governance of the higher 
education system in South Africa should adopt the philosophy of neo-liberalism 
– the current major sign of global competitiveness. To a large extent, this implies 
that economic efficiency becomes more imperative than issues of redress or 
equity. 
In general, I concede to the fact that the broader agenda of making higher 
education respond positively to issues of redress and global economic 
competitiveness can take place with any of the possible alternatives regarding the 
relationship between the state and the higher education sector. But the state 
supervision model can better achieve results in global economic competitiveness 
whereas state control is better suited to achieving equity goals as set by the 
national governments. Ideally, I eliminate state interference because of its very 
nature of being an ad hoc procedure in managing institutions. I think the main 
clue lies in the points of pressure used by any of the partners in making their 
agenda felt and implemented. Specifically, I take note that the two broad ways of 
looking at the benefits and/or outcomes in higher education transformation in 
South African higher education, economic global competitiveness and equity, 
contain inherent conflict between each other. Nevertheless, the general working 
relationship stipulates a model of „co-operative governance‟. This framework 
demands a fair consideration of the interests of all key stakeholders or partners 
without undermining any one of them.  
Omar and Figaji (2000: 82) argue that co-operative governance “entails 
autonomous constituencies of civil society working co-operatively with an 
assertive government”. In this regard, the different key players or interest groups 
are considered to work together towards a common goal or purpose, while at the 
same time recognising their individual interests in higher education practice and 
enterprise (Omar & Figaji, 2000: 84). Hall and Symes (2003: 7) further argue 
that co-operative governance as a model is equivalent to state supervision, a 
model that is discussed above.  
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According to Omar and Figaji (2000), co-operative governance is also a system 
of active role playing by different stakeholders. With regard to higher education 
in South Africa, the stress is on the tripartite co-operation and interaction 
between the Department of Education, higher education institutions and other 
interest groups and a higher education council. In this case, the Council on 
Higher Education (CHE) serves to bring about an effective system of co-
operative governance. 
The system of cooperative governance is envisaged to operate in such a way that 
the ministry would provide expert knowledge on educational policy, 
management, analysis and formulation, among other things. The higher 
education institutions and other interest groups are representatives of particular 
interests and act to advise the minister (Omar & Figaji, 2000: 82). In this 
framework, the advisory body on higher education acts as a buffer zone between 
the state and the institutions, ensuring that “there is no loss of autonomy” (Omar 
& Figaji, 2000: 82). In other words, co-operative governance implies stakeholder 
partnership. While these are the intended purposes of co-operative governance, 
whether these goals are pursued in the same way as meant when first formulated 
has also generated a great deal of debate within higher education discourse today. 
Hall and Symes (2005: 8) argue that White Paper 3 (Department of Education, 
1997) conceives co-operative governance as outlined above to be “a system of 
delineated powers and constraints that remain hierarchical, while incorporating 
checks and balances designed to preserve the degree of institutional autonomy 
necessary for academic freedom in teaching and research”. As such, in co-
operative governance, not all the participants have equal authority and 
responsibility. The idea that this White Paper vision endorses, namely that 
government should have the upper hand since it is the custodian of public 
interest, cannot be considered as too wide of the mark. This is further supported 
by sections 3.6 to 3.7 of White Paper 3 that expect government to exercise a 
“proactive, guiding and constructive role while expecting institutional autonomy 
to be exercised in tandem with public accountability”. Such a mandate partially 
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removes the inevitable situation of government overriding institutional decisions. 
I take this line of thought because of the counselling role government is left with. 
The ideals of co-operative governance in South Africa‟s higher education system 
are an important source for assessing academic freedom within higher education. 
The main reason is that co-operative governance has implications for relations 
between the state and higher institutions (Kraak, 2001). According to Kraak, 
through co-operative governance the apparent opposition between state 
intervention and institutional autonomy is mediated while the state remains in the 
role of steering and co-ordinating. In this case, when an institution exercises its 
autonomy, it does so within the limits of accountability in order to maintain co-
operation. Hence, co-operative governance in the South African higher education 
system necessarily assumes equality of partners operating with a commonly 
agreed agenda in order to arrive at a common good, where autonomy, 
transparency and accountability also become crucial. But the extent to which 
such a vision for higher education can be thoroughly implemented given South 
Africa‟s apartheid history is another matter.  
Nevertheless, the application of co-operative governance in the practice of higher 
education governance in South Africa has come with a number of problems, 
complications and dilemmas. For instance, tensions can arise from the way the 
Ministry of Education wants the higher education sector to operate and from the 
way the Ministry of Labour conceives its mandate for the provision of skilled 
labour to meet the demands of the market economy. The universities‟ perceived 
mission of developing people according to their individual intellectual capacities 
can also come into conflict with the state‟s agenda of redress and social justice in 
a system riddled by inequality. Furthermore, the universities‟ wish to genuinely 
engage in knowledge production and dissemination may not match the market 
demands of producing graduates who will fit into the market economy. These are 
just some of the issues that can bring tension into the conceptualisation and 
practice of co-operative governance in higher education in South Africa. In effect 
these tensions have ramifications for the understanding and practice of autonomy 
within the higher education sector. 
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Two dominant motifs determine how key players in South Africa‟s higher 
education system manage the higher education system. On the one hand, there is 
enough evidence to think that higher education is there primarily for the 
promotion of the common/public good. In other words, higher education is 
supposed to be beneficial to the communities that it serves. On the other hand, 
there is a notion that as much as issues of justice, redress, equity and 
transformation are necessary for the governance of the higher education system 
and the achievement of the common good, such efforts need to be in keeping 
with global trends and the economic imperatives, which should have an influence 
upon higher education today. The researcher will discuss the implications of 
globalisation and neo-liberalism later in this dissertation. 
From the point of view of promoting the common good, White Paper 3 
(Department of Education, 1997) states that higher education should engage in 
social transformation that will enhance the individual‟s capacity to live a full life 
in society (Section 1.3). In addition, higher education should enable the nation 
with its programme of redress through an equitable distribution of opportunities. 
Hence Singh (2001: 8) in trying to put forward the nature of universities along 
the spirit of White Paper 3 further suggests that the “applied use of knowledge 
for social development (community service) is amongst the core elements of a 
university”. 
Other social functions of higher education that are part of the promotion of the 
common good in the South African higher education system include the 
“facilitation of social justice through enhanced access to higher education for the 
disadvantaged and excluded constituencies” (Singh, 2001: 11). In addition, 
higher education is also expected to contribute to critical human development in 
all disciplines. It is also expected to develop critical citizens who would drive the 
democratisation process forward. These expectations become part and parcel of 
the higher education governance system.  
Co-operative governance in South African higher education also implies that 
higher education should be accountable to the demands of the liberal market 
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economy, as indicated above. Among other things, this means that higher 
education is faced with the demands for creating human resources and high-level 
skills and the production, acquisition and application of new knowledge. In this 
regard, co-operative governance is meant to assist the higher education system in 
responding to an increasingly technologically oriented economy (Department of 
Education, 1997: 1.12–1.13). Within the logic of co-operative governance, the 
demands for the promotion of the public/common good militate against the neo-
liberal demands of marketisation in higher education (Singh, 2001: 13). 
South Africa‟s model of higher education governance, after 1994, tilts toward the 
supervision model. The system recognises the equality of key players such as the 
university, the Ministry of Education and the Council for Higher Education 
(CHE) (Department of Education, 1997). In this development, it is assumed that 
the state, although it remains the dominant financier for many South African 
universities, does not control the university sector as just one of its departments.  
In this regard, university institutions are expected to experience substantial 
autonomy in how they conduct their affairs. One good example is the adoption of 
different languages in the different institutions.  
Nevertheless, some fear that at moments the state intrudes on the affairs of the 
universities and imposes itself on the universities in several dealings with them 
(Berkhout et al., 2005: 1). Such remarks come in the wake of the state‟s applying 
specific benchmarks in relation to transformation issues, such as the stress on the 
employment of black academics and other top university personnel, the 
monitoring and evaluation of different universities using the same yardstick, 
without consideration of circumstantial differences, and the insistence that 
universities tackle the dilemmas in fast-tracking. Similarly, a report from the 
University of Pretoria to the CHE on the same issues suggests that the 
interventions made into the higher education system by government after the 
initial 1997 Higher Education Act tilt the balance of power from a supervision 
model of co-operation to a strong interventionist system (University of Pretoria, 
2005: 21). The report further notes that there has been a move from institutional 
autonomy as one of the pillars for the governance of higher education to 
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conditional autonomy. The report regrets that not much clarity is provided for 
this important shift. The University of Pretoria is of the view that institutional 
autonomy in the governance arrangements of the higher education in South 
Africa is held at ransom by government, which sets the conditions for autonomy, 
thereby eroding the very foundations of co-operative governance. 
Furthermore, irrespective of instituting co-operative governance, Jansen (2006: 
12–14) maps nine distinctive pathways through which the state has made 
significant incursions into institutional autonomy in South Africa. Jansen‟s list 
claims that the South African Government now decides what can be taught, 
which institutions will offer what programs, who can be taught and how, funding 
models and credibility of degrees, among many others (Jansen, 2006: 13–14).  
While declaring that his argument does not amount to accusing the state of 
unnecessary changes, Jansen (2006: 14) affirms that such interventions have 
changed the face of institutional practice. To him, the interventions have 
“changed the discourses, understandings, and behaviours of institutions in ways 
that make any (emphasis original) state interventions more legitimate than 
before, thereby also altering how universities understand themselves, their 
missions and their degrees (sic) of freedom” (Jansen, 2006: 15). 
2.6 General characteristics of higher education governance patterns on the 
African continent 
The higher education system on the African continent and in relation to the cases 
I have analysed leans more towards state control. In each of these cases, the state 
has an authoritative voice in the running of the public institutions. This view is 
supported by a number of factors, such as the role of the chancellors, how 
legislation is done and who holds power in the system‟s framework, the 
management of resources and the general funding of the higher education sector. 
The goals of most higher education systems are also determined and set by the 
different nation-states.  
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Higher education on the African continent shows similar characteristics across 
the different nations. One common feature that one is bound to notice in the 
process of analysing the different governance structures in the selected countries 
is that the birth of the higher education systems in the different countries is 
linked with specific social, historical and political factors, which in turn 
characterise the different nation-states. As I explain below, the legacy of 
colonialism, global economic forces together with financing modalities and the 
persistent yearning of governments to make the higher education system „a child‟ 
of the state are some of the major factors affecting governance structures of 
higher education on the continent. My assumption is that much as the South 
African higher education system is unique in terms of history, innovation and 
other things, the dominant characteristics that tend to influence how the 
governing structures of a higher education institution are going to be 
arrangement and their rationale may not be very different across the continent.     
In the subsection below, I evaluate general factors that cut across and 
characterise the governance of higher education systems in Africa. These include 
factors such as the legacy of colonialism, the global market economy and 
government/state control. 
2.6.1 The legacy of colonialism 
Altbach and Teferra (2003: 4) argue that “the impact of the colonial past and the 
continuing influence by the former colonial powers remain crucial in any 
analysis of higher education in Africa”. Most patterns of governance and 
legislation in higher education have not shifted much from those inherited from 
the colonial masters. Altbach and Teferra (2003: 4) also indicate that some of the 
indicators towards this trend include the fact that higher education in most 
African countries still maintains values of limited access. For instance, the 
University of Malawi still continues to enrol less than   1 000 first years every 
year due to the limited capacity of the different colleges under it. In most cases, 
widespread access to higher education in Africa is considered a luxury. There has 
also been a decrease in the funding of higher education institutions, both by 
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international donors and local governments. Among other things, this could be a 
sign of government‟s growing disengagement from higher education. 
Most higher education governance systems on the continent were modelled after 
the colonialist (mostly European) approaches to higher education. Nevertheless, 
this does not mean that there were no higher education institutions before 
colonialism. Other institutions existed but almost with no resemblance to and 
continuity with colonial systems (Lulat, 2003: 19). In the colonial period, the 
governance systems of most higher education institutions in Africa, especially 
British colonised Africa, were replicas of governance systems in Britain. This 
was so because curricula and examinations were determined by a specific board 
or university overseas. The degrees were also granted by the mother institutions 
(Lulat, 2003: 19).  
In the post-colonial era national universities were created for nationalistic 
reasons. Political unification of the new nations determined more the path of 
governance in the newly established universities than the goals universities set 
for themselves. Overseas higher education institutions helped in the development 
of higher education in Africa through overseas training of students, controlling 
the examination system and the granting of degrees (Lulat, 2003: 25). In general 
the development of the higher education sector in Africa has mostly depended on 
ties with overseas governments, multilateral agencies and others. It is in this 
regard that Lulat (2003: 26) argues that external governments and donor agencies 
“have had a virtual monopoly on shaping policy on higher education throughout 
the post-independence period” (Lulat, 2003: 26). I argue that this virtue 
monopoly over policy in higher education in Africa is largely responsible for the 
governance patterns that one observes in most higher education institutions on 
the continent. 
2.6.2 The influence of a globalised market economy 
Mittelman (1994: 144–149) claims that the governance of higher education in 
Africa is fundamentally driven by three forces, which he refers to as pressure 
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points. These are globalisation, the state and the universities themselves. Of these 
three Mittelman concedes that global forces play a bigger part in controlling how 
higher education systems are governed on the continent. The global imperatives 
play themselves out in the three dimensions of global finance, development 
assistance and philanthropic activities (1994: 144). As such, one can validly 
argue that central to the global imperatives are the operations of a globalised 
market economy. 
Mittelman points out that Africa‟s economies are structurally weak and as such, 
they are subject to declining terms of trade and fluctuations in primary 
commodity prices. In turn, this weakness forces the African nations to fall back 
on cushions provided by the international financial organisations such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (Mittelman, 1994: 145). 
The involvement of international funders in higher education systems, for 
instance, brings with it conditions to be fulfilled by the higher education system 
just as is the case with the huge amount of debt that has accumulated in most 
third world countries. In the higher education sector, donor funding has dictated 
the type of education that is to be offered, where and how it is to be offered and 
the maximum level/standard of education on offer. In practise, every fund affects 
how governance structures are arranged in an institution. Most of all, the 
international funders influence the governing of higher education in the sense 
that in many cases the funds allocated to the higher education sector are reduced 
in preference to primary education and the training of primary school teachers as 
opposed to a preferential treatment for higher education. To an extent, one can 
also argue that this pattern reflects a positivist mentality in looking at educational 
outcomes. In this case, the outcomes also happen to be tangible and measurable 
in reference to the extent to which upliftment of the lives of local people is 
affected. I argue that having the above as the working framework for funding of 
higher education institutions on the African continent means that higher 
education has erroneously been considered not to directly affect the lives of 
ordinary citizens in third world countries, Africa in particular. 
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Global welfare or development assistance relates to foreign programmes set up in 
African universities in a bid to strengthen the capacity or output of the 
universities. If such funding prospects come to materialise, it is rare to find this 
development assistance spreading across all areas in the higher education sector. 
Usually, the language of prioritisation cuts in and this funding usually goes in the 
direction of improving the sciences and not so much the humanities. Today, the 
catchphrase “development-related training programme(s)” has become famous as 
a determining factor of whether a higher education institution programme will be 
funded or not. In other words, the very selective nature of development 
assistance directly determines how the governance of higher education systems 
will operate. I argue that this trend fundamentally affects what the higher 
education institution will offer, how it offers it, to whom and also to what level. 
This is much in recognition of the fact that most African universities and their 
research centres depend on foreign assistance because of economic indebtedness. 
Mittelman adds that attachment to philanthropic institutions has also determined 
the nature of governance in higher education, although to a smaller extent 
compared to the other economic forces. Philanthropic institutions have particular 
values and live for and promote those values for what they are. For instance, a 
National Arts Foundation of a wealthy country would develop collaboration with 
a Department of Arts in Africa specifically for the promotion of the arts simply 
for the love of the discourse. In other words, philanthropic institutions are 
selective in their nature and any economic dependency on them determines the 
scope of operations for the concerned higher education institution. In a nutshell, 
globalisation
7
 together with its implied financial arrangements and 
conditionalities on the African continent affects the way higher education 
systems are managed. The availability of financial resources affects the nature of 
personnel recruitment and retention, and the nature of material resources 
available for teaching and learning.  
                                                 
7
  I will consider how globalisation affects the governance of higher education on the African continent 
later in Chapter 4. 
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Teferra and Altbach (2003: 5) further indicate that governance in higher 
education has been under heavy pressure from local governments in the last 
decade concerning finances. Universities are specifically pressured to find 
alternative sources of funding. This imperative affects the orientation of the 
nature of the business of the university; that is, it affects the governance of higher 
education institutions in terms of the scope of operations. Universities have been 
forced by diminishing financial resources to expand and extend their services for 
a fee. For example, Malawi introduced a non-subsidised category in university 
entrance, which implies that students going on such programmes pay the full 
fees, different from state-sponsored students who pay relatively low fees.  
While the trend to let universities on the continent look for sources of funding 
other than state funds, for example full fees for some students, has generally 
increased access to higher education for most students, this move also tends to 
compromise the quality of higher education, and it has caused the redirection of 
higher education institutions in terms of governance models and possible avenues 
for understanding and exercising institutional autonomy. Contrary to these 
unintended though foreseeable consequences, Sawyerr (2004: 5–6) argues that a 
variety of structural adjustment programmes that swept through the higher 
education sector in the 1980s and 1990 were geared towards averting a crisis in 
the higher education sector. The structural adjustment programmes were intended 
to “to give a freer rein to market forces by removing rigidities in the production, 
pricing, marketing and exchange rates regimes” (2004: 5). Leaving universities 
to the operations of market forces ideally meant opening up universities to 
competition with the hope of improving the way universities are run. 
In Sawyerr‟s (2004: 6) thinking, globalisation seems to be the major factor 
driving the particular ways in which higher education lives itself out today. He 
repositions higher education in relation to the economic forces that make higher 
education respond in particular ways. In other words, economic conditions and 
factors are at the heart of determining what higher education ought to be today. 
Nevertheless, what Sawyerr (2004) does not indicate directly is the way these 
economic forces keep on influencing university governance so that even the 
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university‟s own sense of autonomy becomes affected. I intend to dwell on this 
point later in Chapter 3. Sawyerr acknowledges, however, that higher education 
can still be a vehicle for the derivation of maximum social good by promoting 
the restoration of its own “public good” (Sawyerr, 2004: 7). Hence the interest of 
the state in higher education issues has to a large extent been defended on the 
grounds that the public good is at stake. I follow up on this point in the next 
subsection. 
2.6.3 Governance of higher education systems and the state 
My purposive sample of nine systems of higher education systems on the 
continent gives a glimpse of governance structures across the African continent. 
These are Egypt, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Namibia 
and South Africa. In all these cases, the state/government is involved in the 
governance of higher education systems. Nevertheless, there are some variations 
with regard to the extent to which government is considered to fundamentally 
affect the running of these systems. For instance, a closer look at Ghana, Uganda 
and South Africa reveals that there are independent structures responsible for the 
running of higher education systems although government may still maintain an 
oversight role. Ghana‟s bi-cameral system is one such example although the 
appointment of special professors by government tends to jeopardise the 
independence of the system from government structures. South Africa‟ co-
operative governance system has a high potential for independent higher 
education governance although observations of actual government-university co-
operation indicate a tilting towards state intervention (Jansen, 2006). 
Some of these countries have forms of governance that range from moderate to 
high state control and interference. For instance, there tends to be no distinction 
between government and state in Egypt. While in all of these the head of state is 
the chancellor or titular head of the higher education systems, in some cases, 
such as Kenya and Zimbabwe, the presidents are not just symbolic heads. The 
heads of state wield enormous power in the governing structures. They nominate 
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councils and in some cases there are special statutes that allow government direct 
control over the affairs of the academy. 
It may be argued that higher education governance in Africa also shows enough 
signs of using a federal system of governance. Malawi and Lesotho are clear 
cases in point. Such systems are highly centralised with a number of satellite 
colleges or institutions receiving structural and governance orders from central 
offices, which are themselves under the control of the state. 
The analysis of a few cases on the African continent in terms of higher education 
governance confirms the idea that „the governability‟ of a higher education 
system also reflects the level of its obedience to state dictates. Teferra and 
Altbach (2003: 11) think that “most African governments are intolerant of 
dissent, criticism, nonconformity and free expression of controversial, new, or 
unconventional ideas”, hence the need to keep higher education systems under 
state control in order to avoid havoc in a nation. While this tendency cannot be 
explained by the legacy of colonialism, it is the case that the tendency weakens 
the university‟s exercise of autonomous action.  
The state involvement in the governance of higher education can be accounted 
for in a number of ways. Mwiria (2003: 33) argues that apart from the historical 
origins justifying the high presence of government in higher education systems, it 
is also the case that universities have been perceived as centres for national 
development by the state. Hence “African (national) leaders find universities too 
visible and prestigious as national monuments to be given complete autonomy”. 
This being the case, government exerts influence in most important stages or 
sections of the higher education system. It influences the selection of most 
officials and controls the agenda that these officials would be promoting in the 
university. There are strong links between the university and the chancellor (who 
in most cases happens to be the president) and the Ministry of Education. 
Because most high offices are filled by nomination, there is a good chance of the 
chancellor “sending directives to council through their key nominees, such as the 
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minister of education or the vice-chancellor” (Mwiria, 2003: 34), thereby 
compromising the autonomy of these institutions. 
The nature of government influence in the governing structures of a higher 
education system affects the degree of institutional autonomy and academic 
freedom that a system may live out. In the case that governments appoint or 
directly influence the appointment of top management within the university 
systems, the appointees tend to be more accountable to government (the 
paymasters) than to the goals and ideals of a university. Mwiria (2003: 36) 
recounts that due to the centralisation of power and the nature of that power, “in 
many African universities, senates, faculty boards and heads of departments 
often rubber stamp the wishes of the university chief executives”. Such decisions 
are often in line with the wishes of the government of the day but which may 
have little to do with the life of the university and its sustenance.  
Therefore, in effect the nature of the state-university relationship heavily affects 
how the university does what it does, where it does it, with whom and for how 
long. The strong relations between governments and universities have resulted in 
universities being run as state institutions financially. The better the relationship 
between government and the university, the more assistance the university 
receives, thereby having more leverage to do what it wants to do. Government on 
the African continent has a patronising influence on higher education systems. 
In relation to these dilemmas, some suggest that it is a question of discovering 
equilibrium between public interest and the higher education‟s private interest 
(Bok, 1982: 52) so that government and higher education can work in harmony 
and enable higher education to contribute to the social good. Such ideals assume 
an underlying conception of operation between the partners, for instance that the 
activities of government always contribute towards the common good. This 
position is difficult to prove when one looks at how deplorably many 
governments on the continent conduct themselves and the misery they directly 
inflict on citizens at times. But the researcher needs to note here that possibilities 
of underlying terms of co-operation between the state and the university assume 
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that such co-operation heavily depends on the cooperating partners‟ full 
awareness of the terms, conditions and implications of their cooperation.  
Part of this awareness includes a recognition of and respect for what universities 
are mandated to do and under what circumstances they best achieve their goals. 
Such an investigation goes to the centre of defining what academic freedom and 
university autonomy are all about. Again, this questioning is in view of the idea 
that the structures of governance reveal the nature and understanding of 
academic freedom and institutional autonomy. 
2.7 Predominant patterns in African higher education governance systems: 
concluding reflections 
Many of the cases, I have analysed above indicate a heavy stress on state control 
rather than state supervision. On such grounds, I proceed to argue that the 
governance of higher education as shown has more non-liberal tendencies. This 
is the case because the state/government controls most higher education 
governance structures on the African continent. For instance, the case of Egypt 
leaves no distinction between the civil service and the university system. The 
university is structured according to the structures of the state. These cases also 
show that the executive arm of government largely oversees crucial decision-
making processes of the university through the roles performed by the ministers 
who chair university councils. The state president holds the position of 
chancellor in most of the cases. Through such forms of control, one can easily 
argue that government exerts enormous power over the higher education system, 
as seen in a number of African universities.  
It is also noteworthy that in a few cases claims to a bi-cameral system and co-
operative governance are made. These forms of governance are discussed in 
relation to higher education systems in Ghana and South Africa. In such cases, 
government is considered to maintain an overseeing role in the governance of the 
higher education system. In South Africa, for instance, particular emphasis is 
placed on the government as an equal partner or stakeholder in the governance of 
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the higher education system. Nevertheless several scholars indicate that the way 
government handles issues relating to the higher education sector goes beyond 
equal partnership and stakeholdership to government control. This form of 
control is viewed as the main source of the erosion of the basis for university 
autonomy and academic freedom. Hence, Jansen (2004: 4) argues that both 
academic freedom and university autonomy face an uncertain future in South 
Africa. He argues that this is so because the changes taking place both in the 
legislative concept and the practice of higher education constitute a “gradual but 
systematic erosion of historical standards of autonomy that were ingrained within 
the institutional fabric of universities” (Jansen, 2004: 5). Through these changes 
the state is regarded as continuously acquiring new forms of power that 
eventually erode the concept of cooperative governance, as enshrined in its own 
terms of operation with the universities. This can only mean that even in the 
cases I have reviewed as following co-operative forms of governance, persistent 
moves are being made to tilt the higher education mindset toward toeing the 
government line, other than what the universities themselves perceive as their 
mandates in the nature of their work. 
According to the random cases reviewed, it is evident that African governments 
also determine the operations of the higher education institutions through the 
imperative to see the higher education sector as a major agent for labour training 
and the improvement of socio-economic conditions in a country. In this regard, 
higher education is pressurised to be relevant in terms of delivering according to 
the expectation of the state. This pressure can be considered to impact negatively 
on the freedom of the universities to teach what they want to teach to whom they 
want to teach, if I may be allowed at this stage to evoke only a basic 
understanding of autonomy and leave out the complexities that theories of 
autonomy have brought to the fore. I will analyse the different complexities 
involved in the theories of autonomy in Chapter 4.  
Similarly, it is with this understanding that I assert that claims that have been 
made on the autonomy of higher education mainly refer to the institutional legal 
status of the higher institution as a distinct and separate entity dedicated to higher 
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education. But little is mentioned of the required level of autonomy for 
controlling officers of the higher education system. Effah‟s (2003: 346) 
concession that there is never absolute autonomy for higher education to a large 
extent resonates with the circumstances I have just described. 
Higher education systems on the African continent are also heavily subsidised by 
national governments. While the provision for training of people at tertiary level 
is considered as a social good and hence the prerogative of every government 
universally, funding of higher education in Africa by government has meant 
government taking control of what is done in the university. Some common 
examples of this include government‟s control of levels of access and reduction 
of state funding for institutions failing to meet targets set by government, as is 
the case in South Africa. These targets include institutional transformation, 
enrolment rates for designated groups and universities‟ through-put rates, among 
others. 
The control of government in universities has been rationalised on various 
grounds, including the need for accountability for public funds and 
responsiveness to the demands of the nation. On the other hand, universities, 
while requiring government funding for their operations, demand from 
government that the university be left free to decide what it does for it is in the 
best position to judge what is good for the university. In such circumstances, one 
of the problems facing this project is the question of whether government 
funding of higher education should mean government controlling the universities 
or whether such funding should be regarded as government‟s fulfilment of its 
mandate to the public and realising that it is the universities themselves that can 
control themselves. 
So far I have shown that governance of higher education in Africa is a mixed bag 
that heavily tilts towards government control of the sector. This control is also 
seen to compromise what universities are ordinarily mandated to do by their 
nature, that is, free research and dissemination of knowledge. It can also be fairly 
concluded that issues such as the need for creating a national workforce, serving 
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the common good and economic and social accountability are all idioms used by 
governments to have control over higher education systems. It is only in a few 
cases that one observes models of a bi-cameral system of governance and 
cooperative governance. The theoretical grounds on which the models of bi-
cameral system and co-operative governance are based have liberal 
characteristics. But the growing power of the state within such governance 
arrangements and the shifting of the poles of engagement through changing 
legislation by the state represent a corrosion of any possibility to develop such 
liberal underpinning.  
Similarly the belief that governance of the higher education sector on the African 
continent is far from being liberal is justified by the tendency to operate the 
higher education sector as part of the state machinery. Consequently, major 
appointments and control of higher offices are done by the government through 
the ministries of education and offices of the state presidents. In so far as the 
voice of the state carries more weight than the voices of other stakeholders in the 
governance structures, such arrangements can be regarded as non-liberal and 
merely tools of political engineering. The fact that appointments are made on 
political and not professional grounds, as has been reported to be the case in 
Egypt and Zimbabwe, and the fact that tertiary education is still considered as 
part of a national project of self-development and self-realisation, as Sawyerr 
(1994: 25) points out ,show that states do not want to let the higher education 
sector determine its own course (to be autonomous), despite the states‟ claims 
that their higher education systems are autonomous merely by virtue of their 
legislative frameworks. Such a condition can only indicate smaller levels of 
autonomy rather that full-blown autonomous practices.  
A majority of the cases I have analysed indicate that universities operate like 
state apparatuses in the sense that government controls most of the things that 
happen in the university. It is difficult to conceive of the same universities as 
centres of independent thought and criticism. My own experience of working in 
the University of Malawi, for example, tells me that criticising government on 
any issue makes the university become unfavourable and subsequently worsens 
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the university‟s financial problems since government is the sole funder of the 
higher education system in Malawi. In similar cases on the African continent, 
one can at best only say that universities have very little leeway for independent 
criticism since governments control the hiring and firing of university 
management teams through the their education ministries.  
What becomes of the university when it is made to toe the government line? 
Inevitably independent and critical voices are thwarted. In many ways, 
universities become more preoccupied with managing to survive, but how they 
manage to survive and the forms of their silently negotiated identities become 
less important. Whether one considers this mandate of the university from this 
latter utilitarian sense, for instance the idea that universities serve their societies 
in different ways, or from the more sober aims of achieving the highest 
development of human reason and imagination, questions of institutional 
autonomy and academic freedom are indispensable for such projects. Readings 
(1996: 5) hints at the idea of the self-realisation of humanity as the core function 
of the university at the dawn of the Enlightenment. In cases where universities 
operate under state control, this core function of the actualisation of human 
potential also becomes difficult to achieve because most of the political pressures 
universities are made to live with are in many ways parochial and at best short-
sighted.  
In the next chapter I trace the development and usage of the concept of autonomy 
in systems of higher education outside Africa. This examination will be done in 
order to understand the forms and conceptions of autonomy that may have 
influenced the African higher education system.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY 
3.1 Introductory remarks 
In this chapter I proceed in the discourse by taking a look at how the concept of 
university autonomy has evolved in history by, among other things, examining 
underlying assumptions and declarations of autonomy and university practices 
and systems according to some traditions of higher education systems. This 
discussion assumes that the connection between autonomy and education is 
proven. Although I may allude to this matter later in the chapter, the chapter is 
not meant to give a detailed discussion of this connection.  
3.2 The philosophical-historical development of the concepts of academic 
freedom and institutional autonomy in universities 
In this section, I trace the historical developments of the conception of academic 
freedom as it has evolved within university traditions. I first locate the 
conception within historical and social conceptions. In this way, I will also 
attempt to understand whether the concept of autonomy has something unique 
and essential in itself, something that makes university autonomy what it is.  
Is university autonomy a natural right of the universities, as Kirk (1955: 8) 
argues, or it is a socially constructed right? This question echoes most of the 
challenging questions that confront one in understanding the nature of university 
autonomy. Kirk (1955) first distinguishes between intellectual freedom as the 
inner aspiration in people to acquire knowledge and academic freedom, which 
appears more as a construct of the society of practice. The researcher thinks that 
Kirk‟s perspective on intellectual freedom, which is close to academic freedom, 
assumes an acceptance of a specific naturalist understanding of the nature of 
academic freedom. He argues as follows: 
In the middle ages, as in the classical times, the academy possessed freedom 
unknown to other bodies and persons because the philosopher, the scholar, and 
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the student were looked upon as men consecrated to the service of truth; and that 
truth was not simply a purposeless groping after miscellaneous information, but a 
wisdom to be obtained from a teleological search (Kirk, 1955: 17). 
In the first place, this view implies that there must be something out there called 
„truth‟ to which all academic endeavours should aspire. Such an argument is 
mainly proposed by a number of rationalist philosophers, who may also hold that 
the human mind has an inherent capacity to reason and that given an option to 
reason or not to reason, the human being will choose the path of reason. In the 
Rationalist tradition, the objective end towards which the argument for the need 
for academic freedom is made is truth and the idea that this truth is sought for its 
own sake. Furthermore, Kirk (1955) is of the view that people enter into a 
professional enquiry to discover the truth only when such truth is sought for its 
own sake and that the rules for the enquiry are set as the objective end itself. This 
view apparently presents a notion of truth that has an independent metaphysical 
characterisation, in the sense that truth becomes an objective entity that exists 
independently of other realities, be they social or political. In other words, it is a 
notion of truth that is independent of the different historical and social 
circumstances within which knowledge is constructed, as most educationists 
would argue.  
When applied to university life and practice, the notion of objective truth makes 
one think that the autonomy of the university should reside in the search for 
„objective truths‟. Such an understanding removes the role of knowledge 
communities in the construction of different forms of knowledge. The 
understanding also creates the impression that the university is a place where 
reason finds its proper place only in the sense that the university takes on the 
function of developing private reason and imagination and improving the mind 
by apprehension of truth only (Kirk, 1955: 27). Such a free development of 
private reason, nevertheless, has nothing to do with the service to the knowledge 
society. 
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On the other hand, Russell (1993) takes the historical route by unpacking the 
concept of academic freedom and university autonomy from a perspective of 
how the concepts developed in the Middle Ages. He argues that the tension 
between the church and the state in the Middle Ages, with the state wanting to 
rule over church matters, meant that the church had to take an affirmative step to 
defend itself, its role and function in society. As the church was developing its 
sense of autonomy to do the things it had to do within society, universities also 
gained similar levels of autonomy by virtue of their being entities that were 
founded by the church and also under the church‟s control. In this period, the 
church claimed autonomy from the control of the civil state. Russell (1993: 2) 
argues that academics, because their privileges were originally ecclesiastical and 
guaranteed by the Pope, tended to enjoy intellectual power and prestige, which 
made others, like the civil state, feel uneasy. 
The right to have one‟s own sense of autonomy has also been defended on the 
grounds that it is within this atmosphere that universities can meaningfully do 
what they are meant to do, that is “to protect the world from forces of 
irrationality” (Russell, 1993: 3). The sense of university autonomy that Russell 
defends has intrinsic characteristics of the good. This is why in some of his later 
arguments Russell (1993) dismisses the idea that at times an understanding of 
university autonomy and academic freedom can be influenced by financial 
factors and other monetary gains. Such thinking is controlled more by the 
understanding that university autonomy and academic freedom are dictated by 
the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, regardless of the fear of reprisal and 
dismissal. Russell did not pay much attention to the cosmopolitan or 
globalisation influences on higher education governance, which have had a 
heavy impact on university governance today. This can be attributed to the 
particular historical moment from which he was writing. Nevertheless, the idea 
that conceptions of university autonomy and academic freedom should be 
dictated by the search for knowledge for its own sake stands at odds with the 
present globalised and neo-liberalised world. I return to this discussion in the 
next chapter.  
 88 
In a number of cases the defence for the autonomy of the university has been 
proposed on the grounds that academics have “freedom within the law to 
question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and 
controversial or unpopular opinions without placing themselves in jeopardy” 
(Russell, 1993: 18). The intrinsic notions of university autonomy and academic 
freedom evoke the Socratic ideal of the quest for knowledge. This understanding 
of university autonomy and academic freedom implies that a university is vested 
with the power to do research and teach without undue influence either from the 
state or society or even industry, for that matter. Russell (1993: 19) also holds 
that academic research that is meant to be used for propaganda and is not meant 
for seeking the truth for what it is deprives the university of its entitlement to be 
free. In many ways, the early notions of university autonomy depict that the 
university “possesses freedom unknown to other bodies and persons because the 
philosopher, the scholar, and the student are looked upon as men consecrated to 
the service of truth; and that truth was not simply a purposeless groping after 
miscellaneous information, but a wisdom to be obtained, however imperfectly, 
from a teleological search” (Kirk, 1955: 16–17). While medieval times may have 
accorded the university its freedom simply for the love of truth, Kirk (1955: 26–
27) further argues that in modern societies, people require centres of independent 
thought and criticism if society is to survive and progress, given today‟s unique 
challenges.  
Similar to defences of academic freedom in the form of the pursuit of knowledge 
for its own sake and the idea that this autonomy needs to be exercised without 
any fear of reprisal or dismissal by persons engaged in it, many scholars in the 
African higher education system, especially in relation to South African higher 
education, have defended different versions of an apparent negative conception 
of liberty within academic freedom (for instance, see Hall, 2006; Higgins, 2000b; 
The Academic Freedom Committees of the University of Cape Town and the 
University of the Witwatersrand, 1974). For instance, Higgins (2000b: 101) 
argues for a conception of academic freedom that is “vested in an autonomous 
community of teachers and students dedicated to the search for, or service of, 
truth”. Despite the apparent affiliation to community inherent in this notion, the 
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conception carries most of the elements of the traditional understanding of the 
university, as indicated above. The different historical patterns under which the 
concept of university autonomy developed and grew indicate that variations in 
such conceptions are wide. According to these earlier conceptions, the university 
is constitutionally vested with the power to do research and teach without undue 
influence either from the state or society or even industry, for that matter. It can 
be concluded that according to this understanding the university has a natural 
right to autonomy. 
Russell‟s thinking, which I have elaborated on at length, confirms the idea that 
questions on whether the university can operate with or without being 
autonomous can better be answered using a naturalistic path. But the ideals of the 
concept of academic freedom have in many cases been reasserted and reaffirmed 
in varied forms, depending on the social, political and economic forces 
influencing it. Hence, the issues that are ordinarily considered to affect university 
autonomy and its parameters keep on shifting their boundaries along different 
historical moments.  
3.3 Transformations of the modern university and its influence on 
conceptions of autonomy: a focus on German, British and 
American higher education systems 
In this section, I will trace the transformation of the modern university through 
the presumption that what autonomy means in the university has been settled. 
This understanding accommodates autonomy as meaning „self-determination‟ in 
the dual sense of freedom from interference as well as the development of a 
capacity to structure and direct one‟s future. Nevertheless, I have maintained in 
the preceding chapter that a correct understanding of autonomy does not have to 
operate in a vacuum when it comes to understanding how autonomy features in 
different social circumstances. I have thus argued for a situated form of 
autonomy. Similarly, my understanding of the transformations is informed by a 
sense of autonomy that takes into consideration the various ways through which 
people begin to define their lives and activities, without shunning their 
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responsibilities. In this sense, any considerations of the debates that have 
informed the conceptions of autonomy on the African continent have also to be 
considered within the context of substantial and complex international lineage. In 
a particular way, this lineage points to the historical evolution of a relationship 
between university education and society in an English society and the general 
European context, from which ideals of liberal autonomy are largely to be rooted. 
In acknowledging that the concept of autonomy has emerged from this dynamic 
and variable relationship, I will argue that people‟s understanding of the nature 
and prospects of autonomy can be substantial if they recognise the complex 
historical dimensions of such relationships. This overview also intends to show 
that the discourse on university autonomy and academic freedom in relation to 
the African experience is shaped by how the university continues to be perceived 
worldwide and why the discourse on autonomy is an indispensable aspect of the 
universities‟ identity to many. 
Wittrock (1993) reviews the evolution of the university in England, America and 
Western Europe over the last 200 years in the article titled “The modem 
university: the three transformations”. Despite the fact that that this title gives a 
broad overview, my account does not intend to generalise the place and function 
of the university as confined to the social and economic spaces of the societies 
within which it is situated. Similarly, the picture that is presented does not make 
individual universities to be the embodiment of some universal „idea‟ of the 
university by virtue of being subspecies of the university in general. The 
discourse recognises that individual university institutions and ideas “are always 
situational and are neither disembodied nor mindless” (Wittrock, 1993: 309). In 
this way Wittrock‟s account articulates the trajectory of university development 
in a number of countries over the last two centuries, while respecting the 
particular historical circumstances within which these institutions have evolved.  
Wittrock's (1993: 312) account begins with the idea of change in universities and 
how as ages pass universities remain the same even though they may pass 
through historical moments that negatively affect the nature and function of 
universities. In one particular case, Wittrock reflects on the impact of the defeat 
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of Prussia by the armies of Napoleon in 1806. This event is considered from the 
point of view of its influence on Prussia's traditional rulers and its intellectual 
elite. In this regard, he argues that the defeat exposed the weakness of the 
Prussian state, while at the same time precipitating a crisis of cultural identity 
and character for Prussia's leadership. The accounts of the University of Culture 
that Humboldt introduced to the discourse on universities targeted this exposure 
of the Prussian impotence (see also Readings, 1996). Humboldt‟s ideas through 
the concept of the ideal of culture and the university aimed at reclaiming the 
identity of the state and society through the repositioning of the cultural identity 
of the university. It was hoped that the identity of the state and society would be 
enhanced through a determined relinquishment of the kind of traditional 
university education that had characterised Prussian society for centuries 
(Coughlan, Divala, Enslin, Kissack & Mathebula, 2004).  
This system had perpetuated the privileges enjoyed by the faculties of theology, 
law and medicine, for which studies in the arts and sciences were merely a 
preparation. Hence, Wittrock (1993: 311) argues that the forms of knowledge 
that this age possessed were not fundamentally different from those of the 
preceding generations.  For reformers like Humboldt, one of the main problems 
with this traditional system was a certain intellectual stagnation and ossification, 
which resisted any really vigorous and critical scrutiny of the established fields 
of knowledge. The educational privileges of a social minority induced an 
intellectual indolence that could only impede the development of the Prussian 
character. In order to break this impasse, reformers like Humboldt advocated the 
establishment of parity between the faculties and stressed the importance of a 
critical attitude to inherited bodies of knowledge and the promotion of a 
scholarly orientation that would, in fact, elevate philosophy to a supreme position 
within the quest for knowledge. 
The Humboldtian university, inspired by holistic thinking in broad historical 
cultural categories and informed by a type of philosophy which rejected 
narrow-minded specialization, turned out to become the ideal and 
archetypical home for scientific activities … The assumption behind modern 
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scientific thinking and that the historicity of idealist philosophy is at best an 
impossible dream, and that the distinction between the natural and cultural 
sciences, a distinction fundamentally alien to late-eighteenth- and early-
nineteenth-century science and philosophy, is necessary and valid. 
(Wittrock, 1993: 315) 
The new epistemic regime together with the concurrent processes of 
industrialisation, scientification and bureaucratisation led to the development of 
organisationally different patterns for institutions of higher education and 
scientific activities (Wittrock, 1993: 316). The implementation of these ideas was 
initiated by the new University of Berlin. Further, Wittrock (1993: 317) contends 
that the crystallisation of this approach produced a refined formulation of the 
idea of Bildung, which provided a particular rationale for the benefits of a 
university education, albeit one that was characterised by a sustained and 
probably inherently irresolvable tension. The term privileges the notion of 
individual development and character formation and in this sense contributes 
towards a particular understanding of the notion of a liberal education, with its 
emphasis on cognitive breadth, but also on the adoption of a critical rather than a 
respectfully assimilative attitude towards the received understandings of the past. 
However, the term Bildung also encompasses the idea that there is a national 
culture that must be revered and promoted, implying that the reflective activities 
of university teachers and students should contribute towards a definition and 
appreciation of this cultural inheritance.  
At the centre of Humboldt‟s vision of the modern university was a dislike for 
tendencies that incline towards petty academic controversies. The University of 
Culture needed to maintain a “delicate balance of power which is intended to 
secure the intellectual freedom to teaching and learning by safeguarding against 
political incursions and violations” while at the same guarding the university 
“from the narrow guild-like interests within academia itself” (Wittrock, 1993: 
318). Hence the notion of Bildung established a close link between the university 
and society. The university was mandated with the creation of a new societal 
culture. The concept also came to represent key components of academic culture 
 93 
and ideology and a sense of self-understanding in continental Europe. The 
university became considered as a force that would “regain for the state in the 
realm of intellectual activities what it had lost in the physical real” (Wittrock, 
1993: 317, quoting Fredrick Wilhelm III).  
Many reformers in Humboldt‟s time argued that the role of the university lay in 
providing an appreciation for a cultural inheritance because such an activity was 
viewed to have the capacity to provide the Prussian state with a renewed sense of 
dignity and strength and offer it the prospect of restored pride and purpose in the 
aftermath of its humiliation by the French. It was only in later periods that the 
reformers discovered that the notion of critical individualism, articulated by 
some interpreters of Bildung, coexisted in a tense and antagonistic relationship 
with the concept of national unity and cultural cohesion. In a way, the University 
of Berlin had contributed towards a definition of Prussian, and subsequently 
German, national identity, vindicating some of the early 19
th
 century reformers' 
vision that universities should contribute towards an articulation of the notion of 
Bildung. 
If the Prussian university reforms of the early 19
th
 century, epitomised by the 
establishment of the University of Berlin, represented the first phase in the 
transformation of the modem university, for Wittrock the German universities 
also pioneered the inauguration of the second phase in a series of initiatives and 
emphases that were not necessarily compatible with the notion of Bildung that 
had characterised the first phase. For if the notion of Bildung had stressed the 
importance of an individual‟s comprehensive and broad understanding of 
inherited fields of knowledge, developments within the epistemic domain were 
beginning to impugn this kind of aspiration.  
The major long-term impact of the Humboldtian reforms was not the 
preservation of a particular conception of appropriate scientific 
specialization but the resurrection, or rather better, the creation of an 
autonomous institutional setting for intellectual activities which later came 
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to be co-terminous with the modern research-oriented university (Wittrock, 
1993: 320). 
Wittrock (1993) stresses that during the course of the 19
th
 century, the dichotomy 
between the natural sciences and the humanities became more pronounced, 
resulting in the promotion of epistemic specialisation, which ruptured the ideal of 
the comprehensively educated individual and introduced a prevalent culture of 
research into the universities. The departure in university conception from a 
holistic conception of human development does not successfully manage to 
explain the continued influence of the university in the rebuilding of the nation-
state. Nevertheless, the University of Berlin became an accomplished model of 
research to which other universities aspired.  
A closer critical scrutiny of what the advancement of knowledge requires also 
generated controversies about the methods appropriate to the acquisition of 
knowledge. The experimental and empirical methods upon which the 
extraordinary accomplishments of the 17
th
 century scientific revolution were 
based provided a procedural template with which all research was expected to 
comply. Such expectations engendered the fields of enquiry that subsequently 
became the social sciences, which were characterised by the application of 
natural scientific methods of inquiry to the study of human beings. These 
methodological injunctions were, in turn, challenged by the burgeoning 
discipline of hermeneutics, whose focus on the complex relationship between 
culture, language and interpretation contested the view that the methods of the 
natural sciences were appropriate for the study of human beings.  
Such debates and disputes constituted the intellectual vigour and dynamism of 
the research culture in Germany, creating the distinctively modem impression 
that the pursuit of knowledge is a combination of controversy and systematic 
(primarily empirical) investigation. The German model of research not only 
reinforced the distinction between the natural sciences and the humanities but it 
also rendered the difference between pure and applied research more 
conspicuous. The former refers to the research stimulated by curiosity about 
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phenomena that present themselves to people. It also involves an attempt to 
formulate accurate descriptions of the phenomena and to provide convincing 
explanations for the way they appear and behave as they do. The latter 
acknowledges that most advances in people‟s understanding of their natural and 
human environments will have consequences for the ways in which they react to 
and modify both – their knowledge will always have an impact on their contexts 
(implying that, although distinguishable, pure and applied research are usually 
inseparable). This would, in turn, mean that imagining operations in university 
governance without the particular contexts and how these contexts reformulate 
inherent self-understanding and exercise of autonomy may not advance the aims 
and ends of higher education in this context.  
The pioneering and innovative work of the German universities challenged some 
of the epistemic assumptions of the earlier proponents of Bildung regarding the 
notion of the comprehensively educated individual (although their emphasis on 
critical individualism was consistent with the basic tenets of a research ethos and 
aspects of university enquiry, particularly in the field of the humanities, 
contributed towards a consolidated understanding and promotion of conceptions 
of national culture). Consequently, this made a major contribution towards a 
definition of people‟s understanding of modernity, even though the emphasis on 
specialisation ruptured the desired sense of epistemic unity associated with the 
perspective of Bildung. Simultaneously, these German universities presented 
both a challenge to and a model for universities in other countries, whose values, 
orientations and practices seemed anachronistic in comparison with the German 
example.  
In a later commentary on the role of Wilhelm von Humboldt and the revival of 
the university in Germany, Wittrock (2006: 111–112) emphasises that 
Humboldt‟s proposal for Germany‟s new university sought for a “delicate 
balance of power between different interests within and without the university, 
between different governing principles but with an ultimate aim to secure the 
intellectual freedom of teaching and learning”. The conception of a university 
that Humboldt envisaged was one where the creation of new knowledge and the 
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transmission of that knowledge, in given contexts, are linked. Wittrock (2006: 
112) emphasises that the university is an embodiment of the unity of research 
and teaching and also the unity of students and professors.  
The major points of emphasis in reclaiming the vision of the university as seen 
by Humboldt envisage an autonomous university in a very unique way. The 
university needs to constitute the unity of knowledge both in the production of 
new forms of knowledge and in the dissemination of that knowledge. While the 
university necessarily needs to be free from incursions, these influences are 
recognised by Humboldt as matters that can arise from within the university and 
its structures as well as from external forces. In the university, narrow-
mindedness and preoccupation with petty debates that would not advance the 
ends of society are considered as negative elements to the freedom of the 
university. Hence, the conception of freedom or autonomy that Humboldt 
proposed for the German university is one that produces a balanced institution 
that is neither controlled by the state nor by petty academic interests, as also 
indicated earlier on. To him, this kind of university would ably advance the 
interests of society without compromising the nature of a university or the nature 
of the political state. Within this framework of a university, Humboldt 
understood Bildung, which I have elaborated on earlier in this chapter, to refer to 
a “process whereby a person is allowed and encouraged to be raised and to grow 
to maturity in accordance, not with an external imposed mechanical standard, but 
with those inner needs that constitute what is the most fundamental essence of 
being human” (Wittrock, 2006: 112).  
The progressive and successful German example stimulated the reform of 
England's  most prestigious universities, Oxford and Cambridge. Influenced by 
the dedicated expertise of German research specialists, as well as by their 
practical and secular orientation, England's parliament introduced the University 
Reform Bill for Oxford in 1854 and the Reform Bill for Cambridge in 1856 
(Green, 1969: 68–69). The passage of the bills, and the universities‟ compliance 
with them, fostered the emergence of a new kind of „don‟ at these universities, a 
scholar who was more interested in systematic research than in the reproduction 
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of an inherited knowledge, which was traditionally concerned primarily with 
theological issues and the cultivation of a refined aristocratic sensibility.  
The university reform acts began a process that fundamentally restructured the 
conceptions of knowledge and research at these esteemed institutions, consistent 
with German emphases. These reforms were slow and they precipitated a 
controversy between those who emphasised excellence in research and those who 
prioritised sound teaching. Sound teaching was understood to be “education for 
life” in the public school understanding. This understanding contains Platonic 
influences on conceptions of the good life (Green, 1969: 71).  
In terms of management and control, the British higher education system has one 
common feature that distinguishes it from higher education in European 
countries. Today, the University Grants Committee (UGC) is the main force that 
is associated with the co-ordination between higher education systems and 
government. Since the government is the main financier of higher education in 
the United Kingdom, there has been no broad distinction between private and 
public higher education systems. The UGC was created to mediate between the 
higher education sector and government so that the dependence of the 
universities on the state in terms of how they manage their affairs could be 
minimised. The first grant of the government to the universities through the UGC 
was made in 1889 (Allen, 1988: 38). The UGC is composed of members from 
government, civil society, the business community and academia, and most of 
the latter are professors representing different fields of university life although 
they do not participate in the UGC as particular representatives of their 
individual universities or faculties (Wolfenden, 1972: 144–145). The UGC acts 
as a buffer zone between government and the universities (Wolfenden, 1972: 
149). This is so because it is the UGC that deliberates with government officials 
on the details supplied by individual universities on the nature of their funding 
requirements. Wolfenden (1972: 147) argues that such deliberations are made so 
that government acquires a thorough view of the financial requirements and the 
reasons for their justification in respect of recurrent budgets and other historical 
developments in institutions. Once funds are acquired, the UGC distributes the 
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funds to individual institutions with a fair understanding of the circumstances 
within which each institution is working, although this funding from government 
comes without any prescriptions as to how the individual universities may 
dispose off such funds. 
Wolfenden (1972: 148) argues that the autonomy of individual institutions rests 
on the fact that although these institutions provide elaborate detail of their 
functions and projects, the grant from government through the UGC comes in a 
block grant without prescriptions of how it may be used. Wolfenden further 
deduces that such a practice gives the universities a sense of autonomy and a 
confirmation that the UGC and government do not run the universities but rather 
give the universities the necessary resources to run their own affairs. He later 
sums up this working relationship as one that depends on reciprocal confidence 
between the three partners, which also acts as a pillar for the British higher 
education system (Wolfenden, 1972: 149–150). Allen (1988: 38), quoting 
Dainton, adds that apart from securing funding from government, the UGC was 
also mandated  
To collect, examine and make available information on matters relating to 
university education throughout the United Kingdom; and to assist, in 
consultation with the universities and other bodies concerned, the 
preparation and execution of such plans for the development of the 
universities as may from time to time be required in order that they are fully 
adequate to national needs. 
Despite the broad framework of the UGC, as reflected by the above quotation, it 
is acknowledged that the UGC‟s role was mainly confined to financial matters 
between government and the universities (Allen, 1988: 39). 
In relation to the higher education sector in the United Kingdom it is important to 
note the major role that is played by special commissions that are instituted, 
mostly by government, to investigate a particular practice or how certain things 
within the higher education sector can change. In general, I tend to concede that a 
 99 
number of the major changes that have taken place in the British higher 
education system are due to these special reports. For example, although very 
little have been implemented from the recommendation of the Robin‟s Report 
that was presented to Parliament in 1963, it caused a shift from an elitist system 
of higher education to the introduction of some form of mass higher education. In 
this regard, Allen (1988: 43) states that the “Robin‟s Principle” recommended 
that “courses of higher education should be available for all those who are 
qualified by ability and attainment to pursue them and who wish to do so”, 
thereby rejecting the idea  that access to higher education may be determined by 
the skills required in a nation.  
The above case represents only one report amongst many and there have been 
major contestations over the nature and purposes of higher education in the 
United Kingdom. What is crucial in determining the dynamics of university 
autonomy in such instances is that in almost all the cases, the reports are 
presented to an arm of government: parliament. Thereafter the recommendations 
are adopted or not. In other words, this shows a particular working relationship 
between the universities and government and the confines within which the 
universities may or may not do certain things.  
The British higher education governance system shows elements of autonomy as 
well as elements of centralised management. This is the case because both the 
universities and government are equally involved in determining the goals of any 
higher education institution, how the institutions may achieve these goals and the 
nature and amount of resources that will be needed for the system to achieve its 
goals (Allen, 1988: 137). The funding process that I have elaborated on earlier 
also indicates that government is interested in the self-assessments that 
institutions make of their own performance within the range of resources that 
were previously allocated to them. Allen‟s (1988) argument also shows that on 
the whole, the British higher education system is managed in a hierarchical 
fashion with a pyramid structure that has the government and the Department of 
Science at the top and the institutions in the lower bigger section, mediated by 
the University Grants Committee and the National Advisory Board in between.  
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The hierarchical fashion of arranging the management of higher education in the 
United Kingdom carries elements that are clearly associated with a centralised 
system of governance. Allen (1988: 137, 138) notes that the government only 
decides in broad terms or in loosely defined terms what it wants the universities 
to achieve and how much money (in total) they are to be given to carry out their 
tasks. Nevertheless, it is still the universities‟ prerogative to make their own 
internal and autonomous decisions on the activities they will engage in or not 
with the given state funding. In view of these elements, it can be concluded that 
the British higher education system as discussed here contains elements of state 
control as well as an autonomous governing system. 
On the other hand, the American higher education system is unique in form and 
tradition. Martin Trow‟s (1996) chapter firmly characterises the issues that one 
would look for in American higher education system. Trow (1996: 26) first 
traces the origins of the American higher education system back to the Oxford 
and Cambridge traditions. Although it is acknowledged that the American higher 
education system had its defining moment in the 1890s regarding the full 
development of all aspects of higher education, Trow (1996: 26) argues that by 
then, the American colleges and universities “already had a lay board of trustees, 
a strong president and his administrative staff, and a well-defined structure of 
faculty ranks”. The institutional characteristics that are considered to have been 
established more than 100 years ago include, among others, a scholarly and 
scientific reputation linked to publication and the readiness to develop one‟s 
career in any institution; a general education mixed with a follow-up specialised 
education; and an elective system with modular courses and credit accumulation 
based on the transcript of grades. What marked the American system of higher 
education from the very beginning is a “spirit of competition, institutional 
diversity, responsiveness to markets (especially the markets for students), and 
institutional autonomy marked by strong leadership and a diversity of sources of 
support” (Trow, 1996: 26). Despite the widening access to higher education with 
its commensurate increases in enrolments, Trow argues that in approximately 
100 years, the higher education system in America has fundamentally remained 
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the same in terms of prevailing basic structures, diversity, mission, governance 
and finance (1996: 27).  
Trow further attributes the particularity of the American higher education system 
to the European origins of the system despite the fact that the system was locally 
managed through a strong college presidential style of management. The 
particular political history of the time, marked weak state control, also meant that 
the state could “neither provide adequate higher education nor constrain other 
private groups and organisations from doing so” (Trow, 1996: 28) thereby 
deregularising the system from inception. This factor marks a fundamental shift 
in running or managing higher education as explored in the case of African 
higher education systems or the European higher education system. Trow (1996: 
28) states, “In the United States, almost anyone could start a college that awarded 
degrees, and almost anyone did, without governmental approval (or support) or 
their setting of academic standards”, although in some cases, the American 
higher education systems had “their mission defined for them by the state law” 
(Allen, 1988: 65, quoting Norris). But such mandates are also acknowledged to 
have been part of a broader appeal to attract funding from state agencies. 
The above conditions that mark the beginning of the American higher education 
system carry a number of implications that consequently condition the character 
of governance and the levels and nature of higher education autonomy when such 
is evoked. One common mark of the American higher education system is that 
colleges and universities managed to operate without much government control, 
thereby leaving themselves open to the control of market forces. This positioning 
of the American higher education necessarily meant that universities had to 
operate with an entrepreneurial mindset if they were to survive in this 
environment. The idea of leaving the operations of higher education entirely to 
the free market operation mechanism has been viewed by many as taking 
chances with regard to higher education. This view considers that higher 
education is such an important public sector that it requires that central 
governments keep a close watch regarding its management, financing and other 
operations. 
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On the contrary, the initial inception of higher education in America carries a 
belief that higher education systems in America survive on the basis that 
individual people or groups find their offerings necessary for society and hence 
ensure their financial survival through contributions, tuition fees and other 
grants, state or otherwise. By implication this translates into the creation within 
higher education itself of programmes that appeal to the public and are relevant 
to the labour market demands. This position virtually removes the idea of 
universities as serving some undefined common good or good that is mostly 
politically and culturally defined. A university system that operates according to 
labour market demands ensures that its programmes are relevant to the growth 
and sustenance of the labour market while at the same time appealing to this 
labour market for supporting and maintaining the universities in an innovative 
way.  
The above operations of higher education systems in America leave the 
education systems with two alternatives or choices. The systems are impelled, 
according to the rationale of labour market forces, to adapt to the deterministic 
environment of the labour market or risk extinction through financial bankruptcy. 
Trow‟s (1996) argument reveals that the market forces push the universities 
towards innovation drives in a bid to attract more funding through donations and 
increased student enrolments. While many institutions come and go in just 
moments, the growth in size of those that adapt and the establishment of new 
institutions indicate that the higher education system has survived into a mass 
higher education system because many institutions find ways to survive 
economically and many new ones originate, leading to the cumulative effect of a 
mass higher education system based on pure competition for resources and an 
avoidance of being complacent and lax in the management of higher education 
institutions. 
The above characterisation of the higher education system in America shows that 
the higher education system has a unique history and pattern. Trow (1996: 28–
30) characterises the American higher education system as driven by a belief in 
the unpredictable future. This belief spurs competition in a social life 
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organisation as well as in the management of the education system, the higher 
education system in particular. This belief further claims that central 
governments cannot successfully manage the organisation of these facets of life 
without opening up a window of myriads of opportunities to realise their 
potential. This basic vision for an unpredictable life, while creating opportunities 
for everyone in society, cannot be fulfilled if the tenets of an autonomous life are 
not held central in the organisation of the social and economic life in the state. 
An addendum to these factors that spur growth in the higher education system in 
America is the belief that “education is intrinsically good, and that everyone 
should get as much of it as they can be persuaded to enrol for” (Trow, 1996: 29). 
While many American institutions may set basic limits regarding entry 
conditions and qualification, the system inherently believes that the sky is the 
limit and that any student can achieve as much as his or her potential and energy 
allow him or her to.  
Trow (1996) mainly contrasts the American higher education system with the 
European system in arguing that the American system has wide access and very 
few stopgaps, whereas the European system of higher education has tended to 
promote elitism over centuries because of its approach to recruitment, training 
and through-put rates. Nevertheless, it is important to note that while Trow 
(1996) would like to argue that the American higher education system has 
assumed several elements of the „University of Excellence‟ from inception, such 
as the ideals of an equal higher education for all or the „sky is the limit‟ approach 
for everyone, Keohane (1999) argues that the primary origins of American higher 
education are also elitist. The college system was established in order to train 
leaders for the colonies. What is similar between these scholars is the way in 
which they capture the American zeal for higher education as a “civilizing force 
and as a prerequisite for republican government” (Keohane, 1999: 51–52). 
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3.3.1 Understanding the changing nature of the identity of the 
(Western) university through Bill Readings’ symbolism. 
Transformations of the Western university as discussed through the development 
of the university in German, Britain and the United States are summed in the 
three symbols of the university as discussed by Readings (1996). In a way, the 
three ways of conceiving the university can also be considered as particular 
patterns through which the university idea has gone. Nevertheless, such an 
alignment does not necessarily imply a sequential development of the symbols as 
a progression from one to another, as the American case shows otherwise. Each 
of these symbols gives a specific trait of the university and characterises the 
university towards those functions. Readings (1996) argues that the university 
has taken up three different symbols through history. In general the symbols 
signify the extent to which one can envisage a university working with or 
without autonomy. The symbols can also be considered as different spectacles or 
forms through which universities have tended to understand themselves. 
Readings‟ assessment of the nature and identity the university brings to the fore 
three dominant forms that universities, even in the African case, can take. These 
forms are the University of Reason, the University of Culture and the University 
of Excellence. While the three symbols have much to do with the nature of the 
university, I argue that the different forms directly function as three different 
conceptions of university autonomy as much as they are historically located 
conceptions of the functions of the university.  
Regarding the first conception of the university, Readings (1996: 54–61) 
discusses the idea of the University of Reason. This idea arises from an 
understanding of the way knowledge is considered to be organised in the 
university. The conception relates to medieval thought as well as to the modern 
period of philosophical development. Readings (1996) starts off from the 
understanding that the academic disciplines of the university in medieval times 
were centred on the explanation/exposition of a specific understanding of God 
(theodicy). University life and activity at this stage of human civilisation tended 
to be explained by a reason that was itself not clearly manifested in the 
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university. This reason transcended the normal spectrum of explanation in human 
life. According to this reason, divinity and reference to the divine became the 
frame of reference against which knowledge was constructed, measured and 
transmitted within the university. 
Readings (1996: 56) further contends that after the medieval period, it was 
reason that provided the rationale or distinction between the different disciplines 
operational in the university. The modern period of thinking is influenced by the 
works of Immanuel Kant, among others. Quoting Kant, Readings argues that 
reason became primary and authoritative.  
According to this understanding, reason became authoritative because it had its 
own source as much as it was also its own arbitrator. In other words, reason 
became an end as well as being the source of its own authoring. The conception 
of the primacy of reason has traditionally been associated with the practice of 
philosophy. According to Readings (1996), the other traditional three faculties 
that also exist in the university, that is the faculty of medicine, law and theology, 
are believed to be heterogeneously sanctioned. They find their reason outside 
their frame of existence. Hence the idea of the University of Reason is one that 
perpetually champions the use, development and protection of free reason 
because of its very identity of being better positioned to promote rational inquiry 
and being the end itself.  The concept of the University of Reason particularly 
brings to the fore the understanding that reason provided the identity of the 
university. From both the medieval and the modern periods, it is clear that the 
autonomy of the university was and is considered as an important aspect of the 
life of the university and that the university needed and still needs to be 
autonomous in order to carry out its pursuits.     
Readings‟ understanding of the autonomous nature of the university also relates 
to the role of the state. He is of the opinion that the state must protect the 
university so that the use of reason prevails in public life. But on the other hand, 
philosophy, the lower of the faculties but one within which reason is enshrined 
for its own sake, must protect the university from state interference (Readings, 
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1996: 58). This position raises a dilemma on whether reason per se can be 
institutionalised and can still remain autonomous reason. In the Kantian 
understanding, from whom Readings derives most of his ideas on this concept, 
this dilemma is resolved by circumventing the subject or the individual person. 
The individual person is considered as a rational person in terms of handling 
reason, but when it comes to public/state matters, the individual is expected to be 
republican. This means that the university functions by affirming the principle of 
the autonomy of the rational subject while expecting the state to protect this same 
status (Readings, 1996: 59). 
The idea of the University of Reason only depicts the nature and functions of the 
university as determined by reason. Thus, it can also be argued that the nature of 
the autonomy of the university resides in the extent to which the university itself 
makes reason its own operative factor and force. An autonomous higher 
education system would be that which is not overly determined by external 
circumstances in its core nature of developing and using reason in the teaching, 
research and dissemination of its knowledge systems. There is a need for an 
autonomous institution using the ideal of the University of Reason to have its 
reason justified from within the university itself. The conception builds the 
understanding of an autonomous higher education system from the idea that 
reason is supposed to operate independently and find its justification from itself 
and not from another authority.  
No one tradition of higher education governance can claim monopoly to the 
ideals of the University of Reason. For instance, some African higher education 
systems have claimed to be in pursuit of the ideal of reason and that they exist 
simply for the purposes of promoting the same. The governance of higher 
education in Europe, particularly in Germany, can also lay claim to reason as 
infusing the quest for a rejuvenated cultural university, as much as the British 
higher education system can argue that outside the confines of the government, 
the UGC and the National Advisory Board, universities stand to promote the 
ends of reason within the society.  
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Readings‟ (1996) conception of the University of Reason has not managed to 
ward off an understanding that promotion of reason has tended to present the 
ideals of reason as disembodied and abstract. Drawing on the ideals of the 
University of Reason, one can easily infer that Readings‟ conception promotes 
conceptions of academic freedom and institutional autonomy that maintain that a 
university is only autonomous when it is free from interference in staff and 
student recruitments, modes of teaching and the general determination of the 
culture of the university. Based on my discussion of different conceptions of 
autonomy and their application to higher education, it would be accurate to argue 
that such a disembodied conception of autonomy is a misnomer to academic 
freedom and the institutional autonomy of higher education systems.   
The second model that Readings (1996) presents is the idea of the University of 
Culture. The idea of the University of Culture is described as arising from the 
German idealists who were seeking to clarify the autonomy of knowledge in the 
university. In this regard, Readings (1996: 68) argues that “for knowledge to 
become an autonomous object that can be thought organically, it must be 
possible for teaching to be both a process of production and of reproduction at 
the same time”. The act of production and reproduction simultaneously brings 
about an idea of the university where the past, present and future are fused 
together, thereby generating a unifying culture for the university. Readings sees 
Humboldt‟s version of the university as more authoritative than the versions 
proposed by other thinkers such as Fichte and Schleiermacher in so far as the 
relation of the state to the university is concerned.  
Readings (1996: 68) also states that Humboldt proposes looser state control over 
the university whilst ensuring that the university retains its sense of power and 
diversity to fulfil its own mission and its own mandated freedom of action within 
its culture. Humboldt‟s proposal assumes that universities have within limits the 
power to run their own affairs freely. But this position also assumes that given 
such freedom, universities will promote their culture. It is possible at this stage to 
translate the idea of culture as loosely meaning the university‟s culture of 
teaching and research, but Humboldt‟s proposal goes deeper than this. It is 
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important to note that according to this concept, the fusion of the past and present 
in order to determine the future life of any university depends on a thorough 
awareness and understanding of the university as a major agent of cultural 
identity and change. This understanding implies that the state should maintain a 
minimalist role that will only ensure that the university‟s mission is fulfilled, 
without effectively aligning the mission of the university with that of the state. 
The concession by Readings (1996: 69) that there needs to be some regulatory 
state power over the university can be an acceptance that other models of the 
same idea of the University of Culture exist.  
Humboldt‟s ideal of the University of Berlin, which Readings disputes, appears 
to be authoritative because it merges the ideal and the practical. The position 
considers the social mission of the university together with the Kantian 
conception of the idea of reason for its own sake. The university‟s conception in 
this ideal becomes the embodiment of both thought and action as an ultimate end. 
In this regard, Readings (1996: 69) concludes the following:  
The university seeks to embody thought as action towards an ideal; the state 
must seek to realize action as thought, the idea of the nation. The state 
protects the action of the University; the University safeguards the thought 
of the state. And each strives to realize the idea of national culture.  
The concept of the university as realising the idea of culture summed up above 
implies that the university does not only fulfil a social function or mission but 
that it is also given the space to promote reason for its own sake. In other words, 
the university becomes a place for both contemplation and action. The role of 
reason and the social function to the state become the centre of Humboldt‟s 
authoritative proposal. In this conception of the university, a free university is 
one where reason and the social function of the university dialogue with each 
other. In this way, its sense of freedom is partly founded on the social 
understanding of what a university should and can do. The concept of the 
University of Culture harbours no clear indications regarding the autonomy of 
the university or on whether higher education can do without being autonomous.  
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Nevertheless, although there are no clear intimations to forms of autonomy, one 
can without doubt link the University of Culture to the concept of co-operative 
governance of the university, which I have discussed earlier on in relation to the 
cases of South Africa and Ghana or the case of higher education governance, 
which I have briefly stated in the preceding section. If notions of co-operative 
university governance were to be sufficiently infused with deliberative 
democratic culture, it would not be difficult for the state to protect “the action of 
the university” and for the university to “safeguard the thought of the state” 
(Readings, 1996: 69). In the samples I have given in Chapter 2 on forms of 
governance prevalent in the African higher education system, most cases of state 
interference or control represent the nonexistence of a national culture that would 
adequately support the university system as well as promote the ends of the state.   
The last conception that Readings (1996) examines is the University of 
Excellence. Readings indicates that this idea of the University of Excellence has 
been the most recent conception in development and remains very controversial, 
although the idea of „recent‟ is itself debatable. Some accounts of American 
higher education also lay claim to elements of excellence from inception (see 
Trow, 1996). The idea of recent mainly fits with regard to the argument that 
many university reforms to date have tended to demonstrate much of the 
corporate model. 
The concept of the University of Excellence promotes the idea that the ideals of 
excellence are at the centre of and determine how universities operate. The 
concept finds its roots in the value of excellence that is associated with the 
corporate world. It may be argued that when the idea of excellence is applied to 
the governance of the university it introduces mechanical practices such as 
quality control and monitoring mechanisms for university performance, such as 
performance indicators. On these grounds, I argue that the idea of the University 
of Excellence is closely associated with neo-liberal trends of governance. The 
symbolism associated with the University of Excellence brings into the 
understanding and running of higher education managerial practices and ideals 
that mostly belong to the corporate world.  
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Most of the changes that have taken place in the higher education sector in the 
last two decades have occurred in the name of repositioning higher education. 
Consequently, the higher education sector is expected to respond to such issues 
as customer satisfaction, value for money and responsiveness to social and 
economic demands.  In other words, the university is perceived as fulfilling its 
mandated mission if it remains an economically viable system (Readings, 1996: 
21ff). To a large extent, Readings (1996: 8) acknowledges that the idea of a 
University of Excellence leans heavily on administrative overtones.  
The relationships that exist between the different conceptions of the university 
have inevitable conceptual consequences on the nature of the university and how 
the universities understand their own sense of autonomy. In a general 
perspective, there is a strong indication that such a conceptual relationship brings 
about ideals of marketisation and economic viability as the particular marks of 
success and excellence in the university. This conception determines what the 
university is free to do or not free to do. It also raises questions as to whether the 
university can be autonomous as such. In this regard, I also pose the question, 
Are universities autonomous with or without pursuing ideals of excellence? 
Ideals of excellence are also closely connected with globalisation, and this 
question will be answered to a great extent in thee next chapter that examines 
globalisation and higher education. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that despite the different overtones that are 
associated with the conception of the University of Excellence, the conception of 
the University of Excellence is very problematic. When the ideal is introduced in 
education, it easily brings elements of mismatch into the understanding of 
education. The ideals of excellence relate more to corporate management and 
marketisation than to the higher education sector per se and the nature and 
operations of this education system. Readings‟ (1996) exposition of the notion of 
excellence further indicates that the ideal at its best remains nonreferential. In 
other words, there is no tangible or conceptual content to which one can point as 
the focus of excellence. The ideal of excellence can be used as a relational idea 
with varying overtones in each particular reference. When this ideal is used in 
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higher education discourse, it may simply refer to desirable goals that need to be 
achieved in the different areas under consideration. Hence it is also possible to 
have different ideals of excellence in reference to student performance, 
graduation rates and fiscal management of the university, let alone the 
conception and exercise of university autonomy.  
My understanding of the meaning and application of the University of 
Excellence leads to questions of whether the ideal can be put at the same level 
with the other conceptions that Readings (1996) brings to the fore. The ideal of 
excellence in its framework remains a very fluid concept by the fact that it is 
nonreferential. It has no content other than being a pointer to some condition of 
existence. In this case, what represents a condition of excellence in one country, 
for example, may not be regarded as excellent in another country because of 
varying economic and even managerial structures.  
Given the inconsistency of valuation regarding excellence, it is possible that the 
marks of excellence for a university in a liberal state may not be necessarily the 
marks of excellence in an authoritarian state. Readings (1996: 32–33) confirms 
this understanding by stating that “it is not that no one knows what excellence is 
but that everyone has his or her own idea of what it is”. In a more concrete way, 
the conception of higher education autonomy in restrictive states and liberal 
states will, by far, not be the same. This variation alone becomes problematic 
when it comes to conceptualising autonomy in higher education in general and 
the extent to which autonomy is desirable. In other words, although the concept 
of the University of Excellence is the most current conception of understanding 
of the university and its operations, it is also possibly the most divisive model for 
constructing the idea of a university and it relationship with educational 
autonomy.  
The analysis of the ideal of excellence creates the impression that the university 
can exist autonomously of other factors in society by constructing and living up 
to its own ideals of excellence. In this regard, one can even think that higher 
education, by paying attention to this ideal of excellence within its own fields of 
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teaching and research, is an equivalent of living an autonomous life. But one 
does not need to go further in order to see that even notions of excellence as they 
have come down to application are not autonomous in themselves. The 
researcher has just shown using Readings‟ (1996) analysis that many models of 
excellence lean on practices that are prevalent in the corporate world. It can also 
be argued that the dynamics of the corporate world have a colossal effect on the 
life of the university, if this understanding is anything to go by. This simply 
affirms one of the major shortfalls in the idea of excellence that as much as it has 
no referent, the ideal also has no content. In other words, it is neither true nor 
false (Readings, 1996: 13). The ideal of the University of Excellence is only used 
as a buzzword to reflect the economic and managerial viability of higher 
education but has nothing in itself that can direct how reflection and practice on 
higher education autonomy is done, for instance. I will examine the impact of 
economic and managerial practices on university governance in my consideration 
of neo-liberalism and globalisation in chapter 5. 
3.4 Reconsidering university autonomy through traditions of reason  
Conceptions of university autonomy cannot be discussed outside the frame of the 
connection between education and autonomy, which has a long philosophical 
tradition. For instance, the works of Aristotle and Plato tie up the conception of 
education with notions of autonomy or freedom. Plato‟s ideal free person is one 
who is in control of his or her emotions, one whose reason controls the activity of 
the whole person. Similarly, education is also conceived as an activity for 
enabling the rational side of the person to take control.  
On the other hand, Aristotle‟s philosophical works indicate a different link 
between freedom and education. A closer look at this philosophy indicates that 
virtue is the desired frame of human existence. As such, education would be 
considered worthwhile if it promotes a life of virtue where one learns to maintain 
the balance in one‟s life. This is so because virtue, in Aristotelian terms, is the 
balance between lack and excess of any character condition.  
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Nevertheless, one lives in freedom when one is capable of choosing this balance 
as a matter of rational habituation. Hence in both of these classical theorists the 
connection between education, morality and freedom is a common issue. In other 
words, no education can be considered as meeting the condition of education if it 
excludes morality and freedom.  
In relation to different educational setups, Glenn (2000: 11–12) argues that 
educational autonomy can refer to a continuum of issues from the making of 
significant decisions about employment, admission of students, curriculum and 
the budget to making autonomous individual choices in life. It is also observed 
that a lack of proper public funding or its presence alone, as some would assume, 
does not indicate the degree of autonomy for an educational institution. In other 
words, the mere fact that higher education institutions are undergoing 
institutional regulation through modes of funding and other technocratic means is 
far too complex to be an indicator of autonomy than ordinarily perceived because 
autonomy itself touches on many facets of life.  
In general, Glenn (2000: 14) can be understood as characterising autonomous 
educational institutions as those institutions that are a “law unto themselves” in 
the sense that there is mutual agreement among key players in terms of their 
mission and spirit within which business is conducted. From this Kantian 
understanding of autonomy as self-legislation, the autonomous institutions are 
expected to be responsive to those they serve and the communities in which they 
operate. The autonomy of educational institutions would also imply that the 
educational institutions are free to express different educational cultures and seek 
to form their students in different ways available to different societies (Glenn, 
2000: 15).  
3.4.1 Can higher education exist without being autonomous? 
In this section, I want to argue that debates and controversies surrounding 
autonomy are relational, that such debates arise in human life for what it is and 
that they are always in relation to specific forms of human life being considered. 
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In South Africa, for instance, debates on whether higher education can exist 
without being autonomous are always read in the context of the country‟s 
apartheid history where education was heavily used as a tool for implementing 
segregatory practices and policies by the apartheid government.  
My analysis of governance patterns in the South African higher education system 
shows that many developments have taken place in order to move away from the 
apartheid system, which is considered as not having the qualities for promoting 
autonomy in higher education. Universities have undergone restructuring in order 
to reflect the new democratic society in South Africa. Nevertheless, current 
research (Jansen, 2006) indicates that there are more manoeuvres by the state to 
control the life of the universities (see Coughlan et al., 2007; Jansen, 2006). In 
other examples on the African continent, debate is rife as to whether higher 
education systems are autonomous or whether they simply exist as parts of state 
machinery. Only a few cases that I have analysed in the second chapter reveal 
forms of co-operative governance towards a more democratic mode of 
governance. In many of the cases, state control and interference are common.   
The summative perspective of higher education developments in other regions 
such as Europe and America, which I have given in this chapter, is intended to 
put this discourse into perspective. To what extent is a liberal conception of 
autonomy relevant to higher education in Africa? Is it necessary to set limits to 
conceptions and practices of academic freedom and institutional autonomy so 
that, in turn, universities are seen to serve their communities (whether socially, 
economically, or politically)? 
The historical situation of universities globally and on the African continent 
specifically still begs the following questions: Can higher education operate 
without being autonomous? Is higher education necessarily an autonomous 
institution? What forms of autonomy are relevant to higher education?  Such 
questioning brings to the fore the nature of the university while at the same time 
it tries to make sense of education as it is. My examination of this issue does not 
in itself imply that people have to arrive at some definitive unitary point, except 
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for the sake of clarity. Making this discourse definitive would mean putting 
finality into the discourse, thereby thwarting the very conditions under which the 
concepts of education and autonomy are meant to operate in. Most post-
structuralist thinkers would also buy into this position. The current trends in 
philosophical analysis demand that any attempt to define such heavy-loaded but 
apparently simple concepts, such as autonomy in the academy, be mainly 
precursory and tentative. One reason for this is that “academic freedom, like 
freedom itself, defies absolute definition” (Academic Freedom Committees of 
the University of Cape Town and the University of the Witwatersrand, 1974: 2).  
3.4.2 A postmodernist perspective on the relationship between 
autonomy and education and its influence on academic freedom 
in Africa 
Menand contends that most of the perspectives that one finds on the concept of 
autonomy in higher education assume an understanding of autonomy as 
something that is unproblematic itself (Menand, 1996: 5). In other words, the 
idea of autonomy when applied to higher education first gives one the picture 
that it is already a done deal and that everyone knows what autonomy refers to. 
Sometimes this further implies that the conditions of autonomy in higher 
education practices are a given and accepted fact. Alongside such assumptions is 
the idea that the freedom that one finds within the higher education context is in 
itself coherent and acts as a basis upon which certain other issues relating to 
higher education life and governance can be settled. This position nonetheless 
posits autonomy in higher education as a condition upon which desirable 
circumstances could be created. According to Menand (1996), assumptions like 
these in understanding autonomy are also highly problematic.  
In the first place, I am inclined to think that the concept of autonomy or forms of 
freedom is based on and exist within specific social contexts (see Chapter 4). No 
freedom can exist without there being a social context or a primary domain as its 
point of existential reference. As such, any intimation of the idea of the position 
 116 
and the meaning of the relationship between autonomy and higher education as a 
completed and resolved mathematical puzzle remains idealistic.  
Rorty (1996) is one of the scholars who has criticised the underpinnings of 
rationalism from which most liberal thinking has emanated. Reacting to 
conceptions of autonomy that are caught up in abstract rationalism or 
conceptions that do not recognise the lived circumstances of people and their 
changing environment, Rorty argues that the assumption that autonomy and the 
discourse of academic freedom will have to be understood from the 
foundationalist assumptions of Western rationalistic thinking is very difficult to 
sustain. Rorty‟s argument arises from his comments on the nature of academic 
freedom but connects with the dispute on truth and validity between traditional 
Western rationalistic philosophy and the post-structuralists (Rorty, 1996: 29–31). 
Among other things, Rorty consolidates his criticism by raising questions about 
reality. Of particular interest here is the question of whether reality exists 
independent of what people think or whether reality comprises what they think or 
decide to think, and hence is dependent on their beliefs and choices. In his 
conclusions, it becomes clear that the position from which people understand 
reality determines how they begin to understand the university and the 
consequent nature of its autonomy.  
At issue between the two views, Western rationalistic tradition – the basis of 
liberal conceptions of autonomy – and post-structuralism as represented in 
Rorty‟s views, is the dilemma of whether universities need to pursue knowledge 
for its own sake or whether the pursuance of knowledge should be for 
improvement of the human condition and service to society. This dilemma has 
serious implications for the way universities understand the relationship between 
education and autonomy.  
Rorty‟s own position is a conviction grounded in postmodernist thinking that is 
constantly looking for newer grounds for understanding. He argues that it is an 
error to think that “the idea of truth” corresponds to an accurate representation of 
“the intrinsic nature of reality”, which would be objective in itself (Rorty, 1996: 
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35). According to him, reality and its meaning are not objectively defined but are 
rather a result of an inter-subjectivity relation, something that we discover in 
“our living”. What is significant in this shift is the fact that meanings are not out 
there in some objective reality waiting to be apprehended by the human mind but 
that human beings through their social collaboration construct meaning and 
eventually determine what reality will be.  
Rorty‟s (1996) thinking, as presented in the form above, can have many 
implications for the discourse on higher education autonomy. These ideas can 
introduce the notion that the nature of the university and its characterisation of 
autonomy/freedom can be understood from the way agents within the system 
negotiate meanings. In this case, a negotiation of meanings inevitably implies 
that people regard the traditional conceptions of autonomy with suspicion. 
Furthermore, any meaning with universal implications would be equally 
approached with suspicion. Similarly, Dworkin (1996: 359) argues that one‟s 
understanding of freedom depends on the nature of the problems and questions 
that confront one at the time that one is trying to understand that freedom. 
Dworkin uses hypothetical consent in order to reconsider freedom as a person‟s 
capacity to form, revise and rationally pursue what he or she sees as good (1996: 
361–362).  
Furthermore, Scott (1996: 65) argues that meanings and relations are constructed 
according to power relations and different histories. In this regard, the position of 
the relationship between autonomy and education can never be regarded as 
definitive and settled. The reference point for understanding such a relationship 
continually becomes contestable. Nevertheless, the ethical space between an 
ideal of the autonomous pursuit of understanding and its specific historical, 
institutional and political realities should limit how people conceive of this 
relationship. 
Taking seriously a postmodernist perspective on autonomy together with forms 
of situated autonomy will mean that some versions of the concept of academic 
freedom in higher education that would be understood as giving the African 
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universities the right to decide whom to appoint, what to teach and how to teach 
and many more without due consideration of the social position and role of the 
university in society need to be seriously examined for them to be relevant. The 
different examples of university governance on the African continent, which I 
have provided in Chapter 2, consolidate a particular conception of the role of the 
university and its relationship to the state. Similarly, to consider that universities 
are autonomous when they are legislated to be autonomous but are not 
necessarily autonomous in reflection of their place and role in society is to put 
the operations and future of the university in danger. Nevertheless, the idea that a 
situated autonomy that is constantly reflected upon and reconstructed in view of 
the prevailing life circumstances is the more substantive form of autonomy and 
the one being advocated here does not sanction the fact that governments on the 
African continent have a legitimate mandate to monitor and control the affairs of 
the academy.  
3.5  Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I have opted to consider the evolution of the concept of university 
autonomy through the lived examples of university life and reform in Europe, 
particularly in Germany, in England and also in the United States. At the onset of 
this discussion, two perspectives come into focus. On the one hand is the view 
that university autonomy is a natural right in the sense that this autonomy should 
be guaranteed by the very existence of the university. On the other hand there is a 
functional and social construct conception of the university that considers 
university autonomy as a necessary prerequisite if universities are to fulfil their 
mission in societies and also for universities to carry out their work without 
undue interference. I have not bought as much into the idea of university 
autonomy as a natural right as others would want to argue. On the other hand I 
consider university autonomy to be recognised and negotiated within its lived 
circumstances but in full view of the universities maintaining their identity. But 
in general the analysis shows that universities globally, have gone through a 
process of mediating their autonomy between state control and state supervision. 
Not many instances of state interference are cited mainly because of the mutual 
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understanding of the nature and function of the university that both the state and 
the university had. 
Nevertheless, conceptions of autonomy in each of these systems need to be 
understood against the background of the ideals that were driving the particular 
societies at different historical moments. For instance, Wittrock‟s (1993) account 
of these universities (in Western Europe, England and America) acknowledges 
that universities are situational, and that they are neither disembodied nor 
mindless in their missions. According to this understanding, universities 
represent a particular function and identity as reflective spaces in different 
societies across generations. This understanding led the Humboldtian University 
to reject an orientation towards narrow-mindedness in preference for the 
development of broad critical thinking capacity in individuals.  
I have also attempted to bring to the fore how different conceptions of the 
university interact with higher educational autonomy. For instance, the 
University of Reason and the University of Culture display in different ways how 
the life of the university can be organised. Through these different paradigms, the 
conception of university autonomy manifests itself differently. The University of 
Reason is mainly understood from the traditional background of reason. In this 
conception universities are seen as centres where reason is supposed to be 
concentrated and the ones who have to promote reason. On the other hand, the 
Humboldtian conception of the University of Culture slightly shifts this identity 
to making the university a centre where the thought and action of a people are 
embraced. I have associated the University of Culture with forms of co-operative 
governance that one finds in the United Kingdom, South African and Ghanaian 
higher education systems.  
The last conception that Readings (1996) analyses is closely connected with 
ideas of neo-liberalism and globalisation. Using this model, it is possible to argue 
that globalisation has irretrievably pushed the identity of the university into a 
corporate identity (Considine & Marginson, 2000: 41). The shifts in the 
understanding of a university do not suggest that every successive stage in 
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conceptualisation represents a better and refined conception. I think that the 
shifts can be understood without implying any such qualitative progression 
despite the fact that the shifts are tied to a time progression. In this regard, one 
can consider the American claims to elements of the corporate identity of the 
university to be better understood without any implications of qualitative 
progression. 
It is of interest to note that the ideal of excellence as presented in Readings‟ 
(1996) book connects one with issues of neo-liberalism and globalisation in 
higher education. Considine and Marginson (2000: 41) interpret Readings‟ 
conception of the University of Excellence as an indication that “the modern 
government-funded university is changing irretrievably under the pressure of 
globalisation”. In other words, corporatisation is a major force for change in the 
governance of higher education in general. Considine and Marginson (2000: 42) 
partly acknowledge Readings‟ (1996) notion that the corporate identity of the 
university fundamentally undermines ideas of the nation-state and the cultural 
function of the university and that instead of making the university a centre of 
reason and a place where the culture of the nation-state would be embraced and 
nurtured, globalisation turns universities into “trans-national bureaucratic 
corporations whose logic is corporate rather than cultural”. But Considine and 
Marginson (2000) also think that Readings‟ perspective is over-theoretical in the 
sense that it does not engage with actual universities. They argue that the 
relationship between globalisation and higher education or the universities is 
criss-crossed with countertrends and that it is not as simplistic as Readings states 
it. In the following sections I track this argument and assess whether Readings‟ 
conception of the University of Excellence unnecessarily globalises the higher 
education sector and the extent to which neo-liberalism and globalisation affect 
how the business of higher education is done, especially in Africa.  
In the last part of this discussion, I have tried to show that irrespective of the 
cultural and historical features that particular higher education systems find 
themselves in, issues of how such systems live out their autonomy have become 
indelibly linked. Through the discussion, I have also showed that a liberal 
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conception of autonomy has the tendency to drive higher education systems to 
live without properly acknowledging the social and historical circumstances of 
the institutions.  
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCEPTIONS OF AUTONOMY 
4.1 Introductory remarks 
In the previous chapter I have provided a picture of governance forms in higher 
education on the African continent. In all these cases, there are claims to 
autonomy made by each system. Nonetheless, the claims to autonomy are so 
diverse that no single picture of autonomy can be constructed and the claims are 
far from meaning the same thing. This means that the claims to autonomy in 
practice are essentially varied. This has been shown through the purposive 
analysis of some higher education systems on the African continent as well as a 
brief view of some of the world‟s great traditions in higher education such as 
Germany, England and the United States. 
The analysis of the current conceptions and practices of freedom/autonomy in 
higher education on the African continent raises further questions about the 
meanings of autonomy and their different forms. Similarly, one can also question 
whether autonomy is relevant to the discourse of higher education in Africa or 
whether there are any forms of autonomy that speak more to the African 
experience of higher education. This dissertation particularly asks about the 
extent to which liberal forms of autonomy are relevant to higher education 
governance in Africa.  
In order to answer some of the questions above, this chapter will analyse 
different theoretical dimensions of the idea of autonomy and/or freedom. This 
task will begin with a historical mapping of the concept of autonomy. I take a 
closer look at the idea of autonomy and how it has developed in order to have a 
clearer understanding of the implications that arise from different conceptions 
and subsequent practices of autonomy in higher education.  
By starting with a historical mapping of the concept, I intend to highlight how 
the concept developed but also to focus on the different connotations the idea of 
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autonomy has acquired through the different historical stages with the hope of 
bringing clarity to the understanding and practising of autonomy on the African 
continent. This historical mapping can be done through analysis of three different 
stages.  
I will consider the first stage as the period before freedom became the main 
subject in social and political discourses. This is the period before the birth of 
liberalism as a dominant social and political ethic (Skinner, 1998). Skinner 
generally refers to evocations of forms of freedom in this period as the liberty or 
freedom of the ancients. This distinction and naming of the liberty of the ancients 
becomes justifiable against the background of a modern philosophical tradition. 
The modern philosophical tradition, which gives rise to the second stage of 
autonomy in my conception, is considered to be the founding stage for the 
dominant philosophical concepts of freedom and autonomy.  
Towards the last half of this chapter, I will examine what I refer to as the third 
stage in the development of the concept of autonomy in the contemporary period. 
This stage has more elements of the fundamentals of the modern conception of 
autonomy, and what makes it different is the fact that autonomy becomes more 
defined and refined and conceptions of autonomy become heavily contested 
areas as they also mark the different brands of liberalism that people have come 
to know. Although one is tempted to argue that such a consideration after the 
modern conception necessarily becomes a post-modern conception, I do not 
think that the various conceptions of autonomy that continually challenge each 
other today can easily be labelled post-modern, because this categorisation does 
not speak for all forms of freedom after the modern period. Nevertheless, the 
theoretical mindset that brings this contestation uses a post-structuralist 
methodology.  
4.2 The liberty of the ancients  
The idea of the liberty of the ancients is not familiar terminology in the 
contemporary discourse on liberty. Nevertheless I refer to this concept to 
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distinguish and differentiate concepts of freedom/liberty that influence discourse 
on autonomy today. Berlin (2005: 517) uses the concept of the liberty of the 
ancients to refer to how the ancient world understood liberty, particularly among 
the Greek city-states. An equivalent characterisation is also found in Skinner‟s 
(1998: 1–58) conceptualisation of the neo-Roman theory of free states.  
In the ancient world referred to above, to be free meant “to be able to participate 
in the government of one‟s city” (Berlin, 2005: 517). Berlin indicates that during 
this period of human history, there was no distinction between the person as a 
private individual and society as a collective group. In fact, no significance was 
attached to individuality. Essentially, this meant that what the community 
understood as freedom was its own collective freedom from tyrannical leadership 
or foreign forces or occupying forces. Hence, freedom came to designate that 
condition whereby people made laws for their own government and ran the 
affairs of their government, without any subjection to kingdoms or chieftaincies. 
This being the case, it was also understood that the freedom of the state 
penetrated every aspect of life, whether public or private. But the distinction of 
the individual was then immaterial.  
Lovett (2006: 1880) argues that prior to the 17
th
 century, political liberty was not 
an especially controversial notion. The idea of liberty had an uncontested 
meaning. This was largely due to the fact that political freedom during this 
period was not considered an important political value compared to the freedom 
of the nation-state from a foreign power or the arbitrary will of another ruler. 
Lovett (2006) continues to argue that because of its particular historical setup, 
the ancient conception of liberty was also understood mainly as a kind of 
independence from slavery. This understanding conveys the idea that freedom 
was thought of and defended only when it was in danger of being destroyed by a 
tyrant or an autocratic king or leader. A full characterisation of the freedom of 
the ancients has been provided by Skinner (1998) and I now look at some of the 
elements of this conception. 
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In Skinner‟s (1998) Liberty before Liberalism, the ancient idea of liberty is 
understood in two ways. On the one hand is the neo-Roman understanding of 
civil liberty and on the other is the Anglophone classical conception of liberal 
autonomy. Skinner‟s main purpose in this exposition is to challenge the 
assumption that “the freedom of citizens is only possible within free states” 
(1998: 98), a conception that is dominant in the classical understanding of 
freedom.  Skinner‟s explanation of the neo-Roman understanding of civil liberty 
is an example of the classical conception of liberty. 
Skinner (1998: 5) notes that the 17
th
 century discourse on liberty came up with 
regard to the power that the state had in relation to the power held by the 
subjects. In this regard, an individual‟s freedom was only a factor of the freedom 
of the collective or group. The individual was considered free if he or she was a 
member of a free civil association. It was only within the framework of free 
association that one was unimpeded from exercising one‟s capacities in pursuit 
of one‟s desired ends. According to this understanding of liberty, the duty of the 
state is considered to be one of preventing others from violating the right to 
action of fellow-citizens by imposing coercive force of law on everyone. “Where 
the law ends, liberty begins” (Skinner, 1998: 5). Although this conception 
touches on the role of the state in affecting individual liberty, the prime focus of 
the conception is not on the preservation of individual rights as such. 
Government‟s coercive laws to deter others from injuring fellow citizens are 
considered as a means of preserving the natural condition of individual liberty 
within a community. 
What is remarkable in the neo-Roman conception of liberty is that civil liberty 
was always thought of in the relationship between the freedom of the subjects 
and the powers of the state. Hence, conceptions of liberty have always carried 
political implications. The conditions under which individual citizens were 
thought to possess or lose their liberty were tied to and dependent on the free 
association of the whole group (Skinner, 1998: 23). Today, this conception is 
close to the communitarian conception where the primacy of the association or 
the state is held against that of individuality. It was assumed that by virtue of 
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living in a free state, citizens were also free. Similarly, living in a state that was 
autocratic meant that the individual was not free, according to this understanding. 
The idea of common freedom, also referred to as the liberty of the 
commonwealth, became the basis for the discourse of liberty. 
On the other hand, a free government, according to the neo-Roman theory of 
liberty, was one where the actions of the whole group, otherwise also referred to 
as the body politic (1998: 26), were determined by the will of the members as a 
whole. In other words, free states were keepers of their own liberty and unfree 
states were those that were subjected to the will of another who was not oneself, 
the body politic. In this case, monarchies did not fall under free states 
irrespective of the particular licences the monarch would allow his/her subjects. 
A free state was defined only by its capacity for (popular) self-government where 
the prerogative to make rules lay with the general public. A state that received its 
laws from elsewhere/outside, instead of from its members, was similarly 
considered to be unfree. Although in these classical societies one would find 
executive councils, senates and houses of representatives, the state was still 
considered as ruling itself because the power to elect members of society into 
these executive bodies also lay within the general group (Skinner 1998: 34–35). 
Berlin (2005: 517) argues that in the ancient world a person was not free, nor did 
he or she claim freedom, because this world assumed that life is one and that the 
laws and governments covered the whole of it. This conception shows that as 
much as the private arena of life was not given much consideration, there was no 
point protecting it except when it was felt to be in danger (Lovett, 2006: 1880). 
What made this conception predominant is the fact that during this period one 
was feared to have lost one‟s freedom if captured in war, according to the 
Greeks. Lovett (2006: 1881) further argues that it is the ancient concept of liberty 
that influences the conception of liberty in the early English political writers of 
the modern period. 
The neo-Roman conception of autonomy/liberty had a number of implications 
for governance systems. At a general level, the system implied that the idea of 
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„veto‟, as is commonly known in forums or group decision-making processes, 
did not apply to a free society. If all people made decisions, no one had the 
mandate, even constitutionally, to make or abrogate decisions on behalf of the 
group, except when this mandate to decide on behalf of the group was duly given 
to the individual person by the group itself.  
The neo-Roman theory also assumes that certain benefits accompany the ideal of 
a free state over and above that of a free individual. Similarly, the existence of a 
free state was considered as a precondition for the liberty of the individuals. It 
was not common thinking to imagine that individual rights and freedoms could 
exist independently of the state or that one could exercise one‟s liberties under a 
tyrannical rule.  Secondly, Skinner (1998: 61–62) notes, “The benefit of living in 
a civitas libera (free state) is that such communities are especially well-adapted 
to attaining glory and greatness”. This is so because under a free system of 
government everyone strives for glory without the least fear of appearing to be a 
threat, as would be the case in an autocratic system of government. In other 
words, the neo-Roman theory of liberty provided the conditions for the 
advancement of every member of society as part of the advancement of the 
whole group. In this conception the members of the group serve their own group 
interests, thereby indirectly promoting themselves. This is in contrast to a 
monarchical rule where the subjects serve the king and the royal family.  
The idea of the ancient free state also accommodated the understanding that 
liberty comprised the idea that everyone was free to own property without 
reprisals from any higher authority and that the system of society itself gave 
every member a fair chance to advance in life without imposing certain 
privileges on any group of society. The liberty of the free state enabled 
individuals to develop their virtue towards self-fulfilment in life. The dominant 
idea running through Skinner‟s (1998: 30) understanding of the neo-Roman 
concept of liberty is that the rights of every person are respected when every 
person takes part in the making of the laws of society. Skinner (1998: 74) notes 
that participation is a necessary condition of maintaining one‟s liberty. 
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In this section, the neo-Roman theory of liberty as an example of different 
concepts of liberty has been considered. What is of particular interest in this 
position is that liberty was understood as the liberty of the group rather than the 
liberty of the individual members of society. Individuals in society were 
considered free if the collective group made its own rules and ruled itself and 
was not subjected to the will of some dictator.  
4.3 The idea of liberty in the modern period 
Berlin (2005: 517) argues that the clearest formulation of the concept of liberty 
in the modern period can be traced to Benjamin Constant. The concept of liberty 
became prominent as part of an agenda to have a clear distinction between 
private life and public life. This distinction is absent in the concept of the liberty 
of the ancients, as shown above. In the modern period, it is believed that human 
life should have a certain space where the public cannot encroach. This is the 
space where one would be left to one‟s own devices to do as one pleases, 
provided one‟s actions do not injure similar rights and claims of other members 
of society. 
Berlin (2005) provides a socio-historical origin of this conception of liberty. In 
his explanation, he says that the development of the protection of liberty and the 
consequent distinction between the private and public realms of life can be 
attributed to two factors. On the one hand, the often tense relationship between 
the secular state and the church could have contributed to the split between 
private life and public life. The struggle that existed between these two forces of 
society led to the creation of a space within which the individual was allowed to 
do as she or he pleased. But Berlin (2005: 517) also adds that the growth of 
private enterprise, industry and commerce led to the desire to protect individual 
ownership against state interference. Freeden (2006) identifies this shift with the 
birth of the ideal of maximum pleasure, or utilitarianism
8
, as the goal of life. 
                                                 
8
 Glover (1990: 1ff) introduces utilitarianism as an ethical theory/principle that replaces arbitrary-
seeming rules of morality. It argues that human acts should be judged by their consequences. It further 
argues that happiness is the only thing good in itself and that a good action is one that creates the highest 
level of happiness for the largest number of people possible. The major proponents of the theory include 
Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, among others. 
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Freeden‟s argument is made on the basis of a shift of power from the few who 
owned property to the idea of the creation of the happiness of as many people as 
possible as a ground for assessing the good in public matters.  
The result of this shift in thinking was that the realms of individual liberty and 
personal possession of property became the pillars of social and political 
thinking. In other words, the idea of freedom is conceived as part of the broader 
agenda of self-ownership, so that the “scope and nature of the freedom we ought 
to enjoy becomes a function of our self-ownership” (Kymlicka, 2002: 138). This 
conception is refined and developed further in the contemporary debate on 
liberty, which I return to later in this chapter. 
The efforts to distinguish public life from private life can also be seen through 
the works of Immanuel Kant. His ideas have an enormous influence on the 
concepts of liberty in the modern period. In Kant‟s thinking, the distinction 
between nature in general and human nature is crucial for the understanding of 
freedom. On the one hand, Kant entertained the idea that all things in nature are 
connected by the law of necessity. This idea promotes the thinking that 
determination is real and that everything is always influenced by something from 
outside, and as such things are in a perpetual flux or state of change. In this 
regard, human life, given the connection of forces in nature, is determined and 
influenced like that of any other existent being. But Kant further distinguishes 
human consciousness as something that makes a human being different from 
nature in general. Consequently Kant also believes that it is because of human 
consciousness and human rationality that human beings have the capacity to lay 
down the law for their own actions, that is, the moral law (Caird, 1889; Ross, 
1954: 38). It is in the capacity for the moral law that Kant believes that the idea 
of human freedom is central. 
With regard to the idea of the moral law, Kant maintains that human beings lay 
down a law for their actions without reference to circumstances they find 
themselves in, except their ideals (Ross, 1954: 39). The extraction of the moral 
law through human consciousness enables human beings to transcend their 
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natural ties. The moral law is a law that is bound up with the consciousness of 
the self as subject, in such a way that obedience to it is equivalent to making the 
self as subject one‟s end (Caird, 1889: 247). Hence, in the idea of the 
autonomous self, Kant draws a distinction between the self as self-legislating for 
its moral law and the self as determined by others in legislating for its actions. 
But since the idea of the will is connected with the notion of the moral law 
according to Kant, the moral law is necessarily the law of freedom. This idea 
arises from the fact that the will freely legislates for its actions by its own 
determined set standards, which comprise its moral obligation (Ross, 1954: 67–
69). 
It is possible to consider the Kantian formula of freedom as having an aspect of 
negative liberty. This applies only in the case where one considers the self-
legislating will as not interfered with by passions or “sensuous motives” (Caird, 
1889: 255). Using the “neumenal-phenomenal” distinction, Caird argues that in 
Kant‟s understanding “phenomena cannot explain super sensuous objects such as 
free will”. In other words, freedom cannot be explained by something outside the 
person, per se. Freedom is considered as the inner legislation of reason, a faculty 
or a power. According to this position, the conscious subject should determine 
itself in view of its own universal nature alone and should not be determined by 
its particular passions. 
Apart from the innovation in his ideas, it is the circumstances under which Kant 
was writing that made his position unique. Rorty (2004) argues that before the 
Enlightenment, the moral experts were religious leaders, priests in particular. 
Against this background, Kant‟s attempt was aimed at overturning the 
conception of a moral law that arises from outside because it does not evoke 
one‟s sense of duty. Instead, Kant proposed that every person has the inner 
resources necessary to make sound moral decisions. Accordingly, these resources 
consist of the recognition of one‟s possession of an unconditional principle, the 
categorical imperative, that would enable one to decide how to resolve moral 
dilemmas. Hence Rorty concludes that Kant‟s imperative is the product of a 
special faculty, the faculty of pure practical reason. 
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Kant also recognises that consciousness or self-determination in an individual is 
consciousness of oneself as the author of one‟s acts. Kant‟s notion of moral 
autonomy means having one‟s moral decisions regulated and made by reason 
rather than sensual experience. In other words, the self can truly be itself when its 
will transcends its natural or bodily limitations. Hence, an understanding of the 
empirical as distinct from the non-empirical is crucial in understanding Kant‟s 
conception of liberty. Such a distinction is also very similar to Plato‟s distinction 
between form and substance, material and immaterial, human and divine. 
Considered from a different dimension, the distinctions that Kant brought into 
the concept of autonomy have largely been understood as if Kant is proposing an 
individualistic ethic that generates an abstract conception of autonomy that is 
detached from one‟s living circumstances. O‟Neill (2004: 182) notes that Kant‟s 
conception of autonomy has been taken to promote self-centredness, 
possessiveness and individualism. The individualistic forms of autonomy 
attributed to Kant are perceived to devalue the necessary dependence that is part 
and parcel of human life today. The conception of an individualistic ethic is also 
considered to be inimical to issues of human solidarity, community and affection 
because of its inherent sense of self-centredness and individualism. 
Based on the views expressed above, contemporary defenders of the Kantian 
formula of autonomy insist that Kant has been misunderstood. For instance, 
O‟Neill‟s (2004) restatement of Kant‟s position, which is itself a comment on 
Schneewind, defends a conception of autonomy or liberty as self-government 
(2004: 181). This conception acknowledges the ancient concept of the liberty of 
the republic but does not agree with it. Instead, O‟Neill (2004: 182) argues that 
the idea of liberty as primarily a factor of the group does not respect the 
entitlement of individuals to autonomy. An autonomous person is one who is 
capable of legislating for the self, thereby instituting self-government. The 
concept of human self-legislation departs from considerations of external moral 
legislation, whether by God or any external sovereign.  
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The idea of self-legislation of individuals highlights the point that in autonomy 
“individuals shape and govern their own lives” (O‟Neill, 2004: 182). O‟Neill 
contends that self-legislation is a specific understanding of the idea of self-
governance in the sense that to avoid conflict in society, one would need to select 
principles that any, hence all, can also select and adopt as a basis for regulating 
their lives. The Kantian conception of autonomy is meant to be understood as 
one that does not conform to or derive its sense from antecedent-given standards 
of reason (2004: 186). But it provides the supreme principle of practical reason 
itself. O‟Neill (2004: 186) states the following: 
The principle of autonomy as a principle of our willing means that there are 
no external standards of reason but people invent or construct standards for 
reasoned thinking and acting, standards that have the sort of generally 
recognised authority that we would look for in anything that could count as a 
requirement of reason. 
In other words, the idea of self-legislation implies that there must be a “minimal 
structure that must be imposed on thought and action if any plurality of free 
agents is to be able to follow one another‟s thinking and acting” (O‟Neill, 2004: 
187). Therefore autonomy in thinking is an attempt to conduct thinking on 
principles on which all others whom one addresses could also conduct their 
thinking and action. Therefore reason means striving for autonomy in thought 
and action, and conversely autonomy means conducting oneself with reason that 
others can understand or follow.  
In this understanding, reason must be disciplined and flawless, otherwise it 
would not be followed by others. In other words, reason cannot be lawless, 
neither can its law come from anything outside, other than reason itself. It is in 
this sense that defenders of the Kantian conception of autonomy argue that 
reason must be internally disciplined. In other words, reason becomes 
autonomous if it adopts some principle of its own that others would easily 
understand. Hence the idea of self-legislation is a characteristic of thinking that 
free individuals achieve by imposing the discipline of „law-likeness‟ and by 
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making their thoughts or proposals for action capable of being followed by or 
accessible to others (O‟Neill, 2004: 189). 
It is also worth noting that although a free will is one that is determined by pure 
reason, it may be affected by impulses since they are part of human life; 
however, the impulses do not determine the will (Kant, 1965: 13). As such 
freedom attains its peak when the will is independent from determination by 
sensible impulses. Furthermore, Kant‟s conception of autonomy has innate 
foundations. If freedom is one‟s moral capacity as a person to legislate for 
oneself and if this capacity is from within and not from outside, the idea of 
freedom becomes an innate right (Kant, 1965: 43–44). Within the society of 
human beings this innate right implies equality and independence from others. In 
this regard one is not expected to do more than one can also reciprocally bind 
others to do. Human beings through their act of willing become masters of their 
own life.  
Using this Kantian perspective, it can therefore be concluded that liberty or 
autonomy should be conducted in thought and action. Autonomous reason is a 
process of freely imposed self-discipline on the use of one‟s capacities. This use 
of reason is public because it is meant to be followed by everyone and not just a 
specific group of people. Reason that is capable of being followed by everyone 
can manifest itself in speaking, writing and other forms of communication. This 
defence of autonomy as public reason has many implications for the 
consideration of university autonomy and academic freedom.  
4.4 Liberalism and the competing conceptions of liberty 
The modern conception of liberty is largely ushered in by liberalism. Liberalism 
is difficult to define. What the defenders of the liberal ideal propose to be the 
defining marks of liberalism have always varied to the extent that defining the 
term ends up in patronising certain concepts over others, a thing that is contrary 
to the liberal spirit itself. This is why some liberal thinkers, such as Ryan (1998), 
believe that it is easier to produce a list of liberals than to characterise what they 
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have in common. In many ways, liberalism is known for its points of 
convergence that are not even unanimous but generally surround issues 
concerning autonomy and the good. As such no single definition can stand for 
liberalism without defeating the very assumptions on which it is built.  
Nevertheless, the different positions in liberalism can also be distinguished along 
the lines of positive and negative liberty, concepts that were popularised by Sir 
Isaiah Berlin in 1969. In the section subsection, I consider elements of these two 
concepts of liberty.  
4.4.1 Positive and negative concepts of liberty 
Much as one can trace the origins of liberal forms of autonomy to classical 
periods, the origins of negative and positive conceptions of liberty were mainly 
introduced by Benjamin Constant and popularised by Sir Isaiah Berlin in 1969. 
The concepts of negative and positive freedom act as pivot on which 
contemporary debates of liberal autonomy are based.  
Negative freedom refers to the state in which the individual person is or should 
be left to do or be what he or she is able to do or be without interference from 
other persons. Lack of interference, coercion or hindrances forms the hub of the 
conception of negative freedom. Negative liberty does not arise because of 
natural impairment. Berlin (1984: 17) believes that “there ought to exist a certain 
minimum area of personal freedom which must on no account be violated; for if 
it is overstepped, the individual will find himself in an area too narrow for even 
that minimum development of his natural faculties, which alone makes it 
possible for one to pursue, and even to conceive, the various ends which one 
holds good or right or sacred”. This position can better be understood against a 
tradition that held that the group or social association was prior to and 
determined the conditions of individual existence and exercise of choice. The 
repositioning of the role of the individual in the concept of freedom by Berlin can 
also be read as a reformulation of Kant‟s understanding of autonomy which I 
have explained above. Skinner (1998: 29) further argues that the negative notion 
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of liberty implies that the truer and more humane ideal of liberty finds expression 
when the individual is not prevented by others from doing what she or he wants. 
In this sense, the strength of freedom is measured by the strength of the barriers 
to ward off the imposition of the will of an external body.  
Berlin‟s notion of positive freedom can be described as an individual wish for 
self-determination or to be one‟s own master. Berlin (1984: 23) states: “I wish to 
be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility 
for my choices and able to explain them by reference to my own ideas and 
purposes”. In my view, positive liberty is the main source of the concept of an 
autonomous self. The individual self envisaged in this conception is identified 
with reason, and reason is also considered to represent one‟s higher nature. 
Hence this idea of autonomy includes the capacity to have and experience one‟s 
inner space and peace, the presence of inner control through the choices people 
make as they shape their lives. Autonomy brings about self-determination and 
self-realisation in people‟s lives.  
There seems to be a growing consensus that the negative conception of liberty is 
the truer form of liberty, as attested to by Berlin himself. Nevertheless, the 
negative concept of freedom has received more critique than the positive 
concept, especially from communitarian theorists. The critiques are directed at 
the apparent dissociation of the negative concept of liberty from social factors 
that are at play when individuals act. But some of these critics are not necessarily 
in defence of the communitarian conception of liberty, as such. For instance, 
Taylor (1979: 192-3) argues that the classical formulation of negative liberty as 
“absence of external interference” is impoverished and has debilitating effects on 
the individual person. Taylor (1979) states that most often the debate on negative 
liberty tends to entail two extreme ends.  
On the one hand, negative liberty is presented as the opposite of a caricatured 
conception of positive liberty, which is leftist. This caricatured view poses 
positive liberty as exclusively residing in the “exercise of collective control over 
one‟s destiny”, in some form of a classless society” (Taylor, 1979: 175). As such, 
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negative liberty simply tends to be understood as the opposite of this position, the 
absence of any determining collective will or standards. To an extent, the 
caricatured conception of positive liberty does not only misrecognise that 
freedom can exist in societies but it also holds that one can be forced to be free in 
the name of one‟s good, as Raz and others would argue. Nevertheless, Taylor 
(1979: 177) makes concessions to the idea that positive liberty involves exercise 
of control over one‟s life. I return to this idea later in the discussion. 
The caricatured view of negative liberty holds that freedom is simply the absence 
of external physical or legal constraints (Taylor, 1979: 176). For freedom to 
exist, it is not important that other obstacles to freedom such as one‟s lack of 
awareness, false consciousness and other internally determined conditions or 
dispositions are considered. Freedom is merely individual independence from 
other people or influencing conditions. It is the absence of obstacles. Taylor 
argues that such a conception of liberty simply adopts “an opportunity concept” 
(1979: 177) but it is an idea close to what Callan (1997: 56–65) describes as 
choice as mere choosing. Taylor argues that the opportunity concept on its own is 
untenable without self-realisation. But again, self-realisation is not possible if 
one is unaware of one‟s potential and/or if one is influenced by internal fear. In 
this regard, Taylor, and later Raz, promote a similar conception of autonomy.  
It is important to recognise the distinction between „potential‟ and „exercise‟ in 
the autonomous self-realisation of individuals. In this distinction, the concept of 
“being capable to do something without interference” is distinguished from “the 
ability to actually exercise the capability to freedom”. Taylor argues that “being 
able to do what one wants can no longer be accepted as a condition for freedom” 
(Taylor, 1979: 180). He suggests that other factors such as internal motivation, 
accurate knowledge, clear consciousness as opposed to false consciousness and 
basic purpose play a crucial role in determining the nature of autonomy. These 
factors cannot be accounted for by simple notions of positive and negative 
liberty. In this sense, “freedom is no longer just the absence of external obstacle, 
but also the absence of external obstacle to a person‟s capacity to undertake 
significant action, one that is important to the person” (Taylor, 1979: 182).  
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Taylor (1979) proposes a communitarian liberal agenda of autonomy and I will 
discuss this in greater detail in the next subsection. In this view, the idea of what 
is significant in one‟s life is considered from communitarian ends. Taylor argues 
that even the internal motivations that people have as claims for freedom to do 
certain things cannot be put on a linear scale. In other words, just as people have 
significant purposes and less significant purposes in life so will their motivations 
be. This position opens up the area of individual liberty to external arbitration 
and some judgment over the worthiness of these motivations, close to Raz‟s 
(1986) condition of autonomy. Taylor (1979: 187) later refines the idea to retain 
the concept that freedom is the absence of internal as well as external obstacles to 
what a person truly or authentically wants.  
Our attributions of freedom make sense against a background sense of more 
or less significant purposes, for the question of freedom/unfreedom is bound 
up with frustration, fulfilment of our purposes. Our significant purposes can 
be frustrated by our own desires, and where these are sufficiently based on 
misappreciation, we consider them as not ours, and experience them as 
fetters (Taylor, 1979: 191).  
Taylor‟s position includes the idea of strong evaluation within one‟s given social 
conditions as an aspect of human freedom. 
4.4.2 Varieties of liberalism and their implications for educational 
autonomy 
There are as many varieties of liberalism as there are proponents. In general 
Ryan (1998: 293) identifies classical liberalism and modern liberalism as the 
dominant trends in liberal thought. On the one hand, John Locke is seen as one of 
the proponents of classical liberalism, which emphasises “limited government, 
the maintenance of law, the avoidance of arbitrary and discretionary power, the 
sanctity of private property and freely made contracts, and the responsibility of 
individuals for their own fates” (Ryan, 1998: 293). The classical formulations of 
liberalism were made against a tradition of monarchical and authoritative forms 
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of government. It was believed that limiting the powers authorities held over 
their subjects would enhance the liberties of these subjects. 
On the other hand, modern liberalism is exemplified by the works of John Stuart 
Mill, who upholds the capacity of individuals to reason and rationally decide for 
themselves the forms of life that will enhance each individual‟s capacity. Modern 
liberals emphasise individual freedom and the idea that personal fulfilment 
should be the goal of each person‟s exercise of individual freedom (Ryan, 1998: 
295). Today, liberalism is best known for the prominent emphasis it places on 
individual liberty in general.  
Liberalism can be said to designate any ideology, philosophical view or political 
tradition that seeks to make liberty its primary political value and virtue. It can be 
seen as a social ethic that advocates liberty and equality in general (Seidentop, 
1979: 153). From the consideration of being a social ethic, the tendency has been 
to break down liberalism into its constituent elements, which may include rights, 
freedom of thought, limitations on power, especially of government and religion, 
the rule of law, the free exchange of ideas, a market economy that supports 
relatively free private enterprise and a transparent system of government in 
which the rights of all citizens are protected. But again there is no unanimity over 
the particular character of the values regarded as unique to liberalism. 
Bellamy (1992: 219) further divides the contemporary liberal tradition into two 
groups: neutral liberalism and communitarian liberalism. Neutral liberalism is 
characterised by an equal concern and respect for individuals, groups and 
communities so that a particular conception of the good is not imposed and so 
that competing values are allowed to exist side by side. Although neutral 
liberalism springs from the foundations of right that Kant introduced, the 
doctrine has different emphasis points across its adherents (Bellamy, 1992).  
On the one hand, there is the narrow sense of neutralism that holds that the state 
should not take any action to assist its members to achieve their conception of the 
good. This view also implies that no substantive conception of the good will be 
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proposed except that which helps the formation and sustenance of a basic society 
of equals. The second conception holds that the government should assist all its 
members so that they are equally able to pursue and achieve any conception of 
the good that they choose. The third position of neutralism is a combination of 
the first two positions. It tries to strike a middle ground between a minimalist 
state, as Nozick (1974) would call it, and a comprehensive approach to the social 
good.  
In general neutral liberalism promotes the equal rights of individuals to form a 
conception of the good and a good society and the equal entitlement to devise 
means to achieve this. The state‟s role is that of protecting the conditions within 
which these equal individuals will operate without preferring any one and 
particular conception of what is good in life. The implication of this position is 
the presumption of free individuals as people who are capable of discerning and 
choosing alternatives in their lives.  
But if it is desirable within liberalism to allow individuals to see different 
alternatives in life and eventually choose between them, it becomes difficult for 
neutral liberalists to maintain the position of not prescribing any particular 
conception of the good. The presupposition that individuals are capable of 
choosing rationally what is good for each one of them prescribes an expected 
outcome of the process of choice in life. Hence Bellamy (1992: 240) argues that 
there is only a thin line of separation between neutral liberalists and 
communitarian liberalists. This argument is made on the ground that the principle 
of autonomy on which neutral liberalism seems to base its important position is 
itself substantive. 
On the other hand, communitarian liberalists emphasise the role of settled 
traditions and established identities in the formation and exercise of individual 
liberties. Communitarian liberalism draws from the liberal acceptance of the 
principles and values of liberal equality and pluralism on the one hand and the 
social embeddedness of human beings on the other. In the first place, liberal 
communitarianism argues that if people are equal and equally capable of forming 
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and pursuing various conceptions of the good life, it is also admissible for groups 
of people to form and pursue their common interests if they happen to agree on 
similar principles governing their conduct. In other words, if people accept  and 
respect the idea that there are bound to be different conceptions of the good life, 
it follows that different communities will tend to surround themselves with their 
own sense of what is good in life, thereby entitling them to pursue this vision of 
the good as legitimate goal in life. But Walzer (1983), one of the liberal 
communitarians, believes that people can only criticise certain standpoints from 
their privileged standpoint, that the social beliefs they already have act as a 
background for assessing the good in life. Walzer‟s main concern though is 
justice. I position a preferable conception of autonomy within the circles of 
communitarian liberalism. 
Furthermore, Raz (1986) concentrates on conceptions of autonomy as he 
disparages moral individualism and the idea that morality is rights-based. Raz 
identifies two conceptions of liberty. On the one hand, there is a view that liberty 
has meaningful value because it serves other interests. In other words, the value 
of freedom will be affirmed in so far as the other variables outside freedom are 
also affirmed. In this regard, Raz (1986: 17) argues that freedom would collapse 
once the other variables lose their value. Hence, the idea of liberty or freedom 
has to be founded on a self-explanatory principle where freedom is intrinsically 
valuable as an independent value. 
In general, Raz (1986: 17–18) believes that the ideal of liberty is important 
because it is the centre around which political morality revolves. The idea of 
liberty connects liberalism and democracy. But it needs to be noted that although 
liberalism can provide foundations for democracy, it is possible to come to 
democracy through other ways that are not necessarily liberal. On the other hand, 
individualism is a moral doctrine that simply associates with liberalism. But 
Raz‟s point is that just as liberals may support undemocratic institutions in some 
cases, it is possible that liberal conclusions can be based on nonindividualistic 
conclusions. Raz (1986) uses this position to build a conception of autonomy that 
is not individualistic but communitarian in character. 
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The liberal communitarian position shifts away from a vision of liberalism as 
theory of limited government where liberty is about what governments may not 
do in order to promote individual liberty. While conceding that governments can 
be a source of restraint on individual liberty, Raz‟s formulation of liberal 
communitarianism proposes that governments can also create conditions under 
which citizens would enjoy greater liberty than without it. This view shifts to a 
conception of government not as threat to individual liberty but as an enabling 
condition or an enhancement in individual liberty. Such a conception of 
nonindividualistic liberty is essentially connected with forms of government, 
because governments are required to create conditions under which political 
liberties would be created and promoted.  
Raz (1986: 35–37) connects the issue of liberty and political authority and 
ultimately sets conditions under which political authority can be legitimate in 
promoting liberty. He distinguishes mere command as authority from authority 
as a giving of reasons that would be recognised as necessary for action. He also 
makes a distinction between an individualistic morality of rights and a 
nonindividualistic one in the sense that an individualistic morality of liberty, 
though humanitarian, “will not recognise any intrinsic value in any collective 
good” (Raz, 1986: 198). In other words, the collective goods are held in so far as 
they are supportive of the moral rights but are not considered to be valuable in 
themselves. This point gives one a distinct line between autonomy and rights.  
Autonomy, understood from a liberal communitarian stance, can be equated to 
achievement (Raz, 1986: 204). In this regard, an autonomous life is characterised 
not only from what it is but as a synergy of what it might have been (a 
consideration over failed options) and what it actually became. For instance, a 
person cannot be considered to have lived an autonomous life if he or she simply 
drifts through life or if there are no significant choices that he or she has to make. 
In other words, the status of autonomy is one that one consciously achieves 
through one‟s circumstances in life.  
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The above consideration can apply to autonomy at two levels. At the first level is 
the initial capacity to be autonomous, to become the author of one‟s life. Raz 
(1986: 204) refers to this as the “primary sense of autonomy”. The second 
component of an autonomous life comes to the fore when the conditions of one‟s 
assumed autonomous life are such that they make an autonomous life possible in 
real-life circumstances. In this regard the conditions of one‟s autonomy would 
include such things as the state of the individual, the level of knowledge of 
surrounding circumstances and the circumstances of one‟s life, and whether 
through all these one can be considered to have achieved a considerable or 
“sufficient range of significant options” available (Raz, 1986: 204). 
The above conception of autonomy fundamentally separates the two conceptions 
of autonomy. On the one side is a rights view of autonomy that promotes the idea 
of a right to autonomy as a capacity for autonomy within individual persons. On 
the other hand, life is considered as autonomous if its conditions/circumstances 
have come about through achievement and not merely as the result of a capacity 
for autonomy. This brings the judgement on life as autonomous to be made on 
the grounds of the choices the person has made and lived through as a distinct 
mark of his or her life.  
One can proceed to argue that given this understanding, “the ideal of personal 
autonomy requires not merely the presence of options but the presence of 
acceptable options” (Raz, 1986: 205). Such a conception specifically translates 
into the idea that if autonomy is to be achieved, one‟s options will depend on 
certain social conditions for them to be realised. Some of the conditions include 
whether the environment one is in allows for the exercise of those rights or not. 
In the end, social conditions equally become important. It can therefore be 
concluded that the realisation of autonomy depends in part on collective goods 
that cannot be held conditional on some other goods or values and that to an 
extent the collective goods need to be intrinsically valuable, otherwise they 
perpetuate an infinite chain of causes in search of an inherent value. 
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To sum up these views, one can say that the desire to be autonomous implies the 
desire to have options that are socially acceptable as options and to live within 
circumstances where one‟s desires would be fulfilled. Considered from such a 
position, the idea of autonomy as absence of coercion becomes narrow and 
autonomy as situated in life communities becomes meaningful. No wonder that 
several individual freedoms would only be possible if an appropriate common 
culture is also possible and available to support them (Raz, 1986: 247). This is a 
conception of autonomous life that is judged by how it came to be, that is, “by 
what it might have been and by why it is not other than what it is” (Raz, 1986: 
371). The idea directs us to the important factor of autonomy as the ability to 
choose one‟s options and one‟s power to bring about what one has chosen within 
one‟s given social circumstances. Again this position assumes that one has the 
power to do what one chooses, otherwise the action would not be considered as 
contributing to one‟s autonomy or not. Nevertheless the conditions of autonomy 
as necessitating circumstances are just part of what it means to have autonomy 
itself. These circumstances include appropriate mental abilities, an adequate 
range of options and independence.  
This point brings me to a distinction between autonomy and self-realisation. 
While one can achieve self-realisation in a nonautonomous way, autonomy helps 
in the project of self-realisation. The means for self-realisation do not lose their 
quality if they are dominated by the requirement to survive, for instance. On the 
other hand, when the reason for one‟s action is the need for survival, it is difficult 
to talk of autonomy.  
To be autonomous, and to have an autonomous life, a person must have 
options which enable him to sustain throughout his life activities which, 
taken together, exercise all the capacities human beings have an innate drive 
to exercise, as well as to decline to develop any of them (Raz, 1986: 375). 
If choice dominated by the need for survival cannot count as a meaningful 
option, it is also the case that a choice between good and evil is not enough. 
Autonomy requires that many morally acceptable options be available. The idea 
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of personal autonomy transcends what every person may have a right to. To be 
autonomous one must identify with one‟s choices and must be loyal to them 
(Raz, 1986: 379–382). Hence to be autonomous also involves to a large extent 
having integrity. There is value in integrity; that is why an autonomous life can 
also be considered as a life of value. Conditions of autonomy concern the central 
aspect of the whole system of values in society. Raz‟s autonomy-based 
conception of freedom is a combination of individual capacity as well as the 
availability of adequate options, the necessary mechanisms by the state that 
prohibit denial of freedom and to an extent the right to infringe on the perceived 
autonomy of others, based on their good (Raz, 1986: 394).  
In this subsection, I have argued that liberalism can be understood from various 
standpoints or ideals, such as neutral liberalism, communitarian liberalism and 
classical and modern conceptions. I have drawn extensively on Raz (1986) 
because his conception of autonomy accommodates the idea that to be 
autonomous requires a full account of one‟s living conditions and how options 
within those living conditions manifested themselves, were chosen and were 
lived out. I also concede that although much is said in this regard, not everything 
can be said about liberalism and the various trends within it. In the following 
subsection, I consider the positive and negative conceptions of liberty and their 
influences on liberalism and higher education autonomy discourse.  
4.4.3 Political and comprehensive liberalism 
The popularised concepts of negative and positive freedom have influenced 
contemporary debates on liberalism. The two concepts are also at the heart of the 
distinction between political liberalism and comprehensive liberalism (Callan, 
1997; Rawls, 1971). The distinction between political and comprehensive 
liberalism is centred on a particular conception of autonomy, which to a large 
extent cannot be equated with the negative and positive concepts of liberty 
although these two concepts have influenced that thinking. In order to clarify this 
distinction I employ McLaughlin‟s (1992) maximal and minimal forms of 
citizenship for they reveal different dimensions of the contemporary liberal 
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tradition. It needs to be noted that although the framework I am employing deals 
with democratic citizenship, this discussion does not discuss citizenship issues. 
Implications for citizenship issues are discussed in Chapter 6.  
McLaughlin (1992: 236) analyses liberal democratic citizenship from questions 
of identity, virtues, political involvement and social prerequisites that stretch 
between maximal and minimal features. While these characterisations do not 
directly address conceptions of liberty, their basis is rooted in liberty itself. For 
instance, Rawls‟ (1971) proposal for a political conception of justice that is 
preoccupied with finding a general consensus would be considered as fulfilling 
the conditions of minimal liberalism, just as Rawls was more concerned with  
arriving at constitutional essentials. One can also equate such forms of liberalism 
with Bellamy‟s (1992) neutral liberalism. From different angles, neutral 
liberalism is associated with the theories of Nozick (1974), which defend the 
minimalist state.  Callan (1997: 170) characterises the same as a liberalism that is 
satisfied with the lowest common denominator as the basis for teaching children 
what they need to know in society.  
The minimalist conception of liberalism, which is close to Rawls‟ conception of 
political liberalism, uses a negative conception of liberty by virtue of its 
emphasis on the promotion of equal rights for all. The basic framework of this 
conception sets a limit beyond which an individual‟s entitlement cannot be 
disturbed or infringed with. It is with such understanding that I argue that this 
conception is a resemblance of Skinner‟s (1998: 29) position that states that “the 
freedom of a society, or a class or group of people is measured by the strength of 
the barriers to ward off the imposition of the will of an external body onto it, and 
the number and importance of the paths which they keep open for their 
members”. In many ways, liberalism has become famous yet controversial 
because of its preference over a negative conception of liberty, which is in fact a 
minimalist conception of liberalism.  
Macedo (1991) provides one of the clear perspectives on minimal liberalism, 
which is particular in its conception of rights, government and social life. He 
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argues that liberalism is believed to centre on values of individuality, social 
pluralism, liberty, legality, rights, limited government and public reasonableness 
(Macedo, 1991: 12). Similarly and in line with the ideals of a basic society 
(Rawls,  1971), liberalism holds that government ought only to provide for equal 
freedom, order, security and a few other widely acceptable public goods 
(Macedo, 1991: 3). According to this understanding liberalism believes in the 
provision of the basic framework for the proper operation of members‟ activities 
in society. Beyond this framework, any other efforts are considered as tampering 
with individual liberty. 
From the framework of liberalism outlined thus far, one would expect liberal 
systems and societies to place a marked emphasis and value on individual 
freedoms. In many cases it is believed within liberalism that such values are 
better protected in a society that puts into place mechanisms for the rule of law 
and the separation of powers. The rule of law works primarily to protect 
individual rights by making sure that appropriate legal instruments are in place. 
These instruments include the availability of courts and personnel to manage the 
courts as well as clear formulations of the rights of citizens through either a bill 
of rights and/or a constitution. Minimalist liberalism carries overtones of 
constitutionalism.  
Liberal societies, because of the emphasis on equal rights for all, have also been 
known as fertile grounds for the cultivation of democratic values such as 
freedom, respect, tolerance, reciprocity and public reason (Kymlicka, 1989; 
Rawls, 1971). I return to the connection between liberal autonomy and 
democracy later in this chapter as I clarify on the constituent elements of 
autonomy. By promoting diversity, toleration and respect, liberal systems 
emphasise the value and importance of individuality. Individuality is considered 
to be integral to the promotion of personal liberty through the imposition of 
procedural and substantive limits on the ways that persons or governments can 
interfere in the lives of others. In so doing, liberals believe that other values such 
as tolerance and respect for the rights of those from whom one differs are also 
going to be respected and promoted.  
 147 
The ideals of respect, toleration and the right to disagree are mainly based on the 
principles for the minimum requirement of public reason. In other words, it is not 
possible for individuals to engage with each other on public matters if there is no 
effort to engage each other‟s reasons for particular positions on issues affecting 
people. Similarly, the idea of respect would be nullified if people understand 
respect to mean avoidance or lack of interest in the views that others who are 
different from one are proposing (Waghid, 2001: 128–130). Hence Macedo‟s 
(1991: 7–9) idea that liberal rights are not based on disagreement or self-interest 
but on moral principles justifying the equal right to freedom should be 
understood against this background of the liberal spirit. The framework of public 
reason is the background against which liberal ideas are promoted or understood. 
I also note that what liberalism hopes to offer in these liberties is a system of 
justice where the reasons for doing things are made public and are open to public 
scrutiny. I will explain further the liberal implications for justice as I consider the 
implications of these ideals for higher education. 
Liberalism‟s structure of power is horizontal and reciprocal and not vertical and 
managerial (Macedo, 1991: 40). This structure of power within the liberal 
understanding implies that all players in society are equal before the law. It also 
means that the procedures for managing society apply equally to all members of 
society. But this condition can only be sustained in the liberal commitment to 
public justification of reason (Benhabib, 1996). Hence a liberal social order is 
one that should “in principle be capable of explaining itself at the tribunal of each 
person‟s understanding” (Macedo, 1991: 41).The aim of liberalism is to create 
reasonable agreement but for this to be achieved, Macedo argues that liberalism 
should seek for justifications that are widely acceptable to reasonable people 
with a broad range of moral and philosophical commitments and interests, not 
only specialists. This position necessarily moves such strains of liberalism to 
communitarian considerations. 
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4.5 Constitutive features of liberal autonomy 
The idea of autonomy has a number of features that distinguish it from other 
conceptions while at the same time giving a unique character to different claims 
of autonomy. I consider autonomy not just as a mark of the condition of human 
activity but also as an indication of the level at which individuals in an institution 
realise their projects as part of the whole.  Bonnett and Cuypers‟s (2003) article 
gives a distinctive mark to the discourse on autonomy by considering autonomy 
in line with its constituent elements. The elements that are central to the 
understanding of autonomy are freedom or free will, critical thinking, rationality 
or objectivity and consciousness, responsibility, authenticity or identity, and 
community. What this discourse also assumes is that the more one has of these 
elements in the operations of particular institutions, the more one can claim to 
live a liberal autonomous life and that the less one has of these features in an 
institution, the more one can talk of that particular institution as having less 
autonomy. In many ways the constituent elements of autonomy operate together 
in synergy in the projects of an autonomous person or institution. 
4.5.1 Rationality and objectivity 
Rationality is a quality that is inherent in human beings but that needs proper 
cultivation. A better understanding of what rationality means draws me back to 
two key figures in the history of philosophy: Rene Descartes (who lived from 
1596 to 1650) and Immanuel Kant (who lived from 1724 to 1804). Descartes 
(Stumpf, 1988: 236–243) was disturbed by the many doubts and imperfections 
that he had despite having been trained one of the astute academic environments. 
He turned to mathematics in search for the human “mind‟s ability to apprehend 
directly and clearly certain basic truths” (Stumpf, 1988: 239). Through the use of 
methodic doubt, Descartes came to the conclusion that there was one certain 
truth whose foundations could not be shaken; that he was thinking. This thinking 
was the most secure foundation for his existence as a person. It is framed as “I 
think, therefore I am [cogito ergo sum]” (Stumpf, 1988: 243, emphasis original).  
 149 
On the other hand, Kant was stunned by two things: “the starry heavens above 
and the moral law within” (Stumpf, 1988: 300, emphasis original). Kant‟s notion 
of rationality centres on the capacity of the human mind to construct experiences 
according to its own patterns and not on the fact that experience structures the 
human mind in specific ways as Hume and others before him had argued 
(Stumpf, 1988: 307). In other words, the mind imposes its way of knowing upon 
its objects through the process of rational judgement, which is a priori. The idea 
that human beings can deduce meaning by simply analysing logical connections 
between concepts and not by their causal connection gives rationality its 
foundation. Similarly, Kant regards people as morally autonomous “if in their 
actions they bound themselves by laws legislated by their own reason as opposed 
to being governed by their inclinations” (Bonnett & Cuypers, 2003: 327). In this 
sense, the condition of “making rationally informed choices” causes human 
beings to be autonomous (Bonnett & Cuypers, 2003: 327, emphasis original). 
But rational thinking can lose its integrity if it is not objective. Bonnett and 
Cuypers (2003: 338) consider objectivity as the opposite of self-centredness. 
They argue that “rational thinking relates us to the world and achieves its rigour 
by the application of public rule-governed procedures to experience in terms of 
which it is thus organized and validated”. In this case objectivity becomes a 
function of rules to which all people agree as conditions for something to be 
declared „true‟.  
4.5.2 Freedom and/or free will 
The theme of freedom or free will runs concurrently with elements of rationality. 
The rationality of human beings becomes operative when people exercise their 
freedom to hold different opinions and have the reason to defend them. For 
existentialist thinkers “we are always free” (Bonnett & Cuypers, 2003: 328) in 
the sense that people are always positioned to make choices in the ways that they 
respond to different circumstances. The human will can be considered as having 
a nature of its own, although the Frankfurt School (Bonnett & Cuypers, 2003: 
329) argues that the will is “constituted by a person caring about or loving 
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something (emphasis original)”. This understanding of the will is called 
volitional necessity and at first sight appears to contradict the very nature of free 
will. 
The idea of volitional necessity means that a genuine free will is always 
construed within specific conditions and becomes free in relation to those 
conditions. For instance, freedom of expression or of opinion would lose its 
significance if the human condition did not have any histories or conditions that 
impeded the free expression of ideas and opinions. Despite being constructed in 
the negative format of liberty, it is this negative freedom that creates the first 
condition for freedom before people begin to realise their freedoms in various 
ways through civic participation, for instance. Given this understanding, it can be 
argued that autonomy primarily depends on the condition of the individual not 
being under constraint and finally depends on this individual acting according to 
the character of her or his will (Bonnett & Cuypers, 2003: 330).      
4.5.3 Critical thinking 
Critical thinking is thinking that “facilitates judgement because it relies on 
criteria, is self-correcting, and is sensitive to context” (Bailin & Siegel, 2003: 
181–182). In this regard, critical thinking requires both the ability to think and 
the disposition necessary for this thinking to take place. In many ways, critical 
thinking is considered as an overriding ideal for education; that is, education 
aims at developing in individuals the capacity and ability to think. It does this in 
ways such as marking the conditions under which reasons can be evaluated and 
setting the criteria for judgement in so far as the probative reasons are concerned. 
While the capacity to think can be considered as inherent in human beings, 
oftentimes people have preferred not to think about specific aspects of their 
problems because they do not have the skills to do so or simply because they do 
not want to think about the matter in question. As such, the development of 
critical thinking as the disposition to thinking is very much a condition that each 
individual person opts for. 
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Critical thinking becomes a constitutive element of freedom beyond its 
consideration as a disposition in individuals to choose the path of looking for 
reasons, weighing them and choosing from alternatives based on the probative 
strength of these reasons. In one way, critical thinking is the basis for creative 
thinking in human beings. Possible alternatives to an issue are not possible if 
people do not assess the reasons that back different perspectives or options. In 
addition to this, Bailin and Siegel (2003: 188–189) argue that critical thinking 
develops the respect for persons in students and prepares them for adult roles, 
where self-direction are prominent. Apart from the idea that educational 
activities are built on a critical thinking basis, Bailin and Siegel also argue that 
the democratic life to which most educational systems have attuned themselves 
requires careful analysis and reasoned deliberations. In this regard, one can 
consider critical thinking as the basis on which any independent thinking would 
have to be based in developing personal autonomy and judgement.    
One of the crucial capacities in the development of an autonomous self is the 
capacity to critically assess and even actively shape one‟s actions, one‟s 
character as well as the source of one‟s actions (Macedo, 1991: 214). These 
capacities assume that an individual is capable of making strong evaluations 
regarding the circumstances of his or her life and that the individual is also 
capable of scrutinising and shaping his or her values and goals in life.  Hence, the 
ideal of strong evaluation requires that an individual be aware of his or her 
situation, and as such situationless autonomy becomes out of place, as will be 
shown later. This ideal moves away from the Kantian conception of autonomy 
that is centred on pure reason into a conception that is fully situated within a 
specific social context. This will turn out to be an ideal of autonomy that is 
informed by different concrete standards while at the same time maintaining a 
reflective distance from the desires and emotions. 
4.5.4 Authenticity/identity 
The concepts of rationality, freedom and critical thinking that I have analysed 
above pave the way for authenticity or identity. Bonnett and Cuypers (2003: 327) 
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argue that human rationality, which gives birth to critical thinking, provides the 
basis for authenticity, which is better fulfilled in conditions of freedom. In this 
regard, claims that something is truly one‟s own imply that one has considered 
all conditions in perspective and has come to a point of declaring the thing as 
one‟s own. If one were to develop something merely by following a prescribed 
method, one would not be in a position to make a wholesale claim of that thing 
as one‟s own. In other words, while acknowledging the existence of standards in 
ordinary practice or discourse, such as teaching and learning, one would not 
claim that the things one has developed are authentic if one does not assign 
personal meaning to the activity. The idea of creating personal meaning removes 
the possibility of blind adherence to norms and standards while at the same time 
attaching “a personal identity” to the created thing (Bonnett & Cuypers, 2003: 
327, 330). 
Quoting Frankfurt, Bonnett and Cuypers (2003: 330) state that “a person acts 
autonomously [authentically] only when his (or her) volitions derive from the 
essential character of his (or her) will”. This understanding of an autonomous life 
largely evokes Kant‟s conception of the will as a self-legislating will, as one of 
the major conditions for human autonomy to exist. Nevertheless, the conception 
that is central here does not sanction an escape from public rationality that 
moulds a person‟s understanding within a shared social environment but at best 
advocates that even in the face of public rationality, one should not adhere to 
norms of public rationality uncritically. 
4.5.5 Responsibility 
The above-mentioned characteristics of authenticity/identity may have several 
implications for one‟s life. While it may well be possible to argue that some 
elements of authenticity/identity carry possibilities for a self-centred life, Bonnett 
and Cuypers (2003: 337) argue that authenticity requires a decentred relationship 
with the world, in which one begins to acknowledge  the consequences of one‟s 
thoughts and actions and that one has a clear perception of their human 
significance. In this case, one can further infer that responsible action demands 
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conditions of life similar to those proposed by a number of deliberative 
democracy theorists. On a general note, the idea of responsibility only makes 
sense in those places where there is due regard for the equal dignity and worth of 
people other than oneself, irrespective of their social, economic or educational 
status. Bonnett and Cuypers (2003: 337) evoke the idea that there needs to be a 
reorientation of the subject-object relationship. Hence the democratic framework 
stands as a background against which such responsibility can favourably be 
developed.  
The concept of responsibility can be developed into several other ideas such as 
its relationship to the development of friendship. Waghid (2008: 199), 
commenting on Sherman‟s account of friendship, argues that teaching and 
learning, within the democratic framework, takes place when both teachers and 
students avoid being dismissive of one another and listen to each other with 
interest and appreciation. He goes further to argue that when these conditions are 
in place, people learn from one another in an atmosphere of trust, where 
“goodwill and mutual benefit are enhanced” (Waghid, 2008: 200, quoting 
Sherman). Creating a space where friendship prevails assumes that a foundation 
of autonomous acting and thinking has been established. The absence of 
autonomy makes friendship impossible and thwarts independent thinking, 
thereby breeding fear of being unfairly dismissed in public discourse. 
4.5.6 Community:  unencumbered freedom versus situated autonomy 
– in defence of comprehensive liberal autonomy and/or liberal 
communitarian autonomy 
The concept of community is one other element that influences the character of 
autonomy, and hence I consider it as a constitutive element in the debate on 
autonomy. Debates on conceptions of autonomy are connected with and reveal 
notions of the autonomous self and/or the autonomous community and have 
become connected with the realm of human actions and how human beings 
conceive themselves. Callan (1997) argues that the concept of an “unencumbered 
autonomous self” or “unencumbered autonomous institutions” is debilitating. 
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The concept of the unencumbered autonomous self is basically proposed through 
the works of Rawls (1971) and Sandel (1984). The concept of an unencumbered 
autonomous self promotes the idea that the self is not controlled nor influenced 
by any other ends prior to choice other than itself. In reference to individual life, 
the conception holds that as individuals people choose what they want to be and 
do without being influenced by their circumstances except for their free desire to 
choose freely. Choice in its simplistic form becomes their sense of autonomy, 
according to this thinking. I argue that the tenets of this position largely rely on a 
negative conception of liberty, as explained earlier on. 
The position and condition of autonomy that Rawls (1993) proposes argues that a 
concentration on deep-seated beliefs and convictions cannot manage to bring 
about agreement and be a basis for public reason in the public life compared to a 
preference for an overlapping consensus. If this understanding is to be applied to 
the context of higher education governance, one would argue that the framework 
of liberal university autonomy and academic freedom that can follow is likely to 
uphold the categorical right of the university to conduct its affairs without any 
interference from outside, be it government or society at large. It is a position 
that insulates the university from the outside. The insulation from all outside 
influences is what makes Callan (1997: 54) think that “Sandel‟s thesis of liberal 
autonomy hinges on the bizarre metaphysics of the unencumbered self”, that 
existence as being with others is not considered as an essential part of existence. 
Conversely, Callan (1997: 68) proposes a conception of autonomy that does not 
demand that people detach themselves from all their ends: “that a good life can 
hardly be lived in utter disregard of the conditions for responsible action”. 
Callan‟s proposal carries the conditions within which respect and toleration of 
differences can be enhanced without a blatant ignorance of people‟s own 
identities and differences. This proposal is in contrast to the idea of the veil of 
ignorance that Rawls employs in deciding the good and the just end of a society, 
which is presupposed to exist with minimal social difference. 
Through the proposed view, Callan (1997) argues for a conception of autonomy 
that recognises the social and political situatedness of persons. He argues that the 
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requirement of this conception is only that people are capable of asking about the 
value of any particular end with which they currently identify and that they are 
able to give a thoughtful answer to what they ask. In other words, it is an 
understanding of autonomy that is lived deep within one‟s comprehensive 
doctrines, within the framework of one‟s ends and not detached from them. The 
distinction between choice as choosing and choice as willing becomes handy in 
clarifying this position. In the idea of choice as choosing a person is confronted 
with a choice set or possible alternatives. The ranking and consequent choices 
are based on mere preference and no serious valuation is required of the choice-
sets. In choice as willing there is a categorical valuation and a decision is made 
on the basis of the suitability of an option and not merely in consideration of 
comparison with other alternatives (Callan, 1997: 57). The idea of choice as 
willing is similar to the concept of positive liberty since it also evokes 
commitment. It is in this light that Macedo (1991: 45) argues that any liberal 
public justification cannot avoid controversy. Hence, the idea of autonomy 
considered from the position of situated autonomy necessarily becomes partisan. 
It also implies the recognition of the practical impossibility of a perfect 
convergence on common principles of justice and that the fabric of difference 
should also be acknowledged. 
The idea of willing choice bears a great deal of influence on the discourse 
between an unencumbered autonomous self and an encumbered autonomous self. 
These have further implications for higher education autonomy in Africa, 
especially when one goes into the discourse fully aware of the circumstances that 
make higher education governance different on the African continent. Similarly, 
the concept of willing choice synchronises conceptions of autonomy to involve 
choice and willing together. This conception is absent when choice is considered 
as merely choosing. The idea of willing choice has a bearing on conscience since 
“the process of forming one‟s own judgement about how to live depends on 
careful assessment of the reasons available in a given social setting for living one 
way rather than the other” (Callan, 1997: 66). In other words, the conception of a 
situated self makes a person or an institution autonomous when the process of 
making choices happens willingly and within or in full consideration of one‟s 
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given circumstances or environment. Recognition of this situatedness brings 
meaning to autonomous living. Hence autonomy can be considered as reasoned 
free participation in collective self-rule with responsibilities for “a good life 
could hardly be lived in utter disregard of the conditions of responsible choice” 
(Callan, 1997: 68). 
In proceeding with this argument, Macedo (1991) positions the autonomous 
situated self as an opposite of negative liberty. The situated self is characterised 
by self-mastery and one is conscious of oneself “as a thinking, willing, active 
being, bearing responsibility for one‟s choices and able to explain them by 
reference to my own ideas and purposes” (Macedo, 1991: 213). This conception 
of autonomy is more relevant to higher education governance on the African 
continent than the general idea of freedom or unencumbered autonomy. In this 
sense, the idea of autonomy gives room to the development of reflective 
capacities in individuals, thereby enabling these individuals to develop 
appropriate characters for leading a better life in their institutions.  
Among other things, living a situated autonomy means that one engages the 
inherited values and personal commitments into critical and reflexive thinking. 
This understanding of situated autonomy goes along with the social 
responsibilities that reflexive action encompasses (Waghid, 2002b: 470–471). It 
does not mean detachment from one‟s commitments and aspirations, nor from 
social understandings and ideals. In a way, there is no choice in abstract. Hence 
autonomy engages people‟s deeper sense of morality and personal identity as 
their projects, plans and commitments are played out in the requirement for 
strong evaluation.  
Our freedom and the autonomy we strive for are not the consequences of an 
ability to extricate ourselves from this networking of public meanings. We 
are objects and not only agents of critical interpretation, and it is natural for 
us to care about other people‟s interpretations of us and our actions 
(Macedo, 1991: 225). 
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This consideration of others in the lived forms of one‟s life situates one‟s ideals 
of autonomy. I find the conception of situated autonomy more appealing to the 
issue of higher education autonomy than other forms of autonomy that I have 
discussed in this chapter, particularly in view of the circumstances of governance 
on the African continent, as evaluated in Chapter 2. 
Callan (1997) and Macedo (1991) have introduced a few milestones that need 
emphasis in any conception of autonomy. In the first place, it is inappropriate to 
imagine that the idea of freedom only speaks to one‟s inner life and identity away 
from the social constructions with which individuals are meant to live. In other 
words, any effort to make freedom unique requires that this freedom converses 
with the circumstances of life. And if freedom/autonomy is required to speak to 
the circumstances of individuals, it can further be argued that freedom evokes 
commitment, otherwise the forms of life would not be necessary. To an extent, 
liberal autonomy in its extended form as situated autonomy means that it has a 
connection with liberal politics and democracy. This connection is made by the 
prominence of ideals of a character that is “actively reflective, self-critical, 
tolerant, reason giving and reason demanding, open to change, and respectful of 
the autonomy of others, a character disposed to enjoy and participate in the vast 
spectacle of progress and diversity” (Macedo, 1991: 251). In the following 
subsection I explore the relationship between democracy and autonomy. 
4.5.7 Liberal autonomy and the good 
John Rawls‟ theory of justice has been taken as one of the major pillars for a 
liberal agenda. But at the heart of Rawls‟ (1971) theory of justice is what Rawls 
refers to as people‟s basic intuition to lead a good life. In many ways the desire 
for the good life is believed to be brought about by an examined and autonomous 
life. According to Rawls and this human intuition, human beings want something 
that is good and/or desirable in their endeavours. This desire results in the effort 
to make sure that arrangements for attaining this good are fair to everyone. 
According to this liberal understanding, the equal basic liberties are the primary 
goods of any social arrangement (Rawls, 1971: 54). Hence a liberal society and 
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liberal values and virtues have much to do with the idea and realisation of the 
good. Miller (2000: 102) (using liberal communitarianism) argues that one mark 
of the liberal tradition is that it concerns itself with the “irreducible plurality of 
individual values or conceptions of the good; that there are many valuable ways 
of life which people may choose to pursue”. These choices are always informed 
by what people perceive to be their good in the process of the activities chosen. 
Similarly, Macedo (1991: 39) believes that constitutionalism in liberalism is 
desirable because it offers the conditions for the distribution of basic human 
goods and the conditions under which people can enjoy these goods. He argues 
that the basic human goods are security, prosperity and freedom. Nevertheless, 
the idea of autonomy becomes central because the framework for the 
achievement of the good and the consequent social security and prosperity can 
only be guaranteed where the basic freedoms of individuals are maintained.  
On the other hand, Kymlicka (1989: 12–13; 2002: 64) sums up the traditional 
liberal concern for civil and personal liberties as centred on the interest in leading 
a good life and the commitment to do so. He argues that the good life can be 
lived from the inside, that is, in accordance with one‟s beliefs about what is of 
value in life. Furthermore, living the good life also entails the ability and 
freedom to question the very beliefs that inform one‟s choices in life in the light 
of any other relevant information. According to this understanding, the pursuit of 
the good life can only be achieved if government‟s role is confined to that of 
treating people equally, with equal concern and respect, by providing for each the 
liberties and resources needed. Similarly, it would not work for government to 
try and impose values from the outside in order to promote the good. In other 
words, the good life can be lived through the exercise of autonomous choice. 
Kymlicka (1989) further argues that liberty and the good are intertwined within 
the liberal tradition. He explains that “liberty is important not because we already 
know our good prior to social interaction, or because we cannot know about our 
good, but precisely so that we can come to know our good, so that we track our 
best-ness” (Kymlicka, 1989: 18). Similar to the views proposed by other liberals, 
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Kymlicka (1989: 19) thinks that the freedom to examine one‟s ends is worthless 
if one cannot pursue one‟s ends from the inside. Kymlicka (2002: 217) further 
argues that “our interests would be harmed by attempts to enforce a particular 
view of the good life on people, so the state should remain neutral concerning the 
good life”.  
Kymlicka‟s view of liberty as living the good life from inside out has far-
reaching implications for people‟s understanding of autonomy and how 
autonomy is conceived within the university. For instance, the literal implication 
of this view would mean that if people‟s essential interest in living a good life 
requires that they revise their ends and freely pursue those revised ends, 
autonomy would be in jeopardy when penalties and measures of discipline are 
instituted from outside or even when an external measure of success is instituted 
other than that which is from inside. The higher education transformation agenda 
in South Africa runs the risk of instituting measures from the outside in so far as 
there are insufficient deliberative processes before the changes take place. 
Similarly, most cases of higher education governance on the African continent 
that show a heavy state influence in the running of higher education are emblems 
of external control.  
Secondly, Kymlicka also entertains Rawls‟s idea that the distribution of basic or 
primary goods and nothing other than that enables people to act and examine 
their beliefs about value. This distribution of the primary goods enables people to 
live out their essential interest, which is also equated to their good. By 
implication, one can argue that subsidising activities that do not fall within the 
primary goods category would be tantamount to treating people unequally 
according to this thinking. In the case of higher education, and probably on the 
surface of it, and assuming higher education is not amongst the basic primary 
goods, government subsidy of the system is equivalent to treating people 
unequally. This thinking is informed by the reasoning that if it is the case that 
people are responsible for the formation of their aims and ambitions and capable 
of adjusting their aims, within a broader liberal framework, subsidising 
expensive tastes becomes unfair.  
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The link between liberal autonomy and the good, important as it may be, has 
long-standing effects on how university autonomy and public universities are 
conceived. I note that some discourses on the nature of the public higher 
education system have suggested the idea that it should promote the good (Singh, 
2001). But it has also been noted in Chapter 2 through the analysis of higher 
education systems on the African continent that public higher education in Africa 
is largely subsidised by the state. Although the level of subsidy varies between 
the different national economies, it is clear from the analysis given in Chapter 2 
that governments do not just fund public higher education purely from a 
disinterested standpoint. Public funding of the higher education system on the 
continent is heavily associated with state interest both in the running and 
products of higher education.  
To conclude, one can argue that the good life is not one unanimously agreed and 
homogenous path of life. There are various conceptions of the good life, as 
shown above. Some conceptions lean toward a more liberal side when this good 
is conceived within the frames of individual life. On the other hand, a less liberal 
position on the good can be anything from drawing the good as dictated by 
societal values to the belief that the common good is the ultimate source of 
individual good. 
4.5.8 Reframing higher education autonomy within a democratic 
deliberative discourse  
In the above subsections, I have tried to highlight some of the ideals of liberty or 
autonomy. Contemporary discourses on autonomy have drawn a connection 
between autonomy and democracy. Such discourses have also considered 
respect, toleration and public reason as central to the liberal tradition. Although I 
have noted that the concept of liberty is known in a number of variants, such 
variants can be considered as depending on the extent to which the basic 
constituent elements of autonomy take precedence. My conception of autonomy 
gravitates towards substantive notions of autonomy.  
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It is in view of the above that I also argue that ideas of democracy and autonomy 
are interconnected with each other. The concept of freedom or autonomy plays a 
crucial role in democratic theory, and democratic practice is generally considered 
to enhance the exercise of individual liberties. In the first place, freedom as 
understood from the formal and minimalist conceptions has often led to notions 
of freedom as only centred on the legal protection of individual rights: state or 
societal noninterference in individual projects. Specifically, it is the discourse on 
representative democracy that is known for these characterisations of freedom. 
On the other hand, I argue that it is the discourse on deliberative democracy that 
pushes the concept and practice of freedom further to capture central aspects of 
freedom as autonomy. Autonomy is a major factor underpinning active 
democratic deliberation. In the following paragraphs I look closely at the 
dimensions of the relationship between freedom and democracy. 
From a general standpoint, the idea of freedom in democratic discourse is 
understood as synonymous with the imperatives of representative democracy. 
One reason is that democracy secures the freedoms necessary for meaningful 
self-rule. Understood from this position, notions of freedom acquire forms of 
constitutionality, in the sense of different individual rights and freedoms that 
have to be provided for the citizens to govern themselves. Consequently, a 
general democratic discourse understands freedom in its negative conception as 
the absence of interference. Given my analysis in relation to the negative concept 
of liberty, as indicated earlier, this understanding of freedom is wanting on 
several accounts. For instance, Gould (1998: 35) argues that emphasising the 
absence of constraint misses out bringing into consideration the enabling 
conditions necessary for realising one‟s choices. In other words, it assumes that 
democratic freedom can be lived in a vacuum in so far as the circumstances are 
concerned. In addition to this, the understanding “focuses on an individual as an 
isolated being and leaves out consideration of the development over time of the 
person through actions and long-term plans” (Gould, 1998: 35). Gould prefers 
the positive concept of liberty to the negative concept because the positive 
concept is more attuned to developing democracy since it accommodates 
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freedom as self-development. I use the same concept to defend a conception of 
situated autonomy as I make my case for the African higher education system. 
In the first place, the concept of freedom as self-development designates the 
freedom that individuals have to develop themselves through the process of 
realising their projects. In this process, each individual develops her or his 
character and capacity (Gould, 1998: 40). In this regard, the idea of freedom 
embraces the whole of a person‟s life and how this life is lived. This position 
fundamentally means that the consideration of democratic freedom should also 
include objective conditions under which an individual person can fulfil her or 
his freedom, such as social, material and economic conditions. Similarly, people 
are understood to live within cooperative forms of social interaction or reciprocal 
recognition of each other‟s free agency. And as such, the access that people have 
to possible training, information, education and the available social institutions 
(Gould, 1998: 41) comprises the conditions of their freedom and consequent self-
development.   
Gould‟s (1998) discussion of the conditions of freedom may sound essentialist, 
to some extent. This is mainly the case when she draws the concept of positive 
freedom along the lines of what a person is capable of doing in accordance with 
her or his nature. Taking this line of thought, Gould (1998: 43–44) argues that at 
the end of the day there must be a certain threshold that counts as a measurement 
ideal for a specific issue in its own class. Considered in the context of this 
discourse, it can be said that one‟s consideration of the discourse of freedom is 
only meaningful within the context of agents who are capable of being free, 
otherwise the discourse itself would not make sense.  
Although essentialist thinking causes problems with regard to the notion of 
freedom itself, „naming‟ or „identity‟ is inevitable in any discourse. The capacity 
to name and identify something has an influence on the discourse that people 
may have about it. Similarly, Carol Gould‟s thinking that there must be a certain 
threshold of identity against which one can measure the ideal of freedom can still 
stand as an initial stage for the discourse in question. This understanding would 
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mean that a consideration of universities must be accompanied by some 
conception of what a university is or the function of the university, otherwise one 
would not manage to generate any sensible and recognised discourse about it. 
Furthermore, one can infer the full meaning of university autonomy in the 
context of self-development rather than in the context of negative liberty alone. I 
make this claim because contexts of negative liberty are not completely excluded 
from the realms of a university life.   
If the concept of identity cannot be overruled, self-development as linked to 
autonomy can only be so if it expresses the agent‟s own purposes and not 
purposes imposed by others. It is also the case that such purposeful activity is in 
accordance with the goals of the agent for these are central in identifying the 
agent as autonomous. In this case, the idea of freedom as self-development 
necessarily implies democracy. If people are free in the sense of having 
capabilities to realise their options, it means that there are enabling social 
conditions within which these projects can be realised. But the broader 
perspective also implies that within these social circumstances, people can 
recognise and respect each other‟s goals and ends, otherwise the social condition 
would collapse. This idea further implies the recognition of equality of 
membership and claims made on each other (see also Benhabib, 1996). If self-
development requires appropriate conditions for it to be realised, the equality 
principle also means that no single person can lay more claim on others than they 
can on him or her. The claims made on each member of society require 
reciprocity. This idea connects freedom as autonomy with democracy in general. 
In the recent debates on democracy, the simple and constitutional requirements 
of democracy are heavily contested as hardly enough for sustaining democracy 
itself. Due to this contestation, the democratic discourse has largely shifted and 
today is dominated by deliberative models. The concept of deliberation emanates 
from the idea of free choice among equal and free individuals and binds these 
individuals to one another with reciprocal obligations. The deliberative model 
promises to remedy the weaknesses abound in social choice because of the 
inadequacies of the aggregative model (Miller, 2000: 22–23). Enslin, Pendlebury 
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and Tjiattas (2001: 129) argue that “deliberative democracy helps to advance the 
debate about whether toleration or autonomy is more crucial to democratic 
education”. These scholars make a case for toleration motivated by reasonability, 
without ruling out autonomy, as a crucial enabling factor for recognising the 
burdens of judgement and providing for the capacity for “enlarged thought”.  
The problem with aggregation as a method for social choice is that it does not 
consider the content of the preferences in general whereas deliberative 
democracy promises a fair consideration of the content of deliberation by 
allowing this content to emerge during the process of deliberation itself, thereby 
enlarging one‟s perspective. While the aggregative model is moved by the drive 
to give weight to each individual‟s preference by aggregation within the 
conflicting/plural political community, the deliberative model works on a 
different premise in an attempt to resolve conflict in social preferences.  
The deliberative model believes that such conflict is inevitable given the plurality 
and diversity of views in society. It proposes that conflict regarding social choice 
can be resolved by holding open and uncoerced public discussions concerning 
public issues in order to arrive at an agreed judgement. Through the process of 
discussion, it is expected that initial positions or preferences of individuals will 
be transformed because of the interaction of perspectives from other discussants. 
The main purpose of this process is to enable members to bring out their reasons 
for particular choices and have them tested in a public forum. But the general 
rule is that one is expected to put forward reasons that others would equally find 
acceptable. In this sense the deliberative process relies on “a person‟s capacity to 
be swayed by rational arguments and to lay aside particular interests and 
opinions in deference to overall fairness and the common interests of the 
collectivity” (Miller, 2000: 10).  
But if an autonomous life is considered to involve choosing patterns of life after 
reflection on alternatives, such choice is by its nature connected with the values 
that one adheres to in pursuit of those alternatives or the derivative goods that 
one can achieve. Hence the availability and exercise of choice are fundamental to 
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autonomous life in the deliberative process, making the democratic deliberative 
process another important element in considering what constitutes autonomy. In 
one of the liberal communitarian traditions that Miller is associated with and 
towards which I am sympathetic, Miller (2000: 102) isolates two central 
concerns. These are the concern with conceptions of the good and the concern 
with how autonomy is understood. While the relationship between the concept of 
autonomy and the good is already discussed in section 3.5.7, the point is 
important in this discussion because of its implications for democracy as 
desirable for the promotion of autonomy. 
Gutmann and Thompson (2004: 3–7) further characterise the deliberative process 
as marked by the need for people to give reasons for their views in the pursuit of 
common decisions. These reasons need to be accessible to all people concerned 
with the issues. These reasons must satisfy the reasonable judgement of others, 
hence they are also public. But deliberative democracy is critical in such a way 
that it is aimed at arriving at a decision that can be sustainable for a reasonable 
time. Holding each other accountable for public reasons means that deliberation 
is dynamic for it consistently requires that decisions be continuously revised, 
depending on issues and circumstances. More deliberation has the advantage of 
increasing stakeholder participation and decreasing government regulation 
(Gutmann & Thompson, 2004: 34), thereby advancing the aims of deliberative 
democracy. This understanding mainly applies to public institutions, such as 
public universities. 
Considered from the perspectives of Miller (2000: 142), Gutmann and Thompson 
(2004) and Enslin et al. (2001), a deliberative democratic system strives to create 
a community or an atmosphere where decisions are arrived at through a process 
of open discussion in which each participant is free to suggest the agenda and the 
ways of deliberation and to contribute freely and in doing so disposing him- or 
herself to be open and willing to consider the views of others. The deliberative 
process promises to resolve disputes in social choice because its decisions are not 
made prior to the deliberation itself and it allows a wide range of relevant views 
and arguments to enter the debate, provided they reflect the genuine concerns, 
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interests and convictions of the discussants. Given the number of strengths of the 
deliberative ideal of democracy, it can be affirmed that this model can achieve 
more in terms of promoting autonomy than other models of democracy promise 
to offer. 
Before concluding this part, it is important that I evaluate some challenges posed 
to the deliberative model. The main challenge that deliberative processes pose 
concerns the idea that deliberative democracy is in many respects provisional 
and, that it refuses to permanently settle on conclusions reached through 
deliberation, thereby rendering the system unstable. Gutmann and Thompson 
(2004: 112–115) acknowledge that the deliberative process subjects democracy 
to its own principles and other moral principles for critical scrutiny over time. 
Nevertheless, this subjection to openness and revision is far from giving up the 
right to critique and the idea that binding moral and political decisions must be 
justified by reasons. The deliberative theory and practice need to be open to 
change and fresher challenges in a dialectical process. This dynamism of the 
dialectics within the deliberative theory provides the mechanism for its own 
revision and sustainability rather than its annihilation. The deliberative 
framework is partly provisional because of giving room to revision continuously. 
It is self-correcting as it respects the ideal of reciprocity. This being the case, 
deliberative decisions stand on a structure that recognises and provides for 
regular considerations of the same decisions based on new insights, new 
evidence and new interpretation. Similarly, a university governance system that 
promotes autonomy requires that democratic deliberation be central to its norms. 
Gutmann and Thompson (2004) suggest that the schooling system is one of the 
central places in any democracy where the preparation for future free and equal 
citizens can appropriately be done. But this ideal cannot be meaningfully 
achieved if university systems are complacent towards their duties as creators of 
the schooling system itself. Gutmann and Thomson (2004: 35) argue that public 
schools (in which I include public higher education systems) constitute one of the 
important sites for the promotion of deliberation. In this regard, it is also argued 
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that if there is no deliberation in public schools, it is less likely that deliberation 
will exist in other institutions of society.  
I argue that the above argument places all types of schooling, whether primary, 
secondary or tertiary, as centres for the promotion of deliberative democracy. I 
also note that deliberative processes cannot be developed outside the 
understanding of autonomy and autonomous human life, for these are the 
seedbeds of viable deliberations. Dunne and Pendlebury (2003: 208) argue that 
education needs to play the role of cultivating special dimensions of character 
and special virtues that are necessary for the sustainability of any democratic 
regime. In order to bring this form of democracy to maturity, Waghid (2001: 34–
35) argues that universities can only manage to deliver on their democratic 
mandate if reflexive critical pedagogy becomes a central part of teaching and 
learning in higher education. In this regard, the governance of higher education 
institutions can be considered to operate effectively if and only if such 
governance is conducted within a reflexive, deliberative and democratic 
atmosphere. The deliberative framework is capable of successfully meeting the 
challenges of contemporary society in its diversity. One way to make this work is 
to allow the principles of deliberative democracy to operate alongside university 
autonomy discourse (see also Coughlan et al., 2007: 79–81). I elaborate on this 
point below. 
Deliberative theory and practice are believed to have inherent dynamism and are 
open to change and fresher challenges. Coughlan et al. (2007: 80) claim that “the 
internal dynamics of today‟s university, which encompass the dual emphasis on 
teaching and research, are best promoted by fostering a climate of deliberation” 
within the university and between the university and other partners. The 
dynamism within the deliberative theory provides the mechanism for its own 
revision. Hence, the deliberative framework is partly provisional because it gives 
room to continuous revision. It is self-correcting. The commitment to revision 
also respects the ideal of reciprocity. The idea of reciprocity while 
acknowledging the equality and symmetry of all human beings (Rawls, 1996) 
further asserts that all concerned members are entitled to introduce items for 
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public deliberation and set the rules in which such deliberation can be conducted 
(Benhabib, 1996). This being the case, deliberative structure should recognise 
and provide for regular considerations of decisions because actual deliberation 
(giving reasons to each other) promotes reciprocity (Gutmann & Thompson, 
2004: 101). The process of deliberation has epistemic value in the sense that 
deliberation combines factual and evaluative matters in the giving of reasons to 
each other. It can therefore be argued that the deliberative framework is better 
suited as model for the management of higher education institutions. 
The deliberative discourse is morally and politically provisional. Among other 
things, this means that the framework is capable of duly providing room for 
autonomous thinking and revision of policies. Deliberative democracy subjects 
its own principles and other moral principles to critical scrutiny over time. As 
such, deliberation can invite critique to its own principles but refuses to give up 
the right to critique and the idea that binding moral and political decisions must 
be justified by reasons. Gutmann and Thompson (2004: 115) emphasise that 
“deliberative democrats are committed to mutually justifiable ways of judging 
the distribution of power”. 
The ideals that one finds in deliberative democracy, such as open-forum 
deliberation, provision and justification of reasons to each other on issues that are 
publicly important and regarding each other as having equal right to initiate 
debate and lay down the rules that govern this debate, make deliberation a close 
ally of the higher education system. If higher education is about letting people 
find meaning in the lives they choose to live, the challenges that face deliberative 
processes make it more important that deliberative democracy should find a 
home in the governance and autonomy of the higher education system. Similarly, 
higher education helps in living an autonomous life through self-knowledge. And 
since autonomy is made operative through the choice of preferences that are long 
lasting and not simply impressions, knowledge of one‟s deep-seated preferences 
is important in the education for autonomy (Gingell & Winch, 2004: 99–100).  
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A society that has as its central features democratic government, a strong 
emphasis on individual rights and the defence of value pluralism and market 
economics can hardly avoid promoting autonomy and deliberative democracy as 
some of its central educational goals. In a society in which these central features 
have an intrinsic value, autonomy must itself have intrinsic value, since it is 
essential for living a worthwhile life in that kind of society that one has the 
capacity for autonomy (Gingell & Winch, 2004: 105–106). 
My main contention in this subsection has been to argue that universities today, 
whether in Africa or elsewhere, cannot afford not to promote autonomy and 
deliberation. While it is possible to consider this as an in-house matter where the 
culture of the university promotes autonomy and deliberation amongst its 
students, Coughlan et al. (2007: 83) extend the deliberative mandate of the 
university to its relationship with all its stakeholders, such as the state and the 
corporate world. 
4.6 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I have considered debates that surround the concepts of liberty, 
autonomy, liberalism and democracy, with a particular focus on drawing out 
what constitutes autonomy. I have opted to begin to understand freedom from a 
specific historical context of the theorisation of the conceptions. At this point, it 
is clear that the mapping I have tried to provide is far from being exhaustive, 
much as the idea of freedom itself does not in any way have to be understood in 
one way. Nevertheless, autonomy can be considered as more liberal and/or less 
liberal, depending on the type of constituent characteristics available and how 
these characteristics manifest themselves. On any continuum of conceptions of 
autonomy, one is bound to find that characteristics pull between two basic ends 
in liberal thinking. At the one end is the liberal communitarian position, towards 
which I am sympathetic. At the other end, one finds a concentration of elements 
associated with liberal individualism. In this regard, a liberal higher education 
governance system would have more elements of freedom, rationality and 
objectivity, authenticity and identity, responsibility, and critical thinking and the 
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enhancement of a vibrant critical community. The less one finds of these 
elements in an institution, the more one can actually conclude that such a system 
is, in fact, less liberal. One tricky aspect, though, comes up when one begins to 
think of forms of governance as a representation of embedded or encumbered 
forms of autonomy, as opposed to those who believe that autonomy is an aspect 
that primarily belongs to the individual and that such autonomy should be 
unencumbered or unsituated. The latter will believe in the freedom of the 
university to teach whomever it wants to teach, unbridled methods of 
recruitment, research and teaching, and many more, without recourse to 
community responsibility.  
The dominant picture I have provided over the issue of autonomy indicates that 
autonomy or liberty, as may be the case in some instances, can be understood 
either as a factor of the group or of the individual. As a factor of the group, 
notions of liberty exist indistinct from the communities of practice. Once a 
society is considered free, individuals living within it are also considered free 
and it is thought that their freedom is not more important than that of the 
community but only a factor of the community. This view is has been challenged 
by a number of scholars because of its inherent lack of recognition of 
individuality and the creating of meaning that individuals attach to life. But I 
have also explored the view that liberty primarily belongs to individuals. In this 
respect, it is possible to consider liberty as merely the absence of constraint on 
individual choice and action without much thought about what the individual will 
actually do given that there is no outside restraining force or circumstance. 
In the course of this exposition, I have tended to prefer the second option, which 
upholds individual liberty in the sense of a living autonomous self that is 
unencumbered in its life circumstances. Despite the lack of homogenous position 
in this line of thought, I maintain that when autonomy is considered as part of the 
whole life of a person or corporate body, the conception is better positioned to 
promote the good for which the person or body exists. It is on this point of 
recognising the situatedness of being that the concept of a deliberative process of 
engagement can also be sustained. Towards the end of this discussion, I have 
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concentrated on establishing a link between democracy and autonomy, largely 
because the public education system (of which higher education on the African 
continent is an aspect) in any democracy is appropriately placed to prepare future 
free and equal citizens (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004: 35). By implication, this 
thinking would mean that the educational discourse finds its proper place within 
the frames of autonomy, where public discourse can be enhanced. But Gutmann 
and Thompson (2004) also argue that if there is no deliberation in public schools, 
it is less likely that this would exist in other institutions.  
The current atmosphere of university governance in Africa and in the world 
today is also being influenced by a few economic ramifications of the principles 
of democracy. I understand principles of democracy in this instance as those 
principles that advocate popular sovereignty as opposed to either dictatorship or 
monarchy. Far much more than introducing principles of government, 
democratic thought has ushered in a strong culture in people‟s rights and 
freedoms. On an economic front, democratic culture today is also seen to be the 
foundation on which neoliberalism and globalisation thrive. The connection 
between democracy and neo-liberalism and globalisation, hence becomes the 
individual person with one‟s rights, be it social or economic. Given the 
foundations on which principles of globalisation and neo-liberalism are built, one 
would expect that these two generally operate to advance the cause of higher 
education systems. In the next chapter, I explore some of the meanings of 
globalisation and neoliberalism and impact of these processes on higher 
education in Africa. 
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CHAPTER 5 
GLOBALISATION, NEO-LIBERALISM AND HIGHER EDUCATION 
5.1   Introduction 
In concluding Chapter 3, I have indicated that Readings‟ (1996) conception of 
the University of Excellence relates to the corporate world. I have also indicated 
through Chapter 4 that the American higher education system contains elements 
that relate to this conception because of the nature of integration between the 
universities and the corporate world. The corporatisation of higher education, 
which has made the American system what it is, has had similar effects to the 
European higher education in recent years. The previous chapter has also 
discussed different conceptions of autonomy – the relationship between 
democracy and autonomy, among other things. At the centre of this debate is the 
characterisation of what constitutes liberal autonomy in terms of the different 
elements that need to be present for a system to be labelled autonomous 
according to the liberal tradition of thought. I have also argued that the 
connection between democracy and autonomy exists irrespective of the different 
conceptions of both democracy and autonomy that one finds in current 
discourses. In this Chapter, I argue that higher education governance systems on 
the African continent are negatively affected by the processes of globalisation 
and neoliberalism.  
Scott (2006: 129–130) argues that the European universities today are more 
concerned with making Europe the most dynamic region of the world in research 
and technology and that this approach has ushered in a competition-concentrated 
model of higher education within the region. The African higher education 
system has similarly been affected by globalisation and neo-liberalism. In this 
chapter, I argue that globalisation and neo-liberalism, despite their being founded 
on notions of freedom, undermine the practice and governance of higher 
education on the African continent. 
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Much as one can argue that certain conceptions of the university are laden with 
elements of the corporate world, it is important to note that notions of neo-
liberalism and globalisation characterising the corporate world as people know it 
today have only become dominant in the 20
th
 century. In many ways, neo-
liberalism and globalisation have external origins to Africa. Nevertheless, they 
interlace in important ways. Neo-liberalism can be seen as global just as 
globalisation can be seen as neo-liberal. Underlying both of these ideologies is a 
conception of liberty that promotes the individual and activities linked to the 
promotion of the individual. Neo-liberalism is a progressive form of liberalism.  
Bourdieu (1998) tries to provide a definitive statement on the essence of neo-
liberalism. Bourdieu (1998: 1) considers neo-liberalism as a form of rationality 
that is primarily rooted in “individual rationality, and disassociated from social 
conditions of rational orientation”. In other words, neo-liberalism is a particular 
mindset that “calls into question any and all collective structures that could serve 
as an obstacle to the logic of the pure market” (1998: 2). Bourdieu and many 
others have tried to capture the progression of the motifs for liberalism in neo-
liberalism, such as the value for individual liberty. As such, neo-liberalism 
extends the application and assumptions of individual liberty to include a 
person‟s economic activity and its values of productivity and the quest for 
economic advancement as simultaneous to human advancement. This is 
confirmed by another belief that today movement of capital and human labour 
across national borders has become easier than before. Hence what scholars have 
mostly classified as neo-liberalism is not any different from globalisation. For 
instance, Marginson (1999: 19–20) argues that “globalisation refers to more than 
the internationalisation of goods and services, money, people and ideas. 
Globalisation is about world systems which have a life of their own that is 
distinct from local and national life, even while these world systems tend to 
determine the local and national”.     
Elements of globalisation and neo-liberalism are in stark contrast to a number of 
characteristics of most African systems, which are argued and perceived to be 
permeated with a communal sense of being in which individual existence is 
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secondary to communal belonging on which most forms of identity are based. 
Current phrases such as “I am an African” and the concept of Ubuntu, as can be 
observed from political rhetoric and indigenous approaches to bodies of 
knowledge confronting the African continent, are an expression of the 
uniqueness of African systems as more communal than individualistic (See 
Gyekye, 2002; Van Wyk, 2005). In other words, when neo-liberalism and 
globalisation are considered from the way they influence discourse and 
governance approaches in African higher education systems, the African 
universities have to negotiate – or struggle – with both in their reconfigurations 
as well as transformation towards „localised‟ relevance and „globalised‟ 
recognition and competence.  
Zeleza-Manda (2004: 42), elaborating on the nature of globalisation, presents 
globalisation as a project and process of neo-liberalism. He argues that in Africa, 
this process has been “articulated primarily through structural adjustment 
programmes, and that globalisation through its projects has accelerated the 
corporatisation of university management, commercialisation of learning and 
commoditisation of knowledge”. Due to globalisation, the nature of university 
governance and the identity of scholarly discourse have also changed. Zeleza-
Manda (2004: 51) traces the impact of globalisation on higher education on the 
African continent through what he calls the six Cs. The six Cs are the following: 
Corporatisation of management (the adoption of business models for the 
organisation and administration of universities; collectivisation of access 
(growing massification of higher education, continuing education or lifelong 
learning, and accountability to outside stakeholders); commercialisation of 
learning (expansion of private universities, privatised programmes in public 
universities and vocational training); commoditisation of knowledge 
(increased production, sponsorship, and dissemination of research by 
commercial enterprises, applied research, and intellectual property norms); 
computerisation of education (incorporation of new information 
technologies into the knowledge activities of teaching, research, and 
publication); and connectivity of institutions (rising emphasis on 
 175 
institutional cooperation and coordination within and across countries) 
(Zeleza-Manda, 2004: 52).  
This quotation from Zeleza-Manda (2004) introduces into this debate much of 
what one can expect of the interaction between higher education governance on 
the African continent and globalisation and neo-liberalism. From the listed items, 
it will be further argued that globalisation causes universities to adopt a neo-
liberal discipline in the way they conduct their affairs. This understanding affects 
most of the operations in the university, from recruitment of teaching staff to 
student enrolment and graduation rate imperatives, tuning higher education into 
an economic investment rather than a common good.  
5.2 Conceptualising globalisation and neo-liberalism and how they 
may affect higher education operations 
The coming of market reforms in the higher education sector is heavily 
associated with the notion and influences of globalisation. The idea of 
educational marketisation relates to the impact of market forces on education and 
how these affect the running and autonomy of the higher education sector. But 
the idea of marketisation cannot be dealt with in isolation of the other elements 
around it, such as the question of globalisation and its relationship to educational 
trends. Sentiments on globalisation in higher education are often in conflict with 
notions of localisation. Put simply, the idea to govern the higher education sector 
based on internal trends sometimes comes into conflict with efforts to govern this 
sector based on local needs and aspirations. In this case, the idea of whether 
higher education institutions will allow local or global influences to determine 
their course of life becomes one of the central issues that one has to grapple with 
when it comes to dealing with the autonomy of the higher education sector.  
Elements of globalisation can be traced from the onset of civilisation and 
colonialism. In this stage of development, civilisation and commercialism went 
hand in hand. Participating in commerce at a broader level than only one‟s local 
environment was regarded as a positive and good thing (Hoogvelt, 1997: 20). 
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Hoogvelt argues that within this framework of thought, the imperialists saw it as 
their duty or mission to disseminate law, order, justice, education, peace and 
prosperity in the native land. Within Africa, this gave rise to a conception that 
being similar to others, which in many ways referred to developed world, is good 
and a desirable pursuit in one‟s life. The good and desirable forms of life were 
conceived in terms of economic development. In part, this impetus can be 
considered as the beginning of the propagation for a global mindset. 
Hoogvelt (1997: 114) goes further to associate globalisation particularly with the 
beginning of the 1980s, which saw the intensification of networks of human 
interaction across different nation-states in many areas of human enterprise. 
From this particular perspective, globalisation began to mark the increasing 
irrelevance of the local and national and the increasing relevance of the 
international or the global. Considered from this perspective, globalisation can 
also be considered as the antithesis to processes of localisation.  
Today, the concept of globalisation has become trendy to the extent that some 
think that it has become inevitable. But despite this common acceptance and 
occurrence and the frequent usage of globalisation in discourse today, it is less 
obvious what globalisation really means. Kirkbride (2001: 4) notes that “while 
much heat has been generated in discussions and debates around the topic 
(globalisation), there is often not quite so much light”. He further observes that 
the cloud surrounding the concept of globalisation can mainly be ascribed to its 
generalist character. This sentiment refers to the observation that the idea of 
globalisation has tended to be used in almost all fields so much so that, on the 
fringes, one can consider it as term that simply introduces the new millennium, 
the 21
st
 century. The term has been used to represent different forms of novelty. 
Writing from an economics and business management position, Kirkbride, 
Pinnington and Ward (2001: 14–15) suggest that the concept of globalisation 
implies the doing of business beyond one‟s local confinement, like one‟s country 
or continent. In other words, the concept designates a particular way of doing 
things that considers one‟s actions and effects as stretching to or being influenced 
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by others around the world, even those outside one‟s continent. In this case, 
instead of considering individual localities, the whole world is considered as the 
ultimate and unitary space within which people are bound to interact. 
Globalisation, in a sense, blurs the national and continental boundaries and their 
consequent identities. The concept of globalisation, therefore, „relativises‟ the 
local. 
Kirkbride et al. (2001: 16, quoting Hirst and Thompson), argue that globalisation 
raises the locally based and defined parameters to newer levels where “the 
international economic system becomes autonomized and socially disembedded, 
as markets and production truly become global. As systemic independence 
grows, the national is permeated by and transformed by the international”. In this 
regard, judging how extensive the networks of relations and connections are, the 
intensity of their activities and its impact on local communities and the extent to 
which such networks and relationships are regularised and institutionalised in the 
social fabric of life can be a way of assessing globalisation as a process.  
Kirkbride et al. (2001: 18–35) also evaluate the phenomenon of globalisation 
from four different reactionary positions in the way people understand and use 
the concept. In the first position, the idea of globalisation creates a feeling that 
globalisation is here to stay. Such thinking further postulates that the power of 
national governments has become eroded in the face of the global forces and that 
modern capitalism and new technology have become the benchmarks of 
innovation. Having this dominant feeling forces institutions to respond in line 
with the demands and directions of the global village, thereby making the world 
borderless. Through this process, the nation-state becomes weakened in its 
influence (Kirkbride et al., 2001: 27–28).  
The second position that institutions, organisations and individuals are likely to 
take is the belief that the world is not yet global and that it is not any different 
from what it was in some earlier periods. This view makes an exception for the 
increased strength and coverage of networks, which have grown beyond 
reasonable doubt. This position rather acknowledges regionalisation and regional 
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configuration or realignment and that mere „internationalisation‟ has become the 
in-thing in what is called globalisation. I think that this position would settle for a 
perspective of the world as a fragmented world where some units operate in 
isolation. In other words, this second position argues that the world today is not 
yet at a level of being called a global village. To an extent, this position amounts 
to a form of denial of the current state of the world.  
Kirkbride et al. (2001: 30–32) use the works of Held et al. (1999) and Hoogvelt 
(1997) to present a third perspective, referred to as the transformational thesis on 
globalisation. The position is characterised by an acknowledgment that the world 
has reached levels of interconnectedness that have never been experienced 
before. This means that the powers of national governments and institutions are 
becoming reconstituted within modernity. The outcome of this redefinition 
process is the ushering in of change in the direction of a new world order. But 
such world order also brings about integration as much as some things become 
disintegrated. For instance, some economies can become consolidated while 
others collapse by the very same influences of globalisation. 
The fourth perspective on globalisation is the sentiment that recognises the 
impact of globalisation on communities and peoples‟ lives. This perspective 
argues that globalisation has ushered in negative effects on lives and 
communities and the environment (Kirkbride et al., 2001: 32). The „anti-
globalists‟, as Kirkbride et al. (2001: 34–35) coin them, argue that globalisation 
is an emblem of new forms of colonial exploitation driven by free-market 
capitalism, liberalisation and third world debt. This thinking envisages that 
people are in fact controlled by “global economic elites whose interests transcend 
national boundaries, and creates a marginalized and subjugated world proletariat” 
(Kirkbride et al., 2001: 36). In other words, when higher education change is 
considered in the light of this position, the global factors influencing the change 
are considered to have transformed the higher education landscape negatively.  
In a related development, Hoogvelt (1997: 138) argues that the IMF uses 
arguments of neo-liberalism to impose privatisation. What is really at stake is 
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that the world of free markets is believed to promote values such as individual 
freedom and equality through market competition. Similarly, the relational 
powers of supply and demand are further assumed to give people opportunities to 
live a life they can freely choose, given their level of resources. Commenting on 
similar sentiments on globalisation Stiglitz (2003: 55) argues that “the IMF 
simply assumed that markets arise quickly to meet every need, when in fact, 
many government activities arise because the markets have failed to provide 
essential services”. Stiglitz‟s view cannot be taken to mean that the effects of the 
global market meet people‟s hopes about their life and resources. 
Badat, Cloete and Muller (2001: vii-x) further highlight imminent tensions in 
dealing with globalisation and how these forces effect change in contemporary 
society. On the one hand is the option to adopt a communal approach to 
managing society and change in society. This stand represents the localisation 
motif that I pointed out earlier on. The authors indicate that when a state takes 
this option, it becomes less effective in promoting the globalisation agenda. On 
the other hand, when a state becomes a co-agent of a global system of shared 
power, it becomes less effective in addressing the local needs of its people. In 
this case the nation-state focuses on issues such as regional integration and its 
own place within the community of countries. Badat et al. (2001) are also of the 
view that there is persistent tension between these two poles in as far as 
managing state legitimacy and interests are concerned. A globalised idea of 
constituency therefore can be regarded as a constituency that has diminished 
local power. On the other hand, a localised agenda acquires more power as it 
directly speaks to its immediate constituency. Such tensions are not particular of 
state management alone; they also exist in the governance of higher education.  
Castells (2001: 2–21) asserts that the idea of globalisation has its roots in the 
conceptualisation of the new global economy. But any talk about globalisation in 
general begs the question, Globalisation of what? In order to resolve this 
problem, Castells (2001) locates globalisation as a debate linked to other aspects 
such as the economy, finance, politics, the environment and many more. But 
central to all is the economic conceptualisation of globalisation. In this regard, 
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the researcher wants to emphasise that it is the idea of a global economy that has 
seen the concept gain prevalence in many discourses. But what is this global 
economy and how different is it from other conceptions of the economy?  
Different from the previous scholars I have considered, Castells (2001: 2–3) 
characterises the new global economy in three interrelated forms or networks, 
while noting that labour activities are at the centre of this economy. The new 
global economy refers to “all kinds of business or dealings, or activities whose 
organizational source, value and competition are based on information 
technologies” (2001: 2). In this economy, productivity and competitiveness are 
based on knowledge and information. While the global economy operates in 
distinct units, the capacity of these units to operate as one unit in real time makes 
it global. Castells argues that from telecommunications and information 
technologies, the networks of the units manage to operate and remain active 
globally in terms of the supplies they receive and the markets they look for 
(Castells, 2001: 3). As a consequence of the networks of operation and their 
characteristics, globalisation assumes that the environment and the rules that 
operate it are deregularised and liberalised by the different nation-states in 
which they operate. Given that globalisation assumes a weakening of the state‟s 
grip on institutions, it can be concluded that globalisation essentially expects a 
free flow of activities and that such activities depend on the competitiveness of 
global forces or factors. While globalisation tends to acquire an economic face in 
most cases, Castells (2001: 3) cautions that globalisation is not only economic 
because it also includes the media, information systems, the internationalisation 
of institutions and the networks that states establish for their mutual benefit, such 
as NEPAD, the EU and others.  
The interdependence in financial markets that is brought about by their 
integration through globalisation also affects the higher education sector. For 
instance, noticeable in the higher education sector today is the fact that many 
universities on the continent have had to raise their student fees in order to meet 
the costs of running higher education institutions. These costs are heavily 
influenced by what is happening on the global market interface and its prevailing 
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trends. As a result, this phenomenon has also given rise to the idea of „value for 
money‟ as an important consideration in evaluating the contribution of any 
higher education system to the people it serves. Coupled with these 
developments is the fact that universities in a number of African states, such as 
Uganda, Kenya, South Africa, and Egypt, have looked beyond their borders as 
particular catchment areas for prospective students. This is evidenced by the 
creation of a special department dealing with international students, as is the case 
in most South African universities. Nonetheless not many countries on the 
continent are successful in this respect.  
In a number of ways, the current trends in higher education governance on the 
African continent fit in well with Castells‟ (2001) conceptualisation of 
globalisation. Higher education systems are increasingly adopting motifs of 
liberalisation in terms of diversifying their resource base and what they conceive 
to be their catchment areas. Secondly, higher education systems are more and 
more fitting into the „Castellian‟ conceptualisation when it comes to adapting 
their practice in line with the advancement of technological infrastructure. The 
connectivity of individuals with different universities and the capacity to seek 
new forms of information beyond one‟s university is one of the aspects of 
globalisation. But within universities today, the growing need for an intranet and 
use of it proves that the global means of communication is carrying more weight 
as more people begin to find this mode reliable and fast. In any case, this kind of 
networking can only be considered as basic in view of all that globalisation 
entails. Similarly, the new mindset also introduces an instrumental mentality into 
learning as more emphasis is placed on the technical and professional fields at 
the expense of the humanities and basic sciences (Zeleza-Manda, 2004: 53). 
What is also fascinating in Castells‟ (2001: 5) conception in relation to the higher 
education sector is the idea that global financial markets adopt certain global 
ways of evaluating the volatility and stability of financial markets. This generates 
characteristics such as poor and rich in relation to specific grids. The higher 
education system, whether by design or default, finds itself in a situation where 
ranking and benchmarking have become inevitable. In this particular case, 
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universities become ranked on national, continental and global levels. As a result, 
institutional reputation and student flows and preferences have also existed to the 
advantage of the highly ranked universities at the expense of the lowly ranked 
universities. I am aware that this ranking has in many ways depended on 
empirical figures such as graduation rates, publication rates and fiscal standing of 
particular institutions. But the point he is making is that such inclinations 
towards a globalised world perspective also change the discourse of higher 
education, thereby affecting the way a system understands and practices its sense 
of autonomy and the limits that such autonomy may be considered to have. 
Another perception that has moved higher education systems to incorporating 
globalised forms of governance is a perception that regards „being global‟ as a 
desirable position for any higher education institution on the grounds that doing 
so is regarded as having stable market fluency on the global plane. Consequently, 
not playing by the rules set by international (lending) organisations such as the 
IMF or the International Association of Universities may be labelled as not being 
stable (see also Castells, 2001: 6). Such labelling compels developing nations 
and their educational institutions to ascribe to the international standards set by 
the watchdogs even if such measures are deemed harmful to national economies 
and local governing environments. When this becomes the case, globalisation 
works to undermine the seedbed of university autonomy as understood from 
situated forms of autonomy rather than its promotion, which is assumed to be the 
general case.  
My main argument here is that when developing nations dance to the tune of 
international lending organisations in terms of how they organise their monetary 
flows and their organisational policies and options, it becomes inevitable that 
these nations will impose similar regulation on their higher education systems. 
Of late, the higher education system in South Africa has ascribed to and adopted 
„quality assurance measures‟ through the establishment of the Higher Education 
Quality Commission (HEQC). While quality assurance measures can be regarded 
as part and parcel of what it means to run higher education systems, one cannot 
disassociate the quality assurance mechanisms from notions of economic 
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performativity in the management of higher education institutions, which may 
not be directly in the service of the nation‟s common good in achieving required 
levels of equality among its citizenry.   
The globalisation of science and technology is another critical component of a 
globalising agenda. Globalisation operates through the network of information 
and technology. Within this framework, it is noticeable that individual 
organisations and agents begin to realise and consolidate the view that 
developing networks of relationships or partnerships with others has become the 
order of the day, and universities in Africa or elsewhere are no exception. On the 
financial markets, the network of organisation and resourcing is considered to be 
a better way of growing by making sure that one has at one‟s disposal the best 
resources and personnel this world can offer. But what this means is that the 
networks in the financial markets usually work to the advantage of those who 
have access to resources and trade as opposed to those who do not have any 
access to these means.  
The university setup in Africa can similarly be considered to be heavily 
influenced by the global flows of human capital. The dwindling levels of highly 
skilled personnel that one observes in many countries that are poorly resourced 
on the continent can partly be attributed to globalisation. Mechanisms of the 
global market and labour economy enable people to move their own human 
labour and other personnel from one country to another. Sometimes this is done 
in search of better working conditions for the recruited and catching the best for 
the recruiter. In many cases, such movements occur with very little notice of the 
burden laid on poorly resourced and economically weak nation-states. One 
example of this case is the abundant evidence that many trained personnel that 
could have been currently working in universities in countries such as 
Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and many other similarly positioned institutions are 
not presently working within these countries. African higher education systems 
in particular have lost out on a number of eminent scholars to the developed 
world because the poorer nations cannot compete in terms of availability of 
resources for teaching and research, academics‟ work conditions, incentives for 
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research and publication, and many more. Hence, the shortage of personnel 
looming in a number of African universities is a direct effect of the influence of 
the global economic market. 
Castells (2001: 12–20) discusses how the labour market operates as a self-
programmable entity that keeps on replenishing itself through its “in-built 
capacity to generate value through innovation and information” (Castells, 2001: 
13). This propensity causes the globalised labour market to be in a position of 
always looking for highly skilled labour and talent in order to keep its own 
system working. Such a process, while making the system creative and 
productive, creates extraordinary exclusion through what is most referred to as 
the process of networking and segmentation. Networking and segmentation mean 
that any process of globalisation will favour factors that work to the advantage of 
the (global) system in terms of sustaining it and moving it further. As such, any 
elements that are not in its own favour become inimical to the process of 
globalisation. In real terms, it can be argued that globalisation as a market-related 
process will only work to the advantage of elements that enhance the labour 
market and develop it. All other things that apparently do not promote the cause 
of a globalised economy are relegated. In this way, the process of globalisation 
leads to four inevitable conditions in human existence. These are inequality, 
poverty, polarisation and social exclusion (Castells, 2001: 16). 
Similarly, a globalised agenda of higher education governance potentially creates 
inequalities, poverty, social polarisation and exclusion despite the fact that 
notions of globalisation and neo-liberalism are built on liberal beliefs in the 
freedom and equality of human beings. A higher education system with a 
globalised or neo-liberal agenda would want to maintain high levels of 
productivity that would ensure the sustainability of the system, among other 
things. This productivity may be judged in terms of student graduation rates, 
research outputs by academic personnel and, of course, securing a high regard for 
its status in the society where the higher education institution is situated. These 
goals and expectations cannot be fulfilled without excluding people from its 
circles on the basis of inadequate financial support for aspiring students and 
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academic staff‟s inadequate capabilities to work in the university and compete 
with staff from other universities on output or productivity. Those who cannot 
cope with the demands of the system and the conditions within which its policies 
are formulated and implemented will eventually leave the system and join less 
demanding institutions. This contributes to polarisation, leading to exclusion in 
society. 
The process of globalisation tends to concentrate on the labour capital that 
sustains it and as such it purges any elements that are not supportive of the core. 
Castells (2001: 17) argues that “the networking and flexibility of the system 
make it possible to connect the valuable and discard the devalued people, firms, 
territories, leading to a notion of a dynamic system which does not need all these 
other elements of our species”. This process by its very nature creates 
inequalities between the different groups of people, and those capable of making 
it in the capital-intensive world become richer while the poor become poorer. In 
this way, globalisation as a process polarises the world since what really matters 
is the development of a creative, innovative and productive economy in relation 
to how the global economy works.  
The higher education system, as an aspect of the broader education system, 
cannot avoid operating with and through the framework of a globalised world. In 
this age, in so far as technological literacy, research and development are 
concerned, the education system is the pivot and source of production, much as it 
creates the enabling conditions for benefiting from the new order. More and 
more curricula today pay much attention to the development of science and 
technology. Research in science and technology receives more financial funding 
than other sectors of higher education. This attention, which is differentiated 
from that paid to other branches of learning such as the humanities, simply 
confirms the usurpation of the education system by the globalised world.   
The intricate relationship between globalisation/neo-liberalism and the higher 
education system has also been discussed by Marginson (1997) as emanating 
from how the state understands these processes. In this work, it is argued that the 
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idea of a liberal market draws attention to the process of free enterprise and the 
establishment of a competitive order. Much as the origin of this conceptualisation 
is within market and labour issues, the understanding of globalisation as related 
to the labour market refers to far greater things than simply the economic aspects 
of human transaction. This may refer to a borderless worldview where states tend 
to lose their controlling power over their populations to external (mostly 
monetary) control mechanisms. As a result governments no more have the same 
influence over labour issues as before. Most importantly, governments are no 
more considered to offer total commitment to full employment and its concurrent 
extensive social programmes. Marginson (1997: 53) argues that this shift can be 
understood as the overturning of the Keynesian techniques of government 
economic intervention and management. Within the new-found ideological 
mindset (of a globalised and neo-liberal economy), it was understood that a 
competitive market society could only be realised once the governments took 
their hands off the market environment in terms of setting control mechanism. 
Quoting Hayek, Marginson (1997: 54) asserts that within this new global order, 
what is required “is not an ordered competition restricting markets, but a 
competitive order where the state creates conditions favourable to the markets”.  
According to this understanding, the state‟s watchdog role over society is 
transformed into one of simply creating enabling conditions for free enterprise to 
flourish in society.  
The concept of co-operative governance as discussed in relation to South African 
higher education systems after apartheid and the universities in Ghana and 
Uganda brings out this working relationship between governments and 
universities in globalised fashion better. But in many ways, the other cases of 
higher education governance on the African continent represent high forms of 
Keynesian techniques of government economic intervention and management of 
public institutions such as universities. For instance, many African governments 
control funding and access to higher education institutions.  
At the heart of a neo-liberal market understanding of society is also the 
assumption that what makes the world what it is to people is this “timeless, 
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borderless always-ready market” (Marginson, 1997: 55–56) that saturates their 
understanding of social relations as grounded in competitive individualism. 
According to this understanding, market liberalism or neo-liberalism provides the 
tools with which one can begin to criticise processes and reconstruct one‟s 
preferred world order, as much as it provides the rules for assessing such a 
practice. In other words, Marginson (1997) emphasises that market reforms come 
in because the new world order is regarded as normative and universal and the 
slightest margin of difference is similarly considered as a condition necessitating 
public reform. He therefore describes one of the reformists as positing a situation 
where the conceived new world order becomes understood as similar to a natural 
order. To this extent, a neo-liberal mindset or a globalised world view acquires 
more elements that are hegemonic, contrary to the plurality of values and views 
that the mention of a globalised and a neo-liberal framework evokes.  
For instance, the reforms that are most often proposed by the West along with the 
international monetary organisations, such as the World Bank, on how Africa 
should address its economic system and the kind of services a government can 
render to its citizens are underpinned by the assumption of the new world order 
as a natural order. In this natural order, it is further expected that governments 
simply have to adapt or otherwise they perish financially. The 1980s and 1990s 
have witnessed a heightening of pressure on governments to outsource some of 
their services to the general public to private enterprises. Such a mandate or 
requirement is fulfilled with the same understanding that governments should 
leave their hands off public services. Again, the assumption is that such a hands-
off approach by governments will improve market efficiency through economic 
competition, thereby stabilising the institutions, like the higher education sector. 
The restructuring of the public higher education sector is similarly influenced by 
the same understanding. This thinking has led to the emphasis on less 
government expenditure and more stakeholder involvement in managing higher 
education finances. 
What makes globalisation function as new world order is the fact that it embraces 
all dimensions of life that affect the public sphere of life. It is economic, much as 
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it is political and also cultural. Many scholars, including Marginson (1997), think 
that its impact came in with the booming of multinational companies and 
increasing global financial markets that are more complex and dynamic than any 
country‟s system. In the same way, labour becomes more mobile than before, 
and education and research attain an internationalisation agenda. It is to this 
extent that some people view globalisation as the demise of the nation-state and 
the national political sphere in the sense that national political decisions become 
subordinated to the forces of international economic competition. In real terms, 
though, it does not mean that national governments and national economies stop 
to exist but that in their operations and principles they directly or indirectly 
attune themselves to the global flow of events. This also implies that states or 
national governments have a reduced capacity to enforce cultural identity and 
less control of the economic, social and cultural developments within their own 
countries (Marginson, 1997: 59). As such, governments still control national 
politics and other national programmes, but they are more controlled by 
globalisation in their own ideologies. This state of affairs makes governments 
more agents of globalisation in their agenda. Similarly, universities become 
complex and begin to run as multinational companies, with profitability as the 
benchmark of performance indicators. 
Nevertheless, scholars are divided over whether globalisation means that 
governments maintain a minimalist state or not. Marginson (1997: 68, quoting 
Friedman) argues that this state of affairs does not reduce the powers of the state 
or turn the state into a minimalist state. In any case, Marginson (1997) does not 
provide much evidence for this argument. The fact that the state still controls 
areas such as its judicial system and the monetary controls and that it intervenes 
in the financial and economic life of the players falls short of a government 
positively determining the course of events, which is purported to be the case 
here.  
On the other hand, it can be argued that what governments manage to do within 
the influence of globalisation is to maintain forms of negative liberty (see also 
Berlin, 1984). In this case, the researcher particularly refers to the limits that a 
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state can put in place in order to sustain the best possible environment in which 
business can be conducted, a road map for individual noninterference. 
Globalisation ensures that governments protect the citizens‟ free enterprise 
through maintenance of the principle of noninterference. This approach fails to 
ensure that there are favourable conditions within which citizens can 
meaningfully develop without endangering the weaker members of society.  
A global perspective that is heavily biased towards negative forms of liberty 
leads to a scenario whereby the state and business are set apart. In this regard, 
market liberalism operates through and provides its own reason and framework 
while at the same time limiting the powers that a state can have over it. In the 
end, it is market liberalism that informs and critiques state policy, and economic 
management becomes the core of modern government management. But when 
areas central to public service and management are run like corporations, without 
much attention to the public good, working spaces create ambiguities. 
Universities become vulnerable to these ambiguities. Most patterns of 
governance in higher education governance today are the direct effects of a 
globalised and neo-liberal mindset. 
5.3  The relationship between information systems and globalisation 
I have mentioned (above) that although globalisation has become multi-
dimensional, the concept is better understood and analysed from its economic 
dimension (Castells, 1999: 4). It is in this regard that the idea of globalisation has 
also been synonymous with the phrase “the new (global) economy” (Castells, 
1996: 66) as distinct from a world economy (1996: 92). The new global economy 
is distinct because it is characterised as being informational as much as 
possessing the other global elements. In the first place, the character of the new 
economy as informational indicates that its capacity for productivity and 
competitiveness hinges on its capacity “to generate, process, and apply efficient-
based information” (Castells, 1996: 66). On the other hand, its global dimension 
comes in because the “core activities of production, consumption and circulation 
are organised on a global scale” (Castells, 1996: 66). The new economy is what it 
 190 
is because its modes of production, consumption and circulation are 
competitively done through a global network of interactions. 
The productivity of the new global economy becomes distinct from other forms 
of productivity because it possesses information and does not simply focus on the 
accumulation of capital and labour. It is a knowledge-based form of productivity. 
This knowledge base also acts as the cutting edge of new technological 
discoveries that enable the economy to grow and become global. While 
technology plays a crucial role in improving economic growth, knowledge-based 
productivity is not only specific to informational economy. The idea of 
productivity reproduces itself into various other avenues of human life and 
enterprise such as (higher) education. Castells (1996: 79) observes that 
productivity increases, from information technology to other miscellaneous 
services to the extent that organisational change takes place. He also notes that 
“profitability and competitiveness are the actual determinants of technological 
innovation and productivity growth” (Castells, 1996: 81). In this regard, 
institutional dynamics, which have an emphasis on profitability and 
competitiveness, are not exclusive to the economic sector. Various notions of 
profitability and competitiveness are also present in educational discourse. In 
many ways, notions of profitability and competitiveness are likely to be 
understood and used differently between different sectors and different 
institutions.  
For instance, the idea of technological capacity can imply “the appropriate 
articulation of science, technology, management, and production in a system of 
complementaries, each level being provided, by the educational system, with the 
necessary human resources in skills and quantity” (Castells, 1996: 103). On a 
preliminary note, Castells‟ notion can refer to the fact that different areas of life 
can operate with and through a globalised economic conception. In this regard, 
the higher education sector remains a source for the provision of required skills 
and personnel. Secondly, higher education as a system in itself is not exempt 
from the influences of globalisation through information technologies, the basis 
for competitiveness. Thirdly, competitiveness also tends to be influenced by the 
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mode and level of access to influential markets or ideas and resources that 
individual players have within the new global economy. Higher education 
systems are equally interested in influential markets and resources. But despite 
the fact that all may be influenced by globalisation, the extent to which each of 
the global players is affected by constitutive elements of competitiveness tends to 
mark the level at which each is globalised. 
5.4  Africa’s trajectory in the new global economy 
When the economy becomes globalised, processes of inclusion and exclusion 
also take place. Inclusion takes place on the grounds that a country, a system or a 
body operates in synergy with the rules of global competition and productivity 
and is thus essentially assimilated into this system. On the other hand, by the 
same rules, exclusion can also take place. In this case, when a country, a system 
or corporate body fails to integrate itself into the global flow of the economy, it 
relapses or becomes relegated and the system fails to cope in the dynamics of the 
new global economy. Castells (1996: 133) consolidates the idea of economic 
revolution in a globalised economy by emphasising that the new global economy 
“affects the whole planet either by inclusion or seclusion in the processes of 
production, circulation, and consumption that have become at the same time 
globalised and informationalized”. 
Most African states, including many in the sub-Saharan region where a number 
of the researcher‟s cases are concentrated, have experienced deteriorating trade 
terms and development rates compared to the early 1970s. Of‟ course this study 
excludes the years after some of the countries had their debts cancelled, that is, 
after 2005. In the cases where the African governments could not sufficiently 
cope with the increasing demands of a globalised economy, they resorted to 
heavy borrowing from other governments and international lending 
organisations. The bulk of the lenders happened to be concentrated in the 
northern hemisphere. The researcher has in mind countries like Kuwait, Britain, 
the United States of America, Japan and many more whose aid has trickled down 
to Africa. Castells (1996: 133) explains that it is because of the new globalised 
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economic flows that poorer nations, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa, are 
drawn to borrowing in order to keep up with the kind of development that is 
expected of a technological age. He also notes that “the conditions of 
competitiveness in the new informational, global economy were too far away 
from what could be accomplished in the short term by rather primitive 
economies” (1996: 133), which were to a large extent still dependent on the 
economies of their former colonial masters.  
While the economic prospects of many African countries were not that good 
before international borrowing, Castells (1996: 134) argues that the state of 
Africa‟s economy further worsened after the international organisations had 
come in. He attributes this scenario to a number of factors. On the one hand, one 
has international lending organisations that fix the rules of the game towards 
more liberalisation of African economies. On the other hand, there are changing 
climatic conditions that weaken Africa‟s economy that is mainly agro-based. As 
if this is not enough, many African states have experienced unstable political 
conditions and at times civil wars, which further weakens their new economies. 
Some examples of these include Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Zimbabwe and countries in the Great Lakes region of Africa.  
Given Africa‟s realities, such as unstable economic and political conditions, it 
can be concluded that much of Africa does not really benefit from the new-found 
global economic dynamism. For instance, Castells (1996: 135) also argues that 
much of Africa does not benefit from market liberalisation and globalisation 
because “most primary commodities are useless or lowly priced on the 
international and global market, markets are too narrow, investment too risky, 
labour not skilled enough, communication and telecommunication infrastructure 
clearly inadequate, politics too unpredictable, and many government 
bureaucracies inefficiently corrupt”. In a nutshell, these conditions make it 
difficult for many African institutions, including African higher education 
systems, to have a level playing field in global economics.  
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Bloom, Steven and Weston (2007) point out that the African continent is in a 
precarious position when it comes to liberalisation and globalisation. This 
position is informed by several factors that militate against Africa‟s integration 
into the global economy. The factors include globalisation‟s insensitivity to the 
reality of Africa when it comes to its structural adjustment programmes, for 
instance. This is compounded by the global decline in primary commodity prices 
and the rich world‟s protection of its agricultural and textile markets. The 
HIV/AIDS pandemic has also dealt a heavy blow to Africa‟s growing economy 
(Bloom, Steven & Weston, 2007: 193). Poor geographical conditions, the 
inability of African governments to combat chronic diseases, corruption and 
unstable governments are among the many factors that have limited Africa‟s 
capacity to integrate into the new global economy (Bloom et al., 2007: 204ff).  
5.5 The impact of neo-liberalism and globalisation on higher 
education in Africa  
In the preceding subsection, I have mainly been preoccupied with understanding 
globalisation and neo-liberalism. I have wildly taken globalisation and neo-
liberalism as two issues that belong in one basket. I have conceded that 
globalisation may refer to the extension of networks that people build so that the 
limitations of space or its authority will have little influence on the course of 
events. Later, I have aligned globalisation with some of its basic characteristics 
such as the advancement of technology, which has, in turn, broken the national 
and regional boundaries of connectivity that would otherwise have limited the 
process of development. I have also argued that the free market and the 
promotion of its values are central to a globalised perspective. What happens to 
education when government adopts a globalised and a neo-liberal agenda? What 
shifts are evident in the higher education sector? These questions direct one to a 
number of aspects that come into play when the model of a higher education 
institution enters the globalised agenda.  
The theoretical base on which globalisation and neo-liberalism are founded is 
essentially rationalistic and liberal. The processes of globalisation and neo-
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liberalism believe in their own system‟s inherent power to create conditions of 
freedom and development in human lives and societies by restricting the powers 
of the state and allowing private enterprise to flourish. It is believed that private 
enterprise, which operates in many ways through the market dynamics of supply 
and demand, has the capacity to improve the human condition by allowing 
people to source from wherever in order to manage their life and business. It is 
also believed that this process in turn creates opportunities for all. Despite the 
glamorous vision of life inherent in a globalised and neo-liberalised pattern of 
life, it is interesting to note that developments on these processes have caused 
many African states to fail to cope with their external debt levels triggered by 
structural adjustment programmes and other conditions of the labour market. The 
main rationale of structural adjustment programmes has been to shift the focus of 
national governments in public resources allocation and management. In general, 
under structural adjustment programmes, governments are forced to cut public 
spending in a bid to reduce and eliminate their own debt levels. This process in 
many ways has resulted in the lowering of funding to higher education sectors as 
governments tend to concentrate on providing primary education. Changes such 
as these are the direct result of the process of globalisation and neo-liberal 
policies in public management. Hence I argue that neo-liberalism and 
globalisation, although having the conditions for the improvement of human 
autonomy, undermine the same when it comes to the developing world and its 
higher education institutions.  
Globalisation, as emanating from the economic perspective, brings into higher 
education issues such as institutional rating, classification and competition, all of 
which serve economic ends. Market reforms in higher education produce 
competitive behaviours that may result in the examination, grading and ranking 
of the student populations as well as their institutions in terms of economic 
indicators. While this appears to be inevitable in any educational process, the 
effects of globalisation make such competition not only an aspect of educational 
merit but also a system of reproducing the professions and preserving social 
advantage (Marginson, 1997: 134). In such cases, co-operation between higher 
education institutions only appears as a tentative measure towards achieving 
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one‟s individualised ends. This brings about competitive behaviour between 
higher education institutions or systems and a specific standard of performance 
ratings. In this regard the idea of performativity evokes high notions of 
Readings‟s (1996) University of Excellence.  
The ideal of performativity also brings out other related issues. On the one hand, 
higher education performativity and its methods assume that there is a certain 
general standard or rule against which the performance of individual higher 
education institutions will be judged or ranked. The idea of a similar standard in 
a way requires a sense of equality, real or assumed, that comes as a prerequisite 
for that judgement and ranking to take place. In educational terms, it implies that 
all students or higher education institutions be regarded as similarly positioned, 
otherwise the ranking would not work and no ideal of performativity would make 
sense. Among other things, such conditions force higher education institutions 
into policy and practice borrowing without making sense of the autonomy and 
aspirations of the people it serves. Sometimes this borrowing takes place at the 
expense of specific identities that the higher education institutions have acquired 
through history and the particular conditions within which these institutions 
exist. On the other hand, the concept of performativity brings in differences 
between the different higher education institutions involved. Educational 
competition assumes that higher education institutions have different capabilities 
and that these further depend on individual players and their individual 
situations. In turn, this becomes a condition on which higher education 
institutions are judged to be capable of excelling and meeting their performance 
indicators.  
Performativity in higher education heavily influences ideas of desert or merit. 
The processes associated with performativity create conditions for unequal social 
outcomes, although these outcomes are regarded to be educationally justified in 
the sense that every individual gets what she or he deserves or that each reaps the 
fruits of his or her labour and effort in pursuing certain educational goals. While 
performativity per se assists in lifting up individual human capability, its heavy 
reliance on patterns reminiscent of neo-liberalism and globalisation can have 
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negative effects on higher education practices and the relationship between 
higher education and the promotion of justice and the common good. I do a 
follow-up of this argument in the next chapter.  
The idea of competition in higher educational institutions spins off another effect 
of accreditation and „credentialism‟. I use credentialism as a state or condition in 
which higher education institutions find themselves in because different 
governments and bodies have rated their practices against some specific grid of 
performance indicators. Such forms of accreditation, as can be observed from the 
accreditation of South African higher education institutions by the HEQC, can 
also become the benchmark for students‟ choices of preferred institutions and 
courses as well as the background against which prospective donors, whether 
government or non-governmental, contract out services, etc. In the first place, 
most forms of accreditation for higher education place an economic value on 
institutional offerings or courses relative to other global players in the field. But 
in addition to this, the credentials that individuals acquire through the institutions 
carry along with them some economic value relative to the market value of the 
institutions.  
Marginson (1997: 207–209) argues that as educational institutions aspire to offer 
more and more qualifications relative to the market economy, the pressure for 
more and better credentials also rises and spins off the need for further education 
in many people. On an economic level, the preference for better credentials in 
skills also becomes another determinant in the spiral. In general higher 
educational qualifications become stratified according to their attached economic 
goods as determined by labour market values. Through this whole process little 
is done in advancing and accounting for universities‟ contribution towards 
developing the functional and critical human being who would competently 
operate in a multifaceted environment. 
Having considered the above aspects of market values that are brought into 
higher education discourse, an extension can be made to argue that the market 
values also bring in commoditisation into higher education. The idea of 
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commoditisation of higher education has a number of dimensions. At a primary 
level, the commoditisation of higher education takes place when educational 
goods are evaluated and valued as economic goods. For instance, the fact that 
certain degrees are assigned higher tuition fees and that the more marketable 
graduates are in fields like engineering and business management means that 
more tuition is required of an individual for enrolment in such a course. At 
another level, commoditisation changes the nature of the university to a place 
where all knowledge converges toward minute specialisations that leave out 
human development in the process. The changes in higher education in Africa 
have entailed an emphasis on monetary value, which may be detrimental to the 
autonomous running of these institutions because most of the economic pressure 
African institutions bear is heightened by external global factors in the market. 
Such pressures have brought in reductions in student–teacher ratios and the 
adoption of more efficient means of running institutions amidst dwindling of 
quality education both in the higher education systems and in their states. The 
idea of value for money has therefore made things different in the way 
universities run their affairs (Amonoo-Neizer, 1998: 306).  
At a secondary level, the valuing of educational goods as economic goods 
triggers another effect whereby students become clients in the sense that they are 
mainly considered as customers to particular educational institutions and courses 
while the institutions offer educational services to the students in the same way 
that the transfer of economic goods takes place. This takes place through 
educational subjects that are modulated in quantifiable units and valuated and 
charged in similar economic values. Neo-liberalism has resulted in the transfer of 
academic credits across the globe between different institutions. Summer schools 
in a number of universities are a mark of the globalisation of higher education.  
Commenting on the unseen influence of globalisation on people‟s lives, Burns, 
Dell‟Anno, Khan and Poppleton (2001: 291) concede that one of the influences 
of globalisation in this world is its emphasis on the rights and privileges of the 
individual over the rights of the group. In this case the rights and values of the 
broader community are subjugated to those of individuals. Some conceptions of 
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institutional autonomy and academic freedom prevalent in some quarters on the 
African continent bear these marks of universities in a globalised world, without 
many social obligations.  
Bolsmann and Uys (2001) note that globalisation has brought in the 
marginalisation of national boundaries in terms of trade, finance, the labour 
market and the knowledge economy itself, thereby affecting the higher education 
sector. In globalisation, knowledge creates competition, which contributes to and 
affects the knowledge factory. Higher education systems are at the centre of this 
knowledge production. In South Africa, for instance, globalisation has seen the 
development of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Policy (GEAR) 
(Bolsmann & Uys, 2001: 173). GEAR is in itself a neo-liberal agenda. Neo-
liberalism believes that governments have to cut spending on the public sector so 
that in turn growth is accelerated in other sectors of national development. In 
turn, universities, especially in Africa, are made to look for private sources of 
support while at the same time deregulation takes place, which eventually turns 
the running of universities into corporate and managerial systems (Bolsmann & 
Uys, 2001: 173). Governments pressurise universities to make a contribution to 
increased international competitiveness and commercial purposes. In some ways 
this implies that universities take on short-term goals, for instance carrying out 
research for commercial purposes. 
Despite the noted effects of globalisation and neo-liberalism on higher education 
governance, at times universities are caught between bargaining liberalisation 
and the consolidation of democracy (Bolsmann & Uys, 2001: 174). In my 
introduction for this chapter, I have indicated that the needs for neo-liberalism 
and globalisation exist hand in hand with the need for localisation. In this regard, 
universities on the African continent succumb to the growing need of remaining 
relevant in the ever-changing world and addressing needs that go beyond 
national interests through founding new international collaborations. But in many 
ways, these universities also have to fulfil the national needs of developing 
skilled personnel suitable for particular countries. In view of these expectations 
universities always bear a responsibility of balancing between the global 
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imperatives and the local needs. But globalisation and neo-liberalism push the 
universities to a position where they are more relevant to global demands than 
local needs. 
In addition, Cobbing and Southall (2006: 34) note that in cases where 
universities are faced with the challenge of declining funding, globalisation 
compels them to shift from collegial forms of governance to corporate models of 
management. The corporate models of governing higher education systems are 
considered among other things as cost-effective and efficient. Nevertheless, the 
authors also recognise that higher education teaching personnel are entitled to 
maintaining academic freedom in the way they do their business. This position 
shows that there will always be tension between the core duties of academics in 
the higher education system and the external demands that shape the course of 
such institutions, such as the need to be global in the new financial management 
models. In this regard, Pendlebury and Van der Walt (2006: 79) argue that the 
efforts of universities, such as Wits University, to align themselves in relation to 
the demands of neo-liberalism have had negative effects on working students and 
support service workers. They think this is the case partly because the conception 
of a market university inherently contains serious contradictions and antagonisms 
that the managerial model cannot solve (Pendlebury & Van der Walt, 2006: 91). 
These problems further raise questions on how suitable neo-liberal and 
globalised patterns of higher education are to African higher education systems.  
5.6  Concluding reflections  
This chapter has looked at globalisation and its impact on higher education 
systems, with specific reference to African higher education and has highlighted 
the extent to which processes of globalisation and neoliberalism undermine the 
autonomous governance of higher education systems on the African continent. 
One feature that is dominant in the discourse is the idea that globalisation and 
neo-liberalism have economic roots on the one hand and individualistic traits on 
the other. Based on their foundations, neo-liberalism and globalisation are 
assumed to promote individual liberties and conditions for the enhancement of 
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these liberties. I have argued that the ideals of neo-liberalism and globalisation 
primarily belong to the corporate world. As such, their usage in higher education 
discourses represents a corporatisation that has occurred in the higher education 
sector. I also noted that because of a differential development pace between 
Africa , generally regarded as the third world, and many countries of the northern 
hemisphere, generally regard as the first world, neo-liberalism and globalisation, 
when applied to higher education governance on the Africa continent, force a 
compromise between internationalisation and localisation. In their efforts to 
develop societies and their own institutions, higher education systems on the 
African continent bargain between the need for international recognition and 
relevance on the one hand and the need to remain relevant to the local 
environments in which universities find themselves, on the other hand. But most 
of all, one can validly argue that part of this compromise that higher education 
systems have to live through concerns the manner and nature of autonomy that 
universities can have in their own affairs. Through the different ways of exposing 
how globalisation and neo-liberalism manifest through the life of higher 
education systems the researcher argues that these processes make higher 
education governance on the African continent less autonomous. 
It is crucial at this point to note that the urgency to find a balance between 
localisation and internationalisation sometimes reflects the conflict of interest 
and focus in which higher education systems on the African continent find 
themselves in. From one perspective, this conflict can be considered as an 
emblem of the conflict between different ideals of the university, that is, the 
University Reason and the University of Culture as against the University of 
Excellence. In other words, the apparent conflict can be considered, from 
Readings‟ (1996) perspective, as lying between the understanding of the 
university as a centre for the emancipation of reason and the promotion of culture 
on the one hand and as a centre for achieving excellence on the other. But I 
should acknowledge here that even such conceptions do not answer all the 
questions regarding the complex situation in which African universities find 
themselves in. That is why some university missions will tend to reflect elements 
from each one of the three perspectives that Readings (1996) provides. But 
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considering the operations of the higher education sector in Africa merely from 
the three conceptions would be simplistic. 
Delanty (2004) prefers to look at the different conceptions of the university as 
relational. His view takes one to a communicative consideration of these 
relationships with an understanding that neo-liberalism and globalisation do not 
represent the end of the University of Reason and the University of Culture but 
rather show a progression in the understanding of the university within the 
framework of global challenges. Delanty‟s (2004: 244–245) position entails a 
fundamental critique of what constitutes modernity and the role of the university 
as a key institution in modernity. He understands modernity not as an end to 
reason and culture but rather as a progressive extension of different forms of 
communication into all spheres of society. He reconsiders modernity and its 
impact on the university as resulting in four different epistemic shifts that are 
largely characterised as “cultural, social, political with the fourth shift as 
essentially economic and technological” (Delanty, 2004: 248). 
While acknowledging that “economic and technological forces have impacted on 
the university, undermining some of its modernist assumptions based on the idea 
of autonomy and underpinned by academic self-governance”, Delanty (2004: 
248–249) considers these shifts and forces as multidirectional and not unilinear 
in the sense of one replacing another. In other words, he does not think that the 
corporate identity of the university replaces other former identities of reason and 
culture. In view of Delanty‟s (2004) position, I argue that academic freedom can 
exist alongside market freedom as the university negotiates its course of life and 
that traces of neo-liberal practices do not necessarily mean the end of the 
University of Reason and the University of Culture. It is in this perspective that 
globalisation and neo-liberalism can be harnessed into a positive force 
transforming higher education in Africa rather than militating against it, as the 
patterns I have dealt with seem to indicate.  
The identity of the university is thus determined neither by technocratic-
managerial strategies nor by purely academic pursuits. In the knowledge society 
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knowledge cannot be reduced to its uses or to itself because it is embedded in the 
deeper cognitive complexes of society, in conceptual structures and in the 
epistemic structures of power and interests (Delanty, 2004: 252). This 
understanding squarely places the identity of any university within the lived 
experiences and practices of the communities the university operates in. 
Similarly, conceptions and practices of institutional autonomy and academic 
freedom can only make sense within a liberal communitarian perspective rather 
than purely liberal conceptions. Purely liberal conceptions of autonomy only act 
as a seedbed for the further development of required autonomous dispositions.   
Delanty‟s (2004) refusal to reduce the role of the university to the function of 
reason alone and the reflection of the power and prestige of the nation-state is 
intended to shift the understanding of the university to one of providing structure 
within which expert and lay cultures intersect with more specialised knowledge 
domains. The university‟s assumption of neo-liberal and globalised stances can 
be understood as the university‟s repositioning as it tries to accommodate the 
rising demands of the new global economy.  
In an attempt to put to the test Delanty‟s (2004) conception of the cultural, social, 
political, economic and technological repositioning of the higher education 
system in a multidimensional format, the following chapter will look at the 
intersections of cosmopolitanism and higher education as I try to look for ways 
though which African higher education systems can continue to serve the world 
while at the same time remaining true to the challenges facing Africa today..  
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CHAPTER 6 
COSMOPOLITAN CITIZENSHIP AND THE ROLE OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION IN AFRICA 
6.1  Introductory remarks: understanding cosmopolitan norms 
In the previous chapter I has focused much on exposing the dangers of 
globalisation and neo-liberalism in the operations of higher education in Africa. 
Despite this take, one thing that has been implicitly acknowledged is the fact that 
higher education discourse and governance today has become part of the neo-
liberal and globalised agenda, consciously or not. This realisation places 
enormous demands on the operations of the university in Africa as the 
universities try to negotiate the universal demands with the local expectations 
and burdens. In this chapter, I argue that the function of universities on the 
African continent is to focus not just on their economic expansion but also, and 
more importantly, on their civic role. In this way, the African university has a 
real chance to strengthen its autonomy. 
I propose that higher education in Africa can fulfil its civic role by taking up an 
important role in the creation of a cosmopolitan citizen. I also see that the values 
of a cosmopolitan citizen are better attuned to the promotion of justice and a 
better education for all. When social justice and the good of society are promoted 
as collateral aims for higher education, even alongside some neo-liberalist 
elements such as efficiency, accountability and productivity in response to the 
local demands, higher education will reclaim its capacity for autonomy.  
In pursuance of this argument, I explore the foundations of cosmopolitan norms 
and how such norms can affect the governance of higher education institutions 
on the African continent. Before I proceed, it is important that I clarify what I 
understand cosmopolitanism to mean and its relationship to globalisation.  
Once again, it is important to remember that globalisation is often used to refer to 
the broadening of the economic market to operate at a global or worldwide level. 
But in many cases, the terms empire and globalisation are used synonymously 
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with each other. Nevertheless, this usage does not adequately reflect the intricate 
nature of cosmopolitanism because each of these terms, empire and globalisation, 
designates a limited form of operation (Benhabib, 2006: 16). If these terms are to 
be used in place of cosmopolitanism, they are likely to reduce cosmopolitan 
norms only to claims reflecting the rights to life, liberty, equality and property. In 
this way, cosmopolitan norms would be regarded as dependent on free markets 
and trading practices. On the other hand, the idea of empire is conceived as 
referring to “an anonymous network of rules, regulations, and structures that 
entrap one in the system of global capitalism” (Benhabib, 2006: 16). This shows 
that the two terms empire and globalisation fall short of the larger implications of 
the nature of cosmopolitan norms.  
The concept cosmopolitanism can be traced to the Ancient Greek tradition, 
where the term stood for “citizens of the world” (Nussbaum, 1997: 59). This 
understanding of the concept departs from its associations with globalisation 
because it considers humankind as more important than any claims of belonging 
to one‟s own state or native land. In other words, proponents of 
cosmopolitanism, such as Nussbaum (1997), argue that individuals should be 
primarily considered as citizens of the world. Given this position, the concept of 
cosmopolitanism is heavily loaded with considerations over “what is human in 
humanity” (Appiah, 2006: 134). According to Appiah (2006: 135), a 
cosmopolitan outlook promotes the connection of human beings “despite their 
difference”. Appiah  argues that human beings are essentially connected to each 
other despite their affiliations to different nation-states and territories.  
There is also a general tendency to align cosmopolitan norms with democratic 
self-determination. One assumption is that the spreading of democratic rule 
across countries is tied to cosmopolitan norms, but this association does not say 
much about the causative factors of any of these two conceptions. Hence simply 
equating cosmopolitanism with democracy may be equally problematic because 
democratic institutions tend to operate in a localised fashion and become 
legitimate within localised circumstances. When nations adopt democratic rule 
their sovereignty remains valid within the borders of the people who participated 
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in the democratic process and agreed to the rule (see also Benhabib, 1996). 
Considering the conditions under which most democracies thrive, such as the 
need for some consensus from a specific group of concerned people, any 
democracy will only be valid within specific conditions. It is important to note 
that this thinking does not imply that democracies have nothing in common 
because of their specificity. The rules and processes on which democracies are 
established are themselves universal. But on their own, democracies designate a 
national identity and not much of a cosmopolitan identity. Nevertheless, it can be 
affirmed that human beings are connected through their skills and their 
imagination as human beings, as well as their common potential. The image of 
the connection through humanity also builds the foundation for cosmopolitanism 
in the field of higher education.  
What then are cosmopolitanism and a cosmopolitan identity? Brock and 
Brighouse (2005: 2–3) indicate that cosmopolitanism has its roots in the Stoic 
tradition and the idea of a „world citizen‟. On the other hand, Dwyer (2004: 171) 
considers globalisation and cosmopolitanism as aspects of the same process. He 
draws most of his comments from the ideas of Delanty and Falk. Although the 
notion of world citizen that lays the foundation for the notion of cosmopolitanism 
can be traced as far back as the Stoic period, the notion denotes a process of 
global internationalisation where nation states, which are historically located in 
space, become subjected to forms of international law and in which citizens 
acquire the special status of being „citizens of the world‟ by virtue of their 
common humanity. Consequently, this process culminates in the idea that people 
can move and transact their lives across different nation borders unhindered 
(Dwyer, 2004: 171). In this regard, nation-states no longer act as reference points 
for the different activities that people carry out and the demands that they make, 
for the activities appeal to broader sources of authority than the nation-state. This 
broader community of human beings directly refers to one as a citizen of the 
world, something different groups are infused with as they make their claims 
beyond the thresholds of their particular nationalities.  
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The above understanding shows that cosmopolitanism designates matters relating 
to both identity and responsibility (Brock & Brighouse, 2005: 2–3). At the level 
of identity, cosmopolitanism indicates that human existence or life is influenced 
by different cultures. In other words, it is not possible to find uniquely 
homogenous aspects of life in different countries. Forms of life that one finds in 
one place, although they may have features particular to the local environment in 
which they are found, are not purely influenced by the local environment. Life is 
essentially influenced by several factors that may not belong to one culture to 
such an extent that it (life) becomes heterogeneous. At the level of responsibility, 
cosmopolitanism believes that individual human lives are focussed outwardly 
and are concerned about obligations that are not only local, immediate and 
obvious but also relate to the distant other. In other words, a cosmopolitan 
perspective is interested in the obligation people have to others beyond their 
friends and relatives. Although this is the case with regard to the obligations that 
people have towards others, the cosmopolitan positions are not unanimous on the 
extent to which people have a specific regard for the distant other.  
At the centre of a cosmopolitan perspective is the idea that each person is a 
subject of equal moral concern and that each person can act autonomously within 
her or his own range of options. In this regard, cosmopolitan norms take the 
claims of each person seriously without subjecting them to group norms as a 
standard of measurement. As much as cosmopolitanism gives each individual the 
right to make these claims, it is also part of the cosmopolitan norms that such 
ways of looking at life necessarily imply that each individual carries the 
responsibility for the choices that he or she makes. The rationality and freedom 
of human beings reside in individuals and not the groups they belong to (Held, 
2005: 15–16).   
6.2  How do cosmopolitan norms arise? 
How do cosmopolitan norms acquire their being? Benhabib (2006: 20) proposes 
a project of mediations whereby the cosmopolitan norms first acquire the status 
of positive law by using some aspects of democratic foundations. For instance, a 
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group of people that decides to govern itself by some rules that it willingly 
chooses and debates between the members can discover that it is not only this 
group that follows these principles but that other groups also agree on similar 
rules as appealing for their own governance. At this point the norms emerge as 
universal. Through the process of public reason and deliberation, democratic 
states allow their citizens to become convinced of the validity and usefulness of 
cosmopolitan norms. Through the practice of these norms citizens reiterate their 
positive principles and incorporate them into democratic will-formation 
processes through argument, contestation, revision and rejection (Benhabib, 
2006; Post, 2006). According to Benhabib, democratic reiteration, which comes 
in the form of constant re-emphasis of positive laws and their utility in society, 
causes the political practices of the people to generate a body of laws that 
mediate between universal norms and the will of democratic majorities. Through 
this process of democratic reiteration, the substance of democratic law, which is 
fundamentally rooted in the local practices of the people, also changes. In the 
end, the law becomes reconstructed according to the norms of ethical 
universalism. This then is one of the first formulations of cosmopolitan norms.  
Benhabib (2006: 49) also highlights the fact that the reiteration has the capacity 
to change the boundaries of democratic states by altering and expanding the 
definition of the sovereign people or the demos, the subjects of democratic rule, 
to include persons such as those who may be referred to as both legal and illegal 
aliens.  
Democratic reiterations do not completely abolish the distinction that exists 
between universal ethical norms and the particularity of positive law, but they 
can only be ameliorated through the process. Hence, the act of constituting a 
democracy spells out two closely related ideas that tend to blur the universal 
aspect of democratisation. Benhabib (2006) argues that democratic legitimacy is 
an act of self-legislation whereby people bind themselves by some agreed laws, 
which in turn define their community. As such, “democracies require borders” 
(Benhabib, 2006: 33). One understanding from this position is that although 
democratic norms may considered to be legitimately generated by an act of 
sovereign legislation, the understanding of cosmopolitan norms assumes that 
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contemporary democracies should be framed in view of norms that transcend 
specific enactments of these democratic majorities, in the sense that such 
democratic majorities, although inevitable “reiterate the principles and 
incorporate them into democratic will-formation through argument, contestation, 
revision, and rejection” (Benhabib, 2006: 49). Consequently it would not hold to 
think that democracies are impervious to transformative acts of collective will.  
The above understanding enforces the nature of cosmopolitan norms. In other 
words, cosmopolitan norms are those norms that people create in full perspective 
of their democracies and their reiteration of the principles they live by. But most 
of all, it is when the democratic norms and the reiterations recreate new forms of 
understanding (something similar to a synthesis in Hegelian dialectical process of 
reality), transcending those that people already have, that cosmopolitan norms 
emerge. This creative nature of the cosmopolitan norms also implies that the 
processes by which people created their understandings are themselves 
contingent and subject to revision as the conditions and perspectives of life 
continue to reshape in the process of life. This presupposes that the norms are not 
impervious at all. Considered from another perspective, Benhabib‟s (2006) 
cosmopolitan norms can be seen as a revision of her earlier explanations of 
deliberative democracy alluded to earlier on in reference to her understanding of 
deliberative democracy (Benhabib, 1996). 
Can cosmopolitan norms mediate between conceptions of university autonomy 
globally and in Africa? I think that my exposition of the rise of cosmopolitan 
norms spells out a particular way in which people may begin to understand issues 
of institutional autonomy and academic freedom. Having mainly argued for 
positive liberty or situated autonomy as the most relevant condition for African 
higher education systems, I am compelled at this stage of the argument to state 
that conceptions of autonomy within and without the university require a 
cosmopolitan perspective if these conceptions are to address the locally defined 
challenges of higher education while at the same time maintaining the identity of 
the university that has existed for ages. This can happen if universities on the 
continent continuously reiterate their shared understandings of autonomy as lived 
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and perceived from their different social, historical and economic positions. Such 
reiterations have the potential of creating cosmopolitan forms of autonomy that 
speak to both the local environment as well as taking on board what other 
universities have for ages considered as central to this autonomy.    
In order to understand cosmopolitan norms better, one may ask what imperatives 
lie behind the force of cosmopolitan norms. In one sense, cosmopolitan norms 
ride on citizenship theory and its ramifications on a global scale. The primary 
ground on which cosmopolitan norms can be built is the idea that people decide 
to live in harmony in a society according to their agreed terms of reference. In 
this way, the experience of local self-governance stands as ground for any 
emergence of cosmopolitan norms. In many ways, citizenship claims cannot be 
separated from the claims that one makes towards the national in terms of one‟s 
rights and obligations. The general picture of citizenship is one that is situated in 
time and space. But as indicated above, people do not live in isolation. There is a 
further shared understanding of living in the same world and partly being 
determined by the same regulatory natural forces. People may wish to look at this 
as their given shared fate. The shared understanding of living in the same world 
gives rise to the global identity in the way people relate to each other as world 
citizens. In this way, what people ultimately refer to as cosmopolitanism is a 
“hybridity, fluidity, intermingling and interdependence of peoples, cultures and 
practices” across the globe with this understanding of shared fate (Benhabib, 
2006: 175).  
Probably Benhabib‟s (2006) main concern is to try to find a way in which people 
can fashion their political and legal institutions in such a way that they manage to 
govern themselves, amidst the growing conflicts and differences. But such an 
approach to life potentially creates dilemmas. Post (2006: 1) points out that 
despite the apparent need for a universalistic ethic, it is hardy possible to 
establish this ethic because governing of communities is mainly possible within 
the bounded identity where power and control is seen to operate within specific 
frameworks of representation, accountability, participation and deliberation. In 
other words, imagining the case of unbounded communities creates serious 
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challenges as to how the communities operate and probably whether they are real 
or not. Political will and political power are bounded within specific confines of 
operation without which such power comes into effect. While acknowledging 
that “the universalism of our ethics ultimately derives from our capacity to draw 
a transcendent sense of equality and dignity applicable to all”, Post (2006: 2) 
emphasises that the particularism of people‟s laws ultimately derives from the 
well-grounded borders of their states. As such, a cosmopolitan perspective may 
be perceived as primarily aimed at taming the nation-state and as creating a 
lawless state.  
Nevertheless, I wish to restate that from an ethical standpoint, it may be possible 
to establish what people owe others, their fellow citizens, and what they owe 
those beyond the confines of their locality and even future generations. This 
consideration becomes problematic to the law and its application because the law 
itself does not provide ways of its application beyond the constituents of the law, 
that is the nation-state, and specified countries that may have standing protocols 
with the nation-state. In this regard, it may be conceded that the hybridity found 
in cosmopolitan norms has become a way of taming the nation-state on the 
assertion of unbridled sovereignty that often arises in contemporary life and 
discourse. If people were to go the route of positive law, their universal ethical 
standards or regard for others would not find the space to be legally enforced 
because there would be no juridical authority required to enforce such a law and 
there would be no body to enforce this understanding and make sure that 
appropriate redress is given for any injury done.  
I need to indicate here that the world of human rights, despite its differential 
implementation and promotion, is one area where a universalistic dimension, in 
the name of the international human rights declaration, appeals beyond the local 
and the national and becomes applicable in all similar cases. Nevertheless the 
dilemma persists with regard to making human rights laws conform to positive 
laws of particular nation-states. I am tempted to think that the numerous attacks 
that people have made on human rights bodies as toothless and not forceful 
enough may be attributed to their cosmopolitan nature. Even though this may be 
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the case, a human rights conception that is infused with democratic and 
deliberative reiterations has the potential of sailing through such criticisms. 
Benhabib‟s (2006: 16) initial response to this paradox created by cosmopolitan 
norms and their enforceability draws heavily on the Kantian notion of a 
cosmopolitan right. Her main attempt is to begin resolving the inadmissibility of 
conditions of exclusion when it comes to the positive laws of particular states. In 
relation to this idea, Benhabib (2006: 22) suggests that strangers and illegal 
aliens can only be seen as protected when the law of world citizenship is made 
limited to the conditions of hospitality. She argues that the law of hospitality 
necessarily intersects with the democratic authority of ordinary positive law and 
that it “delimits civic space by regulating relations among members, strangers 
and bounded communities” (Benhabib, 2006: 22). The interface between positive 
law and democratic law is made possible because democracies by their very 
nature possess transparent public spheres that are designed to translate ethical 
views of citizens into positive law of the state (Benhabib, 2006: 71). Hence the 
broader global society increasingly endorses the idea that both legal and illegal 
aliens are entitled to equal human rights with an understanding of friendship.  
6.3 The role of cosmopolitan norms in enhancing higher education 
systems to promote social justice 
How does one begin to justify the role and foundations of cosmopolitan norms in 
the governance of higher education systems? Does it really matter whether one 
develops a cosmopolitan perspective or not? One can begin to answer these 
questions by understanding the context in which cosmopolitan norms are built. 
For instance, Benhabib (2006) develops a clear conception of these norms from a 
discourse about the practice of legitimating unethical actions, which can be done 
by particular national states through their legal structures. In this particular case 
Benhabib‟s discussion took shape in view of the crimes of war, or the injustices 
that the Nazi committed towards the Jews. Of course this probing takes into 
account the fact the perpetrators‟ own state, in this case Germany, sanctioned 
these actions. Benhabib then proceeds to suggest that people need a body of 
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norms that transcends the local legal positions of positive law. They need norms 
that are universal and enforceable beyond the borders of particular nation-states. 
This indicates that within the German state, this behaviour towards others was 
legal and therefore also regarded as right. The quest for transnational norms can 
be considered as the beginning of formulating cosmopolitan norms. It is also 
possible to consider the relevance of cosmopolitan norms in the context of the 
xenophobic attacks on foreigners in South Africa that have taken place in the 
middle of 2008. Reflecting on these circumstances poses serious challenges to 
universities‟ role in engendering democratic civic virtues and the extent to which 
these values and virtues are required to be cosmopolitan.   
In line with Benhabib‟s (2006) views, I argue that transnational norms, although 
they provide the ground on which cosmopolitan norms are built, are not 
necessarily equivalent to cosmopolitan norms. In order for one to understand this 
puzzle, Benhabib (2006: 16) distinguishes international norms of justice from 
cosmopolitan norms of justice. International norms of justice designate particular 
inter-state arrangements, enforceable through equally recognisable legal agents. 
In this case the agreed laws surrounding intergovernmental issues are 
enforceable. On the other hand, cosmopolitan justice has broader margins than 
international norms of justice. While the international norms of justice accrue 
from specific arrangements of nation-states, the cosmopolitan norms of justice 
accrue to individuals by virtue of these individuals being considered as moral 
agents and legal persons in a worldwide society, whether or not particular states 
formally subscribe to these norms as signatories. The difference with 
international norms of justice is that these are dependent on the nation-states and 
are valid as long as their agreements are still binding legally; in other words, they 
depend on whether a particular state is a signatory or not.  
If it is the case that cosmopolitan norms stand in so far as individual persons 
exist, it can be argued that such norms are not dependent on the agreements 
people make between each other. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
although it arose from international protocol and arrangement between nations, is 
considered as cosmopolitan norms and universally binding. In this case, the 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights assumes a cosmopolitan understanding 
because it is central to what being human means and involves. As such, these 
norms then cannot be ranked among the international justice norms, although 
international justice norms are at liberty to draw from them.  
What Benhabib brings to people‟s attention is the idea that cosmopolitan norms 
particularise on the identity of the person and what the individual person 
deserves. Merely being human comes prior to all other considerations and 
arrangements. Hence, cosmopolitanism becomes distinct from other notions 
because “love of mankind” in this sense is prior to “love of one‟s country”. This 
version of cosmopolitanism can also be said to be different from other 
conceptions of cosmopolitanism that tend to represent human nature as a form of 
“hybridity, fluidity, and that it is a fractured and an internally riven nature” 
(Benhabib, 2006: 18). I think that the idea of cosmopolitan norms as hybrid, 
fluid, and fractured gives in too much to ethical relativism and can easily lead to 
nihilism or the belief that “nothing exists, and that if anything exists then it is 
incomprehensible or cannot be communicated” (Stumpf, 1988: 33). In this form 
of relativism everything is in flux and reality has no firm ground on which one 
would begin to build some norms in life. Such relativism cum nihilism attacks 
the core that acts as a basis for recognition of the other as an equal and a distinct 
human being who deserves respect and recognition irrespective of belonging or 
association. 
A cosmopolitan perspective that gives priority to the individual human being and 
due recognition of one‟s situatedness is aligned towards the discursive scope of 
ethics, which encompasses or presupposes a universalistic moral standpoint in its 
norms of conversation. When one considers the meaning of this position in 
practical circumstances, it implies, among other things, that the discussions that 
people may engage in are not determined by any boundaries prior to the meeting 
of difference and setting the rules of conversation. Similarly, the discourse on 
higher education autonomy in Africa cannot be the concern of only the citizens 
of a particular nation but a concern of everyone who may be affected by it. The 
position is a complete equivocation of Benhabib‟s (1996: 70) original 
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contribution to deliberative democracy where she holds that decisions affecting 
the well-being of a group should be seen as the outcome of free and reasoned 
deliberation among equals, within principles of equality and symmetry, and made 
in conditions where all can initiate speech, interrogation and debate about the 
issues concerned (Benhabib, 2006: 18). By bringing the same conception to the 
fore, Benhabib (2006) intends to firmly ground cosmopolitan norms in a 
conception of discursive democratic ethics where the rules guiding the discourse 
are not prior to the discussion itself, although its assumptions may be. In other 
words, discursive norms require the concerned people, irrespective of their 
national boundaries, to first settle the norms guiding their discussion with equal 
recognition of the worth of each participant. According to Benhabib‟s (1996) 
understanding, the norms of moral conversation are not limited to people living 
within specific nationally recognised boundaries but include all who qualify as 
human beings. She restates the following: 
Every person, and every moral agent, who has interest and whom my actions 
and consequences of my actions can impact and affect in some manner or 
another is potentially a moral conversation partner with me: I have a moral 
obligation to justify my action with reasons (emphasis in the original) to this 
individual or to the representative of this being. We are all potentially 
participants in such conversations of justification (Benhabib, 2006: 18). 
Of course one can query whether Benhabib‟s initial norms of discursive 
democracy do not explicitly lead to a cosmopolitan view. But this position would 
not fully represent Benhabib‟s discursive deliberations. I acknowledge that when 
a group of people discusses issues that concern them, it is important to establish 
the people who are concerned about those issues. This acknowledges people‟s 
global connectedness and how actions, although perceived as distant, may affect 
others, including future generations. This identification of the concerned may 
initially mean that at some point one has to draw a line as to who will be 
included in the deliberation. But a second consideration of „anyone who is 
concerned‟ fundamentally breaks down the walls some people have put in place 
 215 
to exclude other people from conversation. These walls can relate to language as 
much as they can relate to formal association and economic position.  
When considered from the first ground, processes regarding identification of 
those affected by an issue can further imply that a particular group becomes 
aware of its members having some common grounds that hold the group 
together. The deliberations need to be localised as opposed to being generalised. 
But even if this may be the case with democratic discourse that wants to be 
legitimate, being affected by an issue or becoming concerned is not limited to 
spatial belonging or any other form of social or cultural belonging. Furthermore, 
the norms on which such rules of conversation are established and how decisions 
are arrived at may not be special to a particular group. The norms can be 
applicable across the board if one maintains that all human beings are rational 
and capable at arriving at solutions to things that affect them and that they are 
also capable of doing this by listening to the reasons each one of them brings to 
the table. In other words, the nature of the norms that any democratic group can 
legitimately call democratic is universal and can be considered as cosmopolitan 
at the same time.  
I wish to quickly draw on two other aspects of the democratic discourse and how 
they can be considered as a foundation for cosmopolitan norms. I have in mind 
characteristics of democratic deliberations that meet the conditions of being 
discursive, public and open-ended and that one needs to expect the unexpected to 
happen, or the idea that such discourse is potentially unpredictable and 
inconclusive as it keeps in wait for a better argument (see Habermas, 1996; 
Waghid, 2004). The publicity of these norms is evoked from the understanding 
that discussions are open to all the concerned members. These members 
determine the agenda and the rules of the discourse. But most of all, the 
discourse itself is a public discourse. By implication members of the democratic 
community do not hide any agendas from each other if the other is an interested 
member. But due to the nature of these deliberations and given some of the 
conditions I have described above, democratic deliberations exhort members in 
the democratic dialogue to expect the unexpected to happen. In other words, 
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members taking part in the discourse need to have the understanding their modus 
operandi and the consequent deliberations between them can lead to offending 
others, although this may not be intentional. As a result, every deliberative act 
should have an inbuilt capacity to facilitate forgiveness and respect for the other 
as part of the building pillars of a democratic culture (Waghid, 2005: 331). 
The discursive nature of democratic dialogue has the potential of resolving 
tensions (Benhabib, 2006:19) and can meaningfully improve deliberations 
concerning the African higher education system, which in many forms are 
engaged in intractable disputes. Democratic discourse pays particular attention to 
how people understand themselves as citizens and members of the deliberating 
group. By implication, this understanding of belonging revolves around whom 
and what one excludes or includes from the forms of conversation and the nature 
of issues requiring public conversation.  
For the above argument to remain valid, I need to acknowledge that there is a 
possibility that assuming unity between various bounded communities can be 
dangerous. This is why, according to Benhabib (2006), it is imperative that any 
democratic discourse of a cosmopolitan nature include a philosophical project of 
mediations and not „totalisations‟ or reductions of forms of life. The democratic 
life being promoted here is itself a mixture of different forms of life, experiences 
and expectations. It is an expression of diverse forms communing. This means 
that the public sphere has to transform in such a way that there is adequate 
conversation between the different forms of life, between the moral and the 
ethical, between the ethical and the political, and also between the political and 
the legal dimensions of life. Hence the discursive atmosphere that Benhabib 
(2006) advocates here as part of the cosmopolitan perspective is one in which the 
governing norms of conversation are perceived as neither merely moral nor just 
legal but as dealing with the morality of law in a broader context beyond its 
domestic domain.  
The African higher education system can be a site for the promotion of 
cosmopolitan norms and values. Higher education systems on the continent are 
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by their composition multi-ethnic and multicultural, and of late they have been 
turning multinational. When higher education systems consciously and 
progressively promote the values that connect humanity and its values by simple 
mediations, they can in fact further develop the cosmopolitan norms. But for 
higher education systems on the continent to perform this role effectively, they 
need to develop within their practices a democratic deliberative process whereby 
all opinions are considered without any bias. This implies that the different 
higher education systems, although they are characterised by different historical, 
cultural, social, economic and political environments, need to constantly discover 
the higher moral ground for advancing their purposes within the different 
societies while at the same time contributing to the ends of humanity as such.  
When the cosmopolitan position is considered from the context of human rights, 
Benhabib (2006: 20) stipulates that human rights claims work with a 
cosmopolitan perspective and operate legally regardless of one‟s membership in 
a bounded community or nation. For instance, human rights claims can be made 
by any form of immigrant in a foreign country regardless of whether the person 
is a legal immigrant or not. Such a conception can be achieved by removing 
differential treatment between local students and foreign students in the different 
higher education systems on the continent. 
I now turn to the imaginative dimension of the democratic theory, which acts as a 
basis of cosmopolitan norms necessary for the transformation of higher education 
systems so that they become more autonomous. In this space, I claim that the 
ideal of imaginative thinking is necessary for and central to the building of a 
cosmopolitan perspective. Imaginative thinking and compassionate action have 
the capacity to attune people to expecting the unexpected in human interaction. 
In one of his expositions, Waghid (2005: 331) proposes a conception of 
citizenship education through compassionate action and also claims that this way 
of looking at citizenship enriches the ideals of a deliberative and democratic 
society, as one can find in other contemporary scholars such as Habermas, 
Young, Benhabib and many more.  
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Waghid (2005: 331) derives his thoughts on imaginative and compassionate 
action from Hanna Arendt‟s 1998 book titled The Human Condition. The theory 
of imaginative action believes that action is an initiation into motion. But this 
initiation into movement or action is particularly relational in the sense that a 
person who acts sets into motion a sequence of other actions and/or reactions. 
While one can have full control of oneself and one‟s intentions, the other self or 
person who interacts with one or responds to an initiation into motion can never 
be fully grasped and predicted in the same way that one understands oneself and 
predicts one‟s own behaviour in given circumstances. As such, an action towards 
other people necessarily becomes dialogical in the sense that action brings 
people or subjects into dialogue. This dialogue can also be considered in an 
action-reaction sequence.  
Using the dialogical nature of human actions towards other humans, Waghid 
(2005: 333) argues for the need for compassion and forgiveness in realms of 
human interaction. This proposal is founded on the belief that once a person sets 
(action) into motion, what is said or done cannot be reversed in time and space. 
Although one can wish one had not said or done the particular things, the fact 
that the deed has been done or the words have been spoken cannot be reversed. 
With this understanding in mind, Waghid (2005) proposes that the teaching for 
democratic citizenship should particularly give room for forgiveness and create a 
deeper sense of understanding of the other.  
I want to extend the concept of imaginative action and forgiveness so that it can 
also be used as a foundation for cosmopolitan values in enhancing higher 
education systems on the African continent. In relation to this proposal, one can 
consider the place of the African university as enhanced when the university 
takes up the challenges issued to it by the emergence of cosmopolitan norms. The 
university can be considered as a melting pot of different cultures and thought 
patterns, or as a home ground of different reasons. This means that the university 
in turn uses and promotes cosmopolitan values as it tries to fulfil its mission to 
teach and serve the community and do research. 
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When imaginative action is given room within the spaces of the university, it 
gives individuals the capacity to experience the other and what it means to be the 
other in different circumstances. In turn, this approach allows universities on the 
African continent to cultivate a culture of friendship between students, lecturers, 
other university personnel and the greater society. In this sense, imaginative 
action works in strengthening civic reconciliation by engaging members of 
society in dialogue (Waghid, 2005: 339).  
The idea of compassionate and imaginative action cannot be exercised within 
any specific borders or conditions except that of belong to the community of 
human beings. The human condition suffices in the sense that the underlying 
force is the question of sharing a common humanity and that by virtue of this 
nature people are capable of sharing in other‟s experiences and imagining 
themselves in other people‟s positions. The idea does not negate knowledge of 
oneself but rather advocates the breaking of individual shells so that people can 
reach each other and share the struggles that they may be experiencing. While 
Waghid‟s (2005) elaboration of imaginative and compassionate action does not 
explicitly reveal itself as a cosmopolitan perspective, the explanation that I have 
offered in terms of how compassionate and imaginative action can be exercised 
clearly shows that the concept is based on a cosmopolitan understanding of 
reality and the simple sharing of the same human condition. 
Benhabib‟s (2006) cosmopolitan view, which I have elaborated on at length 
earlier on, is heavily tilted towards a Kantian formula of a universal right as an 
entitlement that every person carries by virtue of being human. In this regard, it 
is important to note that Kant‟s cosmopolitan rights are distinct from two other 
forms of rights although all of these are interrelated in the way their claims are 
formulated. These two are the domestic rights claims of individual persons 
within a nation and the claims guarding treaties between sovereign states (inter-
state rights). The cosmopolitan rights are distinct on the ground that people claim 
them between each other irrespective of nationality or bounded community. They 
do this by virtue of being human and not merely by simple existence in a global 
village (Benhabib, 2006: 21). Such a perspective borrows heavily on the 
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anticipation of each human being as a potential participant in human 
conversation or the anticipation of each person as a potential sufferer as a result 
of one‟s action, to follow the imaginative route.  
To Kant, the condition of being a potential participant in human conversation 
forms the root of his concept of hospitality.
9
 In the ordinary sense, the idea of 
hospitality implies doing someone a favour because that person is perceived as a 
stranger and also as somebody who cannot claim from one the specific behaviour 
being displayed. Quoting David Held, Benhabib (2006: 31) states that 
cosmopolitan sovereignty places its primacy on individual human beings as 
political agents and on the accountability of power in treating others as co-
agents. Hospitality in this regard refers to cases where human rights claims are 
not bound by particular nation-states but are by their very nature cross-border 
claims, claims that can be made by any anonymous persons by virtue of being 
persons. 
The above point brings me to reiterate the intricate nature of democratic states 
and their legitimacy. I have argued that while democracies believe in an exercise 
of power authorised by the people, these people necessarily have to belong to 
specific communities or states within which they can exercise their democratic 
power and mandate leaders in such circumstances. But at the same time, the 
principles within which democracies operate are such that they have their 
reference to internationally recognised democratic practices that in turn 
legitimate any new organisations or practices as democratic or not. At this point, 
the idea of “the rights of the person” (Benhabib, 2006: 32) becomes the major 
reference point for such democratic practices. Although such networking of the 
relationship between the universal and the particular may be seen as antagonistic 
in terms of its trade-offs that also seem to fall on the universal condition, it is this 
core that acts as another nerve for the cosmopolitan ideal. In other words, the 
reference to „cosmopolitanism‟ is not a reference that completely transcends the 
local and the particular, per se. This is so because it is in the local and particular 
                                                 
9
  The concept of hospitality is used differently from the way people ordinarily know and use hospitality 
in human dealings, such as offering friendly reception to visitors. 
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that the universal becomes evident and the universal begins to be applied in other 
similarly positioned cases. Benhabib (2006: 32) confirms that “modern 
democracies act in the name of universal principles that are then circumscribed 
within a particular civic community”.  
Like other theoretical frameworks such as the democratic theory or the 
citizenship theory, it is possible to consider the cosmopolitan norm as layered or 
differentiated, depending on its points of emphasis. For instance, Dwyer (2004) 
considers that globalisation is an initial stage in the process of cosmopolitanism. 
But this stage uses the position of the nation-state is a basic unit of analysis 
(Ritzer, 2007: 3–4). Nevertheless, I note that this way of considering 
cosmopolitanism may eventually conflate globalisation with cosmopolitanism. 
On the other hand, the view may also simply mean that globalisation does not 
have all the elements that make cosmopolitanism to be what it is, that it is a less 
developed form of cosmopolitanism, if one is allowed to put it that way. What 
distinguishes cosmopolitanism from globalisation at this point is the idea that 
cosmopolitanism is essentially a normative norm, whereas globalisation 
characterises the way operations, mostly economic in nature, take place. I will 
now consider Beck‟s (2007) view as an example of a normative claim in terms of 
stipulating the understanding of cosmopolitanism. 
Using Beck‟s (2007: 153–164) view requires me to make a preliminary 
distinction between methodological nationalism and methodological 
cosmopolitanism, which Beck similarly makes. While Beck (2007) has given a 
number of characteristics distinguishing methodological nationalism, one can 
sum them up as representing a particular view of citizenship or belonging that 
tends to put a binary division between the nation-state and the other, between us 
and them. This position also argues that networks of human activity, although 
they can gain broader acceptance beyond the national, are essentially constituted 
by the identity of the nation-state. In methodological nationalism, society is 
subordinated to the state and each of them tends to be defined in terms of the 
other. In other words, the predominant point of focus and analysis is the nation-
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state, but all other relationships or networks are understood on the basis of the 
nature and operations of the nation-state.  
Methodological cosmopolitanism does not spell the death of the nation-state, as 
many have predicted. In methodological cosmopolitanism, the nature and 
functions of the nation-state in human networking are not demolished. A 
cosmopolitan perspective rather considers this nation-state not as a predominant 
factor of analysis or a point of origin. The nation-state is considered as one 
player among many players in the global world of many players. In this regard, 
the either „us‟ or „them‟ is dissolved in a network of relationships to the extent 
that the „inside-out‟ boundaries become blurred in reconstituting human activity. 
I return to this point later in this chapter when I begin to consider how 
cosmopolitan norms can further enhance the governance of higher education 
institutions on the African continent.  
At this point I would agree that Beck‟s notion of a normative cosmopolitanism as 
it is laid out is yet to be realised. Ritzer (2007: 3–4) argues that this is the case 
because most of the networks of interaction between institutions still constitute 
themselves in terms of the national first and only later do they consider the 
broader implications. Nevertheless, the idea that the national ceases to be 
national and the international also ceases to be international is still persuasive in 
the way relationships and activities are constituted. This means that the national 
or local operates through what may be perceived as a symbiosis of the internal 
and external to the extent that maintaining the primary distinction (internal and 
external) is no longer an issue. What then remains are networks of human 
relationships operating without any regard of the physical locality of association. 
Castells (1996) expresses a similar conception in his discussion of globalisation. 
While appreciating the ways through which cosmopolitan norms can enhance 
higher education governance on the African continent, it is important to note that 
the nature of cosmopolitan norms creates paradoxes and enormous challenges in 
the governance of higher education institutions on the African continent. This is 
the case with the particular nature of African circumstances (alluded to earlier in 
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this work) and the role universities are understood to play in the new age. Among 
other things, universities are considered to be constituted within specific nation 
borders and operate under the watchful eye of the nation-state in many instances, 
as the discussion in Chapter 2 clearly shows. Universities strive to achieve the 
objectives set by the different nation-states in which they are located. 
Nonetheless, I want to argue that universities are not confined to these spaces as 
they also have to remain universities within the broader frameworks of what 
universities are. In particular contexts, one can think of the role of universities in 
cultivating the future citizen. I think that given the consideration here, 
universities in particular African states would pay a huge amount of attention to 
developing the human capacity of the nation-states in which they are. But such 
an activity needs to be motivated and even challenged by the global demands of a 
cosmopolitan person who is capable of functioning beyond the particular nation-
states in which one is framed. In this case, vibrant citizenship education within 
nation-states can meaningfully be achieved by concentrating on the development 
of a deliberative democratic person within African universities. This is the new 
space that universities in Africa have to occupy.  
6.3.1 The feasibility and role of cosmopolitan norms in enhancing 
higher education systems on the African continent  
In the discussion above, I have outlined a normative conception of the nature of 
cosmopolitan values and further made an option for it by locating spaces within 
the university where cosmopolitanism can be made effective. In this section, I 
first analyse the possible source of cosmopolitan values within the conception of 
a university before moving on to consolidate the view that universities on the 
continent have the potential for being sites for the promotion of cosmopolitan 
values. Secondly, I consider how the cosmopolitan values, when positively 
acknowledged and promoted, further impact on the nature of the university 
business, in a further postulation of an African university that promotes 
imaginative action, hospitality and respect.  
Most expositions on cosmopolitan norms basically start off from Kant‟s notion 
of a universal moral order and assume the position as proven. For instance, 
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Linklater (1999: 37) uses the Kantian foundation to argue for regard for others 
beyond the members of one‟s immediate communities. This boils down to regard 
for strangers. When one considers the role of the university, there is something 
within the nature of the university that is aligned to regard for others beyond 
one‟s immediate confines. In the first place, the university, as a centre of 
exploration and learning, depends on the universal understanding that human 
beings are capable of reaching newer levels of thinking every time they begin to 
engage with issues of knowledge. This understanding is similarly influenced by 
the idea that reason is objective and public and/or general. In other words, the 
capacity to think and be innovative is a human condition and is not a special 
privilege of a particular race, tribe, nation or class of people. Naturally, 
universities cannot promote ethnicity or favour certain privileged groups at the 
expense of those who reasonably qualify to study at the university.  
On the other hand, Readings‟ (1996) exploration of the nature of the university 
fundamentally becomes a cosmopolitan perspective, particularly when one thinks 
of the university as the centre of reason and excellence. Although reason and 
excellence can only be traced or tied to a particular time and space, the natures of 
reason and excellence are not confined to time and space. In other words, 
standards of reason and norms of excellence are borderless despite the fact that 
particular nation-states may adopt different levels of checking reason and 
excellence in their institutions. This implies that universities, by their mandate of 
promoting reason and excellence in various fields of life, operate in a 
cosmopolitan frame.  
Furthermore, in many cases the university‟s core agenda is centred on the 
development of the human being and its race. Although the human being can 
meaningfully be developed within certain frames of cultural thinking, the 
consideration of every human being as a „thinking self‟, as Descartes coined it, 
becomes the centre of the university‟s belief that knowledge can be cultivated 
and promoted in human beings. Universities today stand out because of their 
predominant association with reason (pure or practical). One can also consider 
what universities are in relation to ideas of the university as the soul of every 
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nation. This Platonic infusion attempts to depict the nature of the university as 
locally situated and universally framed. The university becomes the central nerve 
in the life of a nation. 
Can universities in Africa live up to their cosmopolitan expectation? If they can, 
are they not shaking of the shackles of their own local confinements or the 
national obligations? When one begins to consider ways through which a 
university can live with its cosmopolitan mandate, it is possible to be bogged 
down by the historicity of the university. In this regard, there is a temptation to 
think that the cosmopolitan mandate is a pollution of the mission of the 
university and the particular mission of universities in Africa. I think that such 
conclusions are unnecessary regarding the university, even if one is given a full 
account of the conditions in which African universities operate.  
Although nation-states in Africa understand the university as their main route of 
cultivating nationalism and the core for creating the workforce, universities are 
mandated to produce citizens who can fit into the local or national force. But at 
the same time, universities also have a duty to create citizens who are globally 
mindful and competitive. This is the mandate to create global citizens. But for 
such citizens to be globally mindful and competitive, it is not only their 
economic and managerial skills that need to be developed. These citizens also 
need to be imbued with the requisite qualities and capacities if they are to live a 
critical and meaning life project. Due to the polarisation of existence that has 
overtaken the human race in terms of the „haves‟ and „have-nots‟, the special 
qualities that need to be cultivated in citizens need to be in line with the current 
plurality of values in multicultural settings. One way of reaching this point is for 
universities to teach students what it means to be on the peripheral side of life 
and experience how life is for others who are different. In mind I have a case in 
mind where students would want university education irrespective of whether 
they come from urban or rural places, but after graduation, there is an inclination 
to prefer the urban settings for a workplace. While this particularly has to do with 
personal choice, I argue for a negotiation or a balance of this personal choice 
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with the overall good of society. Promoting the good of society can happen in 
both the urban and rural settings.  
The conditions under which universities in Africa operate require that students 
and lecturers practice imaginative action and compassionate action as part of 
paying respect to each other. The ideals of imaginative action and compassionate 
action are not unique to forms of life on the African continent. Although people 
naturally struggle to resolve the differences between cosmopolitan norms with 
different and unique legal, historical and cultural traditions and memories of 
people, Benhabib‟s (2006: 70) proposal that people must respect, encourage and 
initiate multiple processes of democratic reiterations is one solution. The idea of 
democratic reiterations signifies adoption of the democratic principles and 
constant self-reminder and critique of one‟s own forms of democratic life as a 
way of developing better forms of democratic conversation. It is only within 
these democratic reiterations that the fundamental principles and processes of 
society are re-posited, re-signified and re-appropriated into a new body of 
knowledge and beliefs through the urgency of all people concerned, which are 
both the majority and minority groups (Benhabib, 2006: 73). Cosmopolitanism 
and its norms thus embrace a phase of new meaning making, signification and re-
articulation. 
On the other hand, Hutchings (1999: 17–18) proposes that in circumstances of 
difference and diversion as those articulated by Benhabib and others, one should 
try to draw on what is universally applicable from the distinct forms of life. In 
other words, whereas politics is founded within the particular ways of organising 
society that are practice-based, a cosmopolitan perspective looks for moral 
foundations for the practice. This is particularly due to the nature of being 
human, which Hutchings (1999:17) says is centred on two distinct orders or 
natures although they operate together. On the one hand is the natural order that 
determines human life in relation to its bodily or physical requirements. On the 
other hand is the moral order that strives to go beyond the embodiment of human 
life in search of the universally binding principles.  
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One criticism that clearly comes up in relation to the moral order is the 
assumptions that make human beings capable of being moral. Despite the 
problems evoked by such assumptions, the moral dimension in human life cannot 
be ruled out. It is in this regard that a cosmopolitan perspective appears to remain 
aloof to the practicalities of human life although reason, per se, cannot be 
separated from the life forms at the same time. But due to the nature of reason, 
there is a certain universality attached to them. A cosmopolitan perspective is 
one that is unprejudiced by parochial loyalties and as such gains specific forms 
of authority transcending the local boundaries of authority. This is more the case 
because the conception of the cosmopolitan perspective is one that requires one 
to cultivate a critical mind that is capable of exercising itself above the parochial 
interests, one that can manage to be above the local in self-reflection.  
A cosmopolitan perspective of higher education systems cannot meaningfully 
develop future citizens if it fails to cultivate critical inquiry by students. The goal 
towards developing critical inquiry demands that the particular disciplines that 
make up the knowledge body transmitted by the university need to be infused 
with a philosophical perspective. For instance, educating for the future requires 
that disciplines such as the (natural) sciences, engineering and others similarly 
located should not only be interested in producing experts in these fields, such as 
physicists, mathematicians, astronauts and engineers, but also in producing 
citizens who are capable of manoeuvring in a complex and dynamic world. 
Commenting on Kant‟s works, Hutchings (1999: 17) recommends the teaching 
of philosophical studies to all future citizens. It is hoped that such an approach in 
developing future citizens would create individuals who will not be bound by the 
identification with purely individual or national interest but who will be 
governed by the ideals of reason as an end within a kingdom of ends.  
In other words, a philosophical perspective on life and the art of making critical 
judgements in the different fields that people specialise in necessarily involves a 
cosmopolitan take. I do agree that Hitchings‟ interpretation of the Kantian 
cosmopolitan perspective puts an obligation on universities in Africa and the 
world at large to shift their focus towards developing cosmopolitan citizens who 
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can manage to handle the local demands as well as the international demands 
with a touch of reason. In other contexts scholars even propose the teaching of 
thinking and critical thinking skills right from primary school (see Hand & 
Winstanley, 2008).  
Stevenson (2003: 41) adds that cosmopolitanism in contemporary democracies 
requires the creation of institutions that enable the voice of the individual to be 
heard irrespective of its local resonance and also irrespective of whether it is 
between states or within a state. In this regard, cosmopolitan values are 
conceived to be the major agents of change. Hence, citizens including those 
involved in university teaching and research need to be re-educated in such a 
way that they can manage the negotiation of the self in relation to others in the 
different spaces that they are engaged in. This draws the cosmopolitan values to a 
healthy respect of others for what they are and not what one would gain by such 
association.  
What I have elaborated above is very close to Benhabib‟s cosmopolitan value of 
friendship. In the idea of cosmopolitanism, no institution or society or life is 
considered as completely self-sustaining. Stevenson (2003: 43) argues that 
people‟s personal lives are less regulated by norms and hierarchies than ever 
before. Although this regulation can mean an increase in social inequalities, it 
also implies that there are possibilities for freedom and creativity.  With regard to 
social dynamics within university spaces in Africa, it means that there is a need 
for intercultural or intergroup dialogue and the opening up of different academic 
spaces to become public spaces that can create inclusive forms of dialogue. If 
this is to take place within the life of the university in Africa, it would require 
that the recognition of difference, respect and cultural identity be taken seriously 
because “cosmopolitan politics requires a dialogic view of the self. As the social 
world loses its capacity, once and for all, to fix moral hierarchies through 
tradition, this opens the cosmos to the difference of others” (Stevenson, 2003: 
62).  
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When these ideals of cosmopolitanism are actively promoted in the spaces of the 
university, the practice enables the universities to develop characters that are 
capable of viewing themselves from the generalised attitudes and perceptions of 
other people. In view of the ideas of Dwyer (2004) and Beck (2007) that I have 
discussed above, the cosmopolitan perspective becomes a compelling case for 
consideration in the way higher education institutions are managed on the 
African continent. For instance, Beck (2007: 170–171) provides several reasons 
why a cosmopolitan perspective is compelling. One of these is the situation of 
unjustifiable inequalities between countries and within countries. If such social 
and economic or political constraints were to be adequately tackled for the 
upliftment of the human condition, nation-state orientations would not deal with 
these problems adequately. Higher education systems stand a better a chance 
because of their capacity to rise above the nation-state. Similarly, a university 
programme that is only focussed on addressing the local needs of people cannot 
go far in its own agenda.  
In so far as norms of equality are locally defined, only little progress can be 
achieved in terms of reducing inequalities because such a conception of equality 
lacks cross-reference with neighbouring countries and systems. By implication, 
this lack of cosmopolitan norms would also pose enormous challenges for other 
social delivery systems, such as (public) higher education, and concomitant 
notions of justice that a society will have. The main claim I am making here is 
that cosmopolitan norms, when favourably developed within the university 
system, have a capacity to improve people‟s sense of justice and their consequent 
forms of life. In this regard, universities can be considered as places for the 
creation of empowerment. Similarly, transformation of institutions in terms of 
global expectations would become difficult in cases where the nation-state is the 
predominant basis for critical analysis in university discourse. This is so because 
the locally based forms of life become highly valuable only because they 
emanate from experience, but this does not imply that they are valuable for 
creating a future nation within the contemporary cosmopolitan challenges.  
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6.3.2 The centrality of hospitality and respect and an exclusion of love 
and care as cosmopolitan values 
The neo-Kantian perspective that Benhabib (2006) uses as a way of achieving the 
ends of cosmopolitan norms can be achieved through the ideas of hospitality and 
respect for persons. Kant advocates that in human interactions, persons should 
treat each other not merely as means but also as ends. In this regard, respect for 
persons can be on the basis of the person‟s own good and not for what one would 
benefit from him or her. Haydon (2006) further explores the implications of the 
idea of promoting respect for persons and cultures as a ground for global 
citizenship, among other things.  Haydon (2006: 459) argues that friendship is an 
underlying attitude that human beings need to have in relation to their fellow 
humans. But the promotion of citizenship, which Haydon (2006) uses as a 
foundation for cosmopolitanism, gives in to many varied conceptions of how 
different peoples conceive the idea of citizenship and who they include or 
exclude as members within particular frames of citizenship. The general 
promotion of citizenship norms can be misleading because it apparently 
exonerates inhuman treatment of „non-citizens‟ within particular contexts.  
It is mainly in relation to notions of friendship and respect for other persons 
within conceptions of citizenship that can give one a better reading of 
cosmopolitanism.  In this regard, Haydon (2006) gives the example of respect for 
different cultural contexts as a condition for fulfilling the attitude of respect. 
Understanding of different cultural contexts enables one to focus on individual 
cultures as entities in their own right that need respect. The focus is put on the 
fact that human beings live and interact through different cultural perspectives. 
As such, the respect in question is not necessarily aimed at a particular culture as 
such but at respecting different cultural contexts within which human beings 
operate. This condition is a seedbed for cultivating friendship. Through such a 
perspective, the individual cultures will also be respected. Quoting from Raz, 
Haydon further argues that “respect is neither an emotion, nor a feeling and nor a 
belief. Respecting other people is a way of treating them” (Haydon, 2006: 459).  
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Respect is grounded in the actions of people towards each other. In this regard, 
Haydon (2006) does not only treat respect as an attitude but also as a virtue, just 
as friendship is. Higher education systems on the African continent can engender 
respect by taking the views of students, staff and other stakeholders into 
systematic controversy. Respecting others implies treating them as rational 
beings and hence expecting that the views that people express in a teaching 
forum be considered on merit and not the status of the persons expressing the 
views. Given that the idea of respect has been mainly promoted in order to 
achieve the ends of friendship as Nussbaum suggests, aspects befitting the notion 
of cosmopolitan respect cannot be detrimental to friendship itself. Expecting 
reasons and asking for reasons is just a human moral obligation that universities 
on the African continent can enhance in advancing the ends of society in Africa. 
In this case, attitudes of hatred, xenophobia and other negative feelings towards 
others are detrimental to friendship and inimical to the idea of respect as much as 
ideals of „love‟ and „care‟ that do not live up to the demands of „universal respect 
for humanity‟ undermine cosmopolitan values (Haydon, 2006). 
The nuanced argument from Haydon (2006) makes a case for the exclusion of 
love and care within the frames of universal respect. A number of reasons are 
provided for this move. In the first case, love seems to operate within realms of 
individual contact and it tends to fade away with distance. One may also want to 
consider this as the natural condition of love as „love at first sight‟. A defence for 
love as a way of promoting respect can equally promote parochialism or 
sectarianism. On the other hand, the idea of care faces similar difficulties in the 
sense that it falls within interpersonal contexts and the conditions within which 
love and care can be exercised may not necessary create a sense of shared 
belonging or shared sense of fate across borders (Haydon, 2006: 461–462). 
Having considered the above, one can say that the notion of respect has a stable 
standing only when conceived from the neo-Kantian frames of doing to others 
what one would not want done to oneself, which eventually leads to the 
conception of human beings as living in a community of ends (Haydon, 2006: 
463). Hence, one can respect someone or something independently of how the 
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person or thing affects one‟s relationships or feelings towards certain things. This 
observation on the notion of respect calls for a recognition of persons or things 
merely as objects of respect. On the other hand, the idea that people  share a life 
in a community of ends was later picked by Rawls (1971), in a framework of a 
just society, to explain the fundamental human desire to live in a fair system of 
cooperation among equals, away from considerations of favouritism. In this 
regard, citizens see themselves as sharing the same world and caught up in the 
same structures of power and politics (Haydon, 2006: 463).  
Adopting the notion and practice of respect for persons as simply objects of 
respect demands a number of turning points in human practice and the 
organisation of higher education systems on the African continent. For example, 
it is not possible to pass judgement on the lives of others people while one is 
stuck in one‟s own perspectives. Similarly, one cannot make a fair assessment of 
the different forms of life and the different circumstances people find themselves 
in without at least understanding and sharing their experiences, in some way. 
Understanding the other implies trying to see reality from the other‟s point of 
view or standing in the others‟ shoes.  
While the attempt to see reality from the point of view of the other can imply that 
individual differences are taken into consideration, this does not mean respect is 
a kind of blind obedience to the other. One has to consider how one‟s speech and 
action would be understood in the world of the other, as much as the other would 
also have to take into consideration how his or her actions and speech would be 
understood in one‟s own world. In this sense respect becomes dialogic. Also at 
the heart of the notion of respect for the other is a concession that critiquing the 
other for what the other is and being open about it ensures that the other is not 
respected blindly. From these ideas, it is clear that if one claims that “respect” is 
one‟s reason for not taking the other person into systemic controversy, then one 
is actually disrespecting what personhood entails in the other.  
Respect for persons is itself grounded in respect for the rational and moral 
capacities that distinguish persons from other entities; and the individual 
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possibility of developing those capacities is grounded in a context that 
necessarily transcends the individual (Haydon, 2006: 469).  
This notion shifts from many implications that consider valuing the other for 
utilitarian purposes. It insists on seeing an intrinsic goodness in the other beyond 
one‟s local confinements, a cosmopolitan other. 
6.4   Concluding remarks 
This chapter has outlined central ideas that comprise a cosmopolitan perspective. 
Through this explanation I have also argued for the place of higher education 
systems in formulating cosmopolitan norms. Furthermore, I have argued that 
higher education institutions are the best possible places on the continent where 
cosmopolitan values can be nurtured and further promoted in society through the 
cultivation of appropriate civic virtues in students. This means that higher 
education systems should focus not just on the economic benefits of the system 
but also on the important civic role of the university as a central function where 
the autonomy of the university can be enhanced. Doing this will enable higher 
education systems on the African continent not fall victims of the impact of 
neoliberalism and globalisation. But at the same time higher education 
institutions would also manage prepare future citizens who can navigate between 
the local and the international.  
Taking the above position seriously has a number of implications for the way 
higher education is to be governed and conducted and the extent to which higher 
education considers intercultural aspects as integral to its functions. Higher 
education systems on the African continent are expected to recognise and 
promote different cultural contexts and not only privilege a few, if their mandate 
to cultivate respect is to succeed. Through this promotion, it is urged that culture 
will become a central element at the foundation of human life and not an element 
that has to be deconstructed. The cultural context is the milieu in which human 
beings find meaning and value. It is through the same cultural context that people 
discover new meanings of autonomy. As such overlooking this context in the 
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structuring and governance patterns of higher education would only be 
detrimental to the human life higher education claims to support and promote, as 
much as undermining its own autonomy. On the other hand, respecting different 
cultural contexts does not in itself mean that everything goes, as value pluralism 
seems to be claiming. The position of value pluralism stereotypes cultures and is 
antithetical to the claims of cosmopolitan values, let alone of deliberative 
autonomy.  
If the cosmopolitan norms are to be enhanced in higher education through 
democratic deliberative processes, it is important that cultural respect be equally 
recognised. In many circumstances, celebration of diversity seems to steal away 
or blur the importance of respecting inherent differences among people. In many 
cases, higher education systems have tended to promote the majority or superior 
culture over and above minority cultures. Given my line of argument in this 
chapter, it can be concluded that no celebration of people‟s diversity would be 
meaningful if the texture of the diversity is not properly recognised. Recognising 
this texture implies seeing why others are different and what makes them 
different. It goes to the extent of evaluating the grounds for difference which the 
different / other would understand as unique to itself and worth of recognition. 
Higher education institutions on the African continent cannot abrogate their duty 
towards the promotion of cosmopolitan values in which respect for the other is 
central.  
The task of making cosmopolitanism a reality is not foreign to the nature and 
functions of the African university, per se. This being the case, the promotion of 
friendship and respect cannot be adequately carried out outside the frames of 
democratic deliberation. In fact, democratic deliberation provides the conditions 
within which respect can be effective. As a member of a democratic society, one 
needs to be willing to listen to the ideas of others and to their reasons for what 
they think is true and of value to them. But one would not be doing them justice 
if one just listens and nods one‟s head at their ideas without taking their ideas 
and reasons into systematic controversy.  
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With regard to respecting the integrity of others, Beck (2006: 49) mentions one 
of the challenges facing a cosmopolitan perspective. When people begin to take 
cosmopolitanism for what it is and expects of them, they realise that 
cosmopolitanism demands that they have universal procedures or norms that 
should be upheld at all cost. These norms also have to do with instilling the 
notion of universal justice. Universal justice requires that people be fair across 
the board. Nevertheless, cosmopolitanism becomes challenged in the process of 
giving equal recognition to the voice and rights of others when doing so means 
giving way to forces that are inimical to the ends of a just society. Beck 
highlights that these inimical forces are actually predators of cosmopolitan 
norms. In this case, the cosmopolitan norms seem to allow the use of force 
against the rights of others if such rights are conceived to be detrimental to the 
ends of a just society. At the end, what makes cosmopolitan norms stand out is 
not what they aim at but what they aim to avoid at all cost (Beck, 2006: 59). In 
other words, cosmopolitan norms are intended to avoid annihilation of others and 
their cultures. Such a perspective puts a special responsibility on public 
institutions, such as higher education institutions on the African continent, not to 
be agents of conflict, ethnic cleansing, xenophobia and other evils to society.  
Some of the issues I have raised above particularly point to the difficulties of 
conducting education in a cosmopolitan world and /or a world that is denied 
being cosmopolitan, as could be seen in a number of African universities. One 
thing that the cosmopolitan perspective is challenging in education in general and 
in higher education in this particular case is people‟s capability to pose and 
reflect on the questions, What is education to us? What does higher education 
mean to us in our age? I have discussed how cosmopolitanism as a perspective 
can influence one‟s perceptions of the other, especially the distant other. I hold 
that through the norms of respect of the other for what the other is and through 
friendship, universities can begin to create a cosmopolitan citizen capable of 
facing the world with its multiple challenges.  
Biesta (2006: 147–149) answers this challenge for higher education as he 
proposes that what education can offer best is to create a world where individuals 
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share their worldly responsibilities, balanced between engagement and openness. 
According to Biesta (2006: 148), the challenge confronting higher education on 
the African continent is the “responsibility (to prepare) for what is to come, 
without knowledge of what is to come”. Higher education systems should 
manage to prepare future generations for what is to come without restricting the 
boundaries of what is to come because people have no knowledge of what is to 
come. This is where higher education has the responsibility to educate people for 
openness. Biesta‟s (2006) ideas propose a redirection in the way higher education 
is conceived and conducted. While some may be preoccupied with preparing 
students for global economic competitiveness, Biesta‟s (2006) understanding is 
that at the same time people cannot foretell the nature of future economic 
competitiveness. Hence their mandate lies in preparing future generations to take 
responsibility for the world in openness. Such openness, although influenced by 
local demands and circumstances, is not controlled by them. Higher education 
only does itself a favour by cultivating appropriate virtues and capabilities in 
students, which allow students to engage with their world in an open and friendly 
manner.   
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CHAPTER 7 
THE CIVIC ROLE OF UNIVERSITIES: SOME CONCLUDING 
REFLECTIONS 
7.1  The civic role of African universities  
In this dissertation, I have argued that liberal autonomy is relevant to African 
higher education governance systems on the grounds that no university can 
meaningfully perform its mandate in any society if its system does not seem to 
favour rationality and promote objectivity among its students, staff and 
surrounding affiliates. In my view, a liberal conception of autonomy is also 
constituted by the capacity of higher education systems to promote critical 
thinking, authenticity and responsibility within one‟s local environment. This 
position shift the liberal conception to a liberal communitarian position but at the 
same time avoids the dangers of becoming another grand narrative. The 
discussion in Chapter 4, Section 4.5.7 has raised the point that every education 
system, higher education or not, inherently aims to achieve some good both in 
individuals and in society in general. No system would be called an education 
system if it promotes perversion of the values that people who subscribe to the 
system have. The direct opposite of education is of course indoctrination, while a 
weaker form of education would be the route of technical education. I have not 
dwelt on the latter because they are not the focus of this dissertation. Technical 
education in itself does not provide enough grounds for the cultivation of 
character, especially one that is aligned to cosmopolitan values. 
One other crucial element of liberal autonomy, which in my view acts as a 
seedbed for the civic role of the university, is the idea of community, whether 
community may be considered from the point of view of an encumbered self or 
an unencumbered self. In this discussion I have made a preferential option for a 
position of liberal autonomy that is rooted in and informed by the self-
understanding of one‟s circumstances. In this regard, I have argued that 
university or institutional autonomy and academic freedom in Africa need to be 
understood within the context of the social, historical, economic, political and 
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cultural factors that inform the purposes of higher education governance in 
Africa. Truly, these claims promote a communitarian liberal conception of 
autonomy within African higher education system. The liberal communitarian 
position is the main position that informs me of the possible civic role of higher 
education in Africa within a cosmopolitan perspective. Within the liberal 
communitarian understanding of autonomy, universities can manage to negotiate 
between their local demands and needs while at the same time paying adequate 
attention to what makes a university be what it is. The liberal communitarian 
position also has better chances of mitigating the negative influences of both 
neoliberalism and globalisation on higher education institutions on the African 
continent. 
African universities can move towards achieving their cosmopolitan goals by 
maintaining universities as public spaces engaging in a critical and reflective 
manner in the life of society, its politics as well as its economics. Universities 
can do this by incorporating into the various disciplines critical thinking skills 
and other necessary rational dispositions. My usage of the views of Gutmann and 
Thompson (2004) has shown that nations cannot be democratic if schools are not 
any way close to promoting democratic deliberation. I have argued further that 
although Gutmann and Thompson (2004) seem to have their focus on schools in 
general, a country‟s education system is a manifestation of the kind of teachers in 
the schools and that the teachers are themeslves products of their own training. 
This connection put enormous obligations on the university system in so far as 
developing citizenship virtues is concered.  
Universities on the African continent conduct their business in environments that 
are riddled with a number of inequalities due to colonialism, tribal politics and 
many other social ills. Despite these conditions, universities world-wide are also 
known for their potential to create economic gaps in societies between those who 
have a university education and those who did not make it. This double challenge 
puts the African university that aims at achieving cosmopolitan justice in a 
difficult position. One way of resolving this paradox is for the university to first 
acknowledge its challenges and the relevant characteristics of life within which it 
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is operating. The university in Africa needs to engage in an honest interrogation 
of its circumstances and the possible ways through which it can ameliorate the 
conditions of inequality and injustice in society. Such a path can be achieved by 
taking all affected parties on board where the university through its functions of 
teaching and research takes the problems into systematic controversy using 
deliberation. Poverty, conflict and armed struggle can be minimised through 
universities‟ abilities to mediate between people‟s reflexive thoughts, thereby 
generating inclusive solutions to the problems. 
7.2 A synopsis of the project, its foundations and the researcher’s 
position 
The questions that have been raised through this thesis were formed after a 
period of entertaining simplistic conceptions about the operations of autonomy 
and its relationship to higher education governance. At the heart of these 
simplistic conceptions was the view, which I held rather uncritically, that 
autonomy exists in split opposites, that a situation is autonomous or not simply 
based on whether it is determined or not. This position leans heavily on liberal 
individualism. In its simplistic version, to a large extent ascribable to the 
influence of some modern philosophers such as Spinoza, Nozick and many more, 
this position does not recognise autonomy in conditions that are determined, 
irrespective of the forms of determinism. I also thought that this simple equation 
between freedom and lack of external influence should apply in cases at all 
times. When I began reflecting on higher education practices, I was taken aback 
by the realisation that the version of autonomy I was relying on was very 
simplistic and depended on problematic assumptions. I assumed that an 
autonomous higher education institution should have the freedom to teach 
whomsoever it wants to teach in whatever way it chooses, as well as the freedom 
to choose whom to hire, without regard of external influence and circumstances. 
Some academics today still propose this format of understanding academic 
freedom and institutional autonomy. An examination of forms of the encumbered 
self and situated autonomy led me to a re-examination of some of the positions I 
had assumed as philosophical fact and inevitable. 
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In this re-examination, I began to ask myself, Is it possible for a public system to 
claim autonomy, in full awareness of its public role? Is it possible for a 
university to claim autonomy when it is controlled by the state? Does the claim 
to live and organise life and institutions according to the local demands, as is the 
case with many African institutions, mean that such institutions have become 
communitarian and that they have necessarily juxtaposed themselves against 
liberalism and that they are not autonomous? I came to the conclusion that some 
of the views I held regarding autonomy and the activities of the university and 
what it meant to be communitarian in outlook were too simplistic. This personal 
repositioning of understanding engendered the quest to understand the different 
forms of autonomy and the need to investigate whether liberal conceptions of 
autonomy are relevant in governance arrangements of higher education systems 
on the African continent and the extent to which such liberal conceptions can 
enhance governance arrangements in Africa‟s higher education systems.  
The above question, which has become central to this work, examines two key 
issues. On the one hand I have scrutinised the liberal tradition and analysed the 
different strains of liberalism. Notably, my discussion has centred on 
distinguishing between conceptions of autonomy that tilt towards a negative 
liberty from those that are prone to positive liberty. I have made a preferential 
option for positive conceptions of autonomy and defended the conception of a 
situated self as a preferred and meaningful understanding of an autonomous self. 
Inevitably this discourse has led my thinking to be grounded on a liberal 
communitarian philosophical position. Within this position, I discovered a route 
that still positions liberal conceptions of autonomy to be relevant to higher 
education governance on the African continent due particularly to the challenges 
facing African higher education systems. On the other hand, I have examined 
how different higher education systems are governed on the African continent. I 
have done this through a purposive sampling of nine countries and examined the 
higher education systems, which also happen to be public. In almost all the cases, 
there are clear claims indicating that the systems are autonomous by people who 
have done some empirical studies on the systems. But given the nature of this 
exercise, my first task, among others, has been to take such claims to systematic 
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controversy. According to this analysis, most of the claims of autonomy amount 
to constitutional regulation or legislation of the university by the state as 
autonomous institutions. In addition, I have also discussed the fact that a number 
of these cases show instances of heavy state presence in the operations of higher 
education institutions. While one would be drawn to conclude that such cases 
reveal lack of autonomy, this dissertation argues that the presence of the state 
through funding and other mechanisms is not a sufficient indicator for lack of 
autonomy. There is more involved in assessing whether a higher education 
institution is autonomous than a simple stratification of governance 
arrangements. The processes through which the state becomes involved in thee 
running of the higher education system are crucial for any assessment of 
autonomy or lack thereof. Again, I have argued that conditioning higher 
education institutions to be responsive to the local demands of society does not 
per se amount to lack of academic freedom and institutional autonomy. I have 
argued for a deliberative engagement between all stakeholders in higher 
education in Africa as one of the conditions for an autonomous institution. 
In concluding the examination of governance arrangements on the African 
continent, I have argued that these arrangements show more signs of being 
nonliberal. This is exemplified by the fact that in some cases there is no 
distinction between the state and the higher education sector, as is the case in 
Egypt. While most state presidents are at the same time chancellors of the higher 
education system, their chancellorship is not only titular but affect appointments 
and policy directions in the higher education systems itself. Such occurrence 
become indicative of a lack of deliberative engagement between stakeholders and 
is likely to lead to institutions of higher learning becoming less autonomous. In 
cases where co-operative governance is in place, there is a conception that 
government, the university and society are equal partners in the governance of 
the higher education system. The only problem that exists in these cases is that 
some people think, and rightly so, that the way government handles issues 
relating to the higher education sector goes beyond equal partnership and 
stakeholdership and gravitates towards government control. This form of control 
is viewed as the main source for the erosion of the basis for university autonomy 
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and academic freedom (Jansen, 2004: 4) because the changes taking place both 
in the legislative concept and the practice of higher education constitute a 
“gradual but systematic erosion of historical standards of autonomy that were 
ingrained within the institutional fabric of universities” (Jansen, 2004: 5).  
The belief that governance of the higher education sector on the African 
continent is far from being liberal becomes justified by the tendency to operate 
the higher education sector as part of state machinery. In so far as the voice of 
the state carries more weight than the voices of other stakeholders in the 
governance structures, such arrangements can be regarded as nonliberal and 
merely tools of political engineering. The fact that appointments are made on 
political and not professional grounds, as has been reported to be the case in 
Egypt and Zimbabwe, and the fact that tertiary education is still considered as 
part of a national project of self-development and self-realisation, as Sawyer 
(1994:25) shows, points to the fact that states do not want to allow the higher 
education sector to determine its own course of life (to be autonomous). This is 
so despite the states‟ claims that their higher education systems are autonomous 
merely by virtue of  their legislative frameworks. Such a condition can only 
indicate smaller levels of autonomy rather that full-blown autonomous practices. 
Similarly, such instances may have few elements of the constitute elements of 
liberal autonomy as discussed earlier in this dissertation. 
The queue from an original conception of higher education governance and 
autonomy has led me to the examination of the development of higher education 
systems in places like Germany, England and the United States in order to 
discover common elements regarding the governance of these institutions. By 
way of conclusion, I have made the point that no one system of higher education 
can claim to have one determining pattern in so far as reason, culture and 
excellence are concerned. A system becomes known as favouring the cultural 
pattern when it shows that more of its characteristics lean towards and emphasise 
the university as the place for the recreation of culture. I have argued that such a 
claim does not in any way imply that the same system may not have elements 
that promote the domination of reason or values of excellence. Similarly, 
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questions of university autonomy will also have to be interpreted differently 
given that the different systems are likely to understand autonomy from their 
unique and privileged positions. 
Using Readings (1996) I have highlighted possible conceptions of autonomy and 
their ramifications for autonomy. The idea of the University of Excellence is 
closely connected with ideas of neo-liberalism and globalisation. I have used this 
model to argue that globalisation and neo-liberalism have irretrievably pushed 
the identity of the university into a corporate identity (Considine & Marginson, 
2000: 41). This discussion connects issues of globalisation, neo-liberalism, 
cosmopolitanism and higher education discourse.   
On autonomy, I have argued that there are various claims to autonomy made by 
each system, which are so diverse that no single picture of autonomy can be 
constructed, and that the claims are far from meaning the same thing. My 
discussion on autonomy is influenced by the quest to find forms of autonomy 
that speak more to the African experiences of higher education than the general 
conceptions of autonomy that one can find in the history of philosophy. 
Nevertheless, such a quest cannot overlook the historical shapes that the concept 
has taken. My examination of Skinner‟s (1998) distinctions between the liberty 
of the ancients and that of the moderns rests on this reason.  
The dominant picture I have tried to provide on the issue of autonomy indicates 
that autonomy or liberty can be understood either as a factor of the group or of 
the individual. As a factor of the group, notions of liberty exist indistinct of the 
communities of practice. Once a society is considered free, individuals living 
within it are also considered free and their freedom is not regarded as prior to 
that of the community but only as a factor of the community. This view 
inherently disregards the recognition of individuality and the making of meaning 
that individuals attach to life. One cannot dismiss the fact that liberty primarily 
belongs to individuals. Nevertheless, I have tended to prefer the second option, 
which upholds individual liberty in the sense of a living autonomous self that is 
at the same time encumbered in its life circumstances. Despite the lack of a 
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homogenous position in this line of thought, I maintain that when autonomy is 
considered as part of the whole life of a person or corporate body, the conception 
is better positioned to promote the good for which the person or body exists. It is 
in this recognition of the situatedness of being that the concept of a deliberative 
process of engagement can also be sustained.  
I have personally attached much importance to questions of autonomy per se. At 
the back of my mind is a conviction that clarity on conceptions of autonomy 
assists in understanding educational issues because education and autonomy are 
internally linked. Gutmann and Thompson (2004: 35) argue that the public 
schooling system in any democracy is appropriately placed to prepare future free 
and equal citizens. By implication, this thinking would mean that the educational 
discourse finds its proper place within the frames of autonomy, among other 
things. Hence Gutmann and Thompson (2004) also argue that if there is no 
deliberation in public schools, it is less likely that this would exist in other 
institutions. By aiming at developing the individual‟s capacity to think and form 
opinions of one‟s own, among other things, education aims at developing 
people‟s autonomy. This is more the reason I consider analysing the type of 
relationship needed between education and autonomy, therefore transferring such 
discourse to implications for higher education and African higher education 
systems in particular. This confirms Kirk‟s (1955: 16–17) position, in reference 
to the life of the university in its beginnings, that “the academy possessed 
freedom unknown to other bodies and persons because the philosopher, the 
scholar, and the student were looked upon as men consecrated to the service of 
truth; and that truth was not simply a purposeless groping after miscellaneous 
information, but a wisdom to be obtained, however imperfectly, from a 
teleological search”.  
In the subsequent chapters, I have argued that the challenges facing higher 
education institutions on the African continent cannot be considered as complete 
if one does not at the same time consider how the mandate of the public 
university to creating future citizens can be carried out efficiently given that the 
world no more operates in segmented units in so far as the knowledge economy 
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is concerned. I have noted that neo-liberalism and globalisation have become the 
major characteristics of the corporate world today. Despite the fact that that these 
major characteristics both have external origins to Africa, they interlace in 
important ways. Neo-liberalism can be seen as global just as globalisation can be 
seen as neo-liberal. Underlying both of these ideologies is a conception of liberty 
that promotes the individual and activities linked to the promotion of the 
individual. When neo-liberalism and globalisation are considered from the way 
they influence discourse and governance approaches in African higher education 
systems, the African universities have to negotiate – or struggle – with both in 
their reconfigurations as well as transformation towards „localised‟ relevance and 
„globalised‟ recognition and competence. This is because what is considered 
African is in many ways community oriented.  
I have further noted that because of differential development paces between 
Africa , generally regarded as the third world, and many countries of the northern 
hemisphere, generally regard as the first world, neo-liberalism and globalisation, 
when applied to higher education governance on the Africa continent, force a 
compromise between internationalisation and localisation. But in their efforts to 
develop societies and their own institutions, higher education systems on the 
African continent bargain between the need for international recognition and 
relevance on the one hand and the need to remain relevant to the local needs on 
the other hand. In furthering this argument, I have looked at Delanty (2004), who 
argues that the different conceptions of the university are relational. This position 
entails a fundamental critique of what constitutes modernity and the role of the 
university as a key institution in modernity. In this conception, modernity is not 
an end to reason and culture but rather serves as a progressive extension of 
different forms of communication into all spheres of society (Delanty, 2004: 
244–245). Delanty does not think that the corporate identity of the university 
replaces other identities of the university such as the ideal of reason and culture. 
As such academic freedom can exist alongside market freedom as the university 
negotiates its course of life, and the presence of neo-liberal practices in the 
university does not mean the end of the University of Reason. Such an 
understanding squarely places the identity of any university within the lived 
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experiences and practices of the communities the university operates in. 
Similarly, conceptions and practices of institutional autonomy and academic 
freedom can only make sense within a liberal communitarian perspective.  
In Chapter 6 I have discussed cosmopolitan citizenship and the role of higher 
education, particularly the extent to which the cosmopolitan norm can assist in 
reshaping higher education autonomy discourse on the African continent. The 
discussion on cosmopolitanism has started with an initial distinction with regard 
to the concept of globalisation. In this case I understand globalisation as the 
broadening of the economic market to operate at a global or worldwide level. On 
the other hand, I have used cosmopolitanism mainly in the way Benhabib (2006) 
and Appiah (2006) use it. These scholars use the idea of cosmopolitanism to 
represent the broadening of an outlook that promotes the connection of human 
beings irrespective of their national or societal boundaries. Cosmopolitanism 
concentrates on “what is human in humanity” (Appiah, 2006: 134). In this case 
all human beings are primarily conceived as citizens of the world.  
The conception of people as citizens of the world is centrally connected to the 
democratic theory. In this dissertation I have shown my inclination towards a 
deliberative model of democracy. Such a model is seen to operate alongside a 
cosmopolitan perspective if considered from the angle of Benhabib‟s discursive 
community rather than John Rawls‟ basic just society. Cosmopolitanism affirms 
the connection of human beings in their skills, imagination, as well as their 
common potential. This conception of a cosmopolitan person is the main leeway 
for cosmopolitan values in African higher education systems as well as other 
systems.  
Cosmopolitanism designates matters relating to both identity and responsibility 
(Brock & Brighouse, 2005: 2–3). At the level of identity, cosmopolitanism 
indicates that human existence or life is influenced by different cultures. In other 
words, it is not possible to find uniquely homogenous aspects of life in different 
countries. Forms of life that one finds in one place, although they may have 
features particular to the local environment in which they are found, are not 
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purely influenced by the local environment. At another level, the level of 
responsibility, cosmopolitanism believes that individual human lives are 
focussed outwardly and are concerned about obligations that are not only local 
and obvious but relate to the distant other as well. A cosmopolitan perspective is 
interested in the obligations people have to others beyond the framework of 
friends and relatives and in a situation where nation-states no longer act as 
reference points for the different activities that people carry out and the demands 
that they make (Brock & Brighouse, 2005; Dwyer, 2004). This form of 
belonging creates a sense of inclusion for different groups of people as they 
make claims beyond the thresholds of their particular nationalities.  
A take on the cosmopolitan norms leaves a number of implications for the 
governance of higher education institutions on the African continent. Among 
other things, higher education systems on the African continent are expected to 
recognise and promote different cultural contexts and not only privilege a few 
(see Haydon, 2006). If the cultural context is the milieu in which human beings 
find meaning and value, undermining this context in the structuring of higher 
education would itself be detrimental to the human life higher education claims 
to support and promote. Yet again the duty to promote different cultural contexts 
cannot be meaningful outside a deliberative democratic culture. This means that 
higher education systems on the African continent need to be modelled within 
the frames of deliberative democratic values and norms. Genuine deliberative 
processes have the capacity of building respect and recognition of differences 
between people with different backgrounds, which is normally the case in any 
higher education setting on the continent. 
Cosmopolitan norms are better positioned in creating conditions of justice for all 
on the African continent. The patterns of higher education on the African 
continent that I have analysed in Chapter 2 point to a picture of higher education 
that carries along elements emanating from its colonial past, which in many ways 
has not fostered equality for all people. Two clear examples in this regard include 
the fragmented system of higher education on which co-operative governance is 
being built in South Africa. A number of the examples also show how political 
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influences such as the hiring and firing of high-ranking personnel on political 
grounds, the insufficient numbers of enrolment to offset the effects of 
underdevelopment and many more can tarnish the image higher education has on 
the continent. In view of these factors I have argued for a system of higher 
education governance that allows the university some freedom but one that 
manages to offer a critical examination of the lived circumstances of people and 
their worldview. This is the situated autonomy that carries elements of both 
liberalism and communitarians. This proposal for higher education autonomy on 
the continent is in tandem with Africa‟s experiences as well as giving space for 
universities to be globally competitive in the knowledge economy. Biesta (2006) 
summarises the cosmopolitan challenges for higher education by arguing that 
what education can offer best is to create a world where individuals share their 
worldly responsibilities, balanced between engagement and openness. Hence 
higher education on the African continent is endowed with a “responsibility for 
what is to come, without knowledge of what is to come” (Biesta, 2006: 148).  
7.3  Some limitations of this study 
As I sit back and reflect on the process of writing this dissertation, I imagine 
academic challenges to the ideas I have about the nature and function of higher 
education on the African continent. Some of these challenges I have already met. 
In particular, I will endeavour to answer one possible challenge in this space: that 
the work is too idealistic or too theoretical for educational purposes, and if 
anything, just another grand narrative that can address Africa‟s problems.. 
Imagining this possible challenge takes me back to my chosen methodological 
framework. This work is an example of possible works open to students in the 
area of philosophy of education. Hence by its nature this work is not supposed to 
be empirical as some would envisage. The analysis of governance structures on 
the continent did not require special empirical investigation into such practices 
because a great deal of data is already available on how higher education 
governance is managed on the African continent and other continents. Hence the 
sampling of cases to closely examine has also been a purposive random sampling 
merely based on sufficient available material already recorded about a specific 
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higher education system. Secondly, I consider the fact that a philosophical 
analysis in the domains of critical inquiry, in which this work is rooted, would fit 
in any other case that one may think about. Any possible case – countries not 
included in the sample of countries and their higher education – would not 
necessarily create methodological and philosophical discomfort. 
Thirdly, this dissertation does not propose another grand narrative that is 
insensitive to the needs of Africa and its higher education system. The 
proposition for the cultivation of a cosmopolitan citizenship is made in view of 
clear challenges to such a project. Some of the challenges include the idea that 
higher education discourse on the African continent is better off concentrating on 
regional networking and collaboration. While this move is good for the life of 
higher education, governance of universities does not need to restrict itself to 
preparing simply an African citizen who will fit and operate in an African 
society. Doing so would mean dividing Africa to social, geographical and 
political boundaries. Current society and the vision of members of different 
societies today are not confined to their geo-political boundaries. Such 
boundaries confine thoughts about selfhood to local ethnic belonging than 
belonging to the whole human race. It is on such grounds that irrespective of the 
negative effects of globalisation and neoliberalism on higher education systems 
in Africa, I still propose a move towards the cultivation of a cosmopolitan and 
deliberative citizen in higher education systems. 
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